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1. INTRODUCTION 
Analysis of present experience in the operation, 
maintenance, and testing of different systems in nuclear 
power plants points out the need of giving more attention 
to human reliability research. . The contribution of human 
reliability to overall nuclear power plant performance 
is evident from the many serious events in which human 
error was one of the major contributing causes. 
In assessing human reliability in nuclear plants, 
one needs a good and reliable tool to model and analyze 
human performance while conducting different tasks. 
A data bank with a content that expresses, in so far as 
possible, the actual operational experience is also needed 
to assure, when used as input data for the models, 
yielding applicable results. 
The present work addresses these two needs for the 
nuclear field. The models are covered in Chapters Two 
through Five. The reader will find through the literature 
survey in Chapter Two a brief description of some methods 
that have been developed to quantify the human performance 
in man-machine systems. In this chapter, different human 
reliability modeling and analysis techniques are reviewed. 
Also reviewed are the different efforts that have been done 
2 
in constructing human performance data banks for the 
operation, maintenance, and testing tasks in nuclear power 
plants. 
Chapter Three addresses the technique for Human Error 
Rate Prediction known as "THERP" stressing its applicability 
in the nuclear field. The five steps of the modeling 
technique "THERP" are explained in detail with the aim of 
efficiently carrying out each step to make an accurate 
determination of human factors contribution to the operational 
reliability of nuclear power plants. Special emphasis is 
given to the role of performance shaping factors, which 
affect the human reliability in situations such as power 
plant operation, maintenance, and testing, in the assessment 
of human reliability. Some relevant human performance 
shaping factors in nuclear power plants are highlighted 
in a review of Licensee Event Reports. Methods by 
which these factors can be used for quantitative determina­
tion of human reliability are discussed. At the end of 
Chapter Three, an illustrative example is given which 
shows how the "THERP" is used to quantify the human 
contribution to the failure of a nuclear power system 
during the task of restoring valves after testing. 
Another developed modeling technique for human tasks. 
System Analysis of Integrated Networks of Tasks, "SAINT", 
is discussed in Chapter Four. Critical evaluation of the 
3 
"THERP" and the "SAINT" techniques showed that although 
the latter has never been used in the nuclear field it 
is more flexible, has promising features for human engineering 
studies of complex systems, and has more nuclear relevance 
than the static technique "THEKP" currently used in 
nuclear safety analysis. The flexibility and nuclear 
relevance of "SAINT" are illustrated in a case study in 
Chapter Five. The case study addresses a significant 
event that occurred at one of the operating nuclear power 
plants in the U.S.A. and is concerned with the contribution 
of different human errors to the unavailability of all 
on-site power sources in the nuclear power station. "SAINT" 
with its wider capabilities is used to simulate this event 
with all the dynamic interactions of tasks, resources and 
state variables involved. 
Turning to the second need, suitable and adequate 
data for the use in the models, effort is devoted in 
Chapter Six to investigate the availability of data banks 
for human reliability analysis in nuclear power plants. 
The present data sources are surveyed and evaluated 
exploring the main deficiencies. A developed classification 
scheme for human related events is proposed. The scheme 
includes simple codes for presenting different information 
matrices and the necessary description of the event. 
Specific recommendations on how to realistically include 
4 
the man-machine interface are given and an addition of a 
developed format of a supplementary data sheet for human 
performance to the current Licensee Event Report is suggested. 
Data analysis with qualitative and quantitative 
evaluation is presented in Chapter Seven, using the 
information matrices in the developed description formats. 
5 
2. LITERATURE SURVEY 
The contributions of human reliability to overall 
nuclear plant systems reliability are gaining more 
attention after the TMI-2 accident. Past and present 
studies point to the fact that the frequency and 
consequences of human errors warrant closer attention. 
Historically, in analyzing the man-machine systems, 
the man is treated as the most difficult and multidimen­
sional component in the system. An early study by 
129 Taylor , presented a man-machine system (MMS) in which 
the man was considered an essential component of the model. 
The study devoted special attention to: 
1. The display link through which the machine component(s) 
communicate with the human component through the 
information displays. These information sources 
constitute potential sources of input to the human 
component (s) (McComack^ )^. 
2. The control link which involves the response 
execution stage in the MMS model where the skills 
and abilities of the worker typically enter the 
system through his manipulation of different 
controls (Fleishman^ )^. Many human errors can be 
committed during the manipulation of controls 
(Fitts and Jones^ )^. 
6 
The quantitative assessment of human performance 
in MMS and the development of predictive methods in human 
reliability engineering, are the main subjects that occupy 
most research areas in human reliability engineering. 
118 In 1964, Swain discussed some problems in the 
quantification of human performance reliability in the 
MMSs. These problems include complexity and subjectivity 
of available quantification methods and grossness of 
assumptions behind these methods. Swain pointed out the 
need for the development of an improved human performance 
data bank and improved models for human tasks (Williams^ ^^ ) . 
The first effort to provide available data for the 
development of error prediction methods was done in 1962 
by Altman and his colleagues at the American Institute of 
1 83 Research (Altman , Payne and Altman ). The work of Altmar. 
was directed towards the development of an operability index 
for some controls and displays. Three objectives were 
set for this index: 
1. It would be task oriented. 
2. Scores from the operability index would be directly 
meaningful in terms of time and error probability of 
performance (speed and reliability). 
3. Data on speed and reliability would be obtained, 
insofar as possible, from available experimental 
and field data. 
7 
Altman and his colleagues searched through several 
thousand sources for the data on the effect of design 
dimensions on the performance and found 164 reports 
including usable data. As the data available were 
incomplete, extrapolations, interpolations, and judgments 
were necessary in the compilation. The resulting 
reliability estimates and performance times were compiled 
to form the AIR DATA STORE. Although the AIR DATA 
STORE was a significant contribution to the state-of-the-
art, its application was limited to discrete procedural 
tasks and it lacked the capability of predicting the 
ultimate effect of errors on the overall system. 
An extension of the AIR DATA STORE collected by 
Altman and his colleagues was the development of a method 
for evaluating the human error contribution to system 
degradation. The method is called "TKERP" (Technique 
for Human Error Rate Prediction) and was developed by 
THERP is based upon reliability 
theory and other methods used by reliability engineers and 
uses the AIR DATA STORE as a main source of input data 
beside some probability measures from other sources 
including expert judgments. The model has been used 
primarily to provide quantitative predictions of system 
degradation resulting from human errors in association 
with equipment reliability, operational procedures, and 
8 
other system characteristics which influence human 
behavior. THERP differs from the AIR DATA STORE in that 
it is (theoretically at least) capable of dealing with 
continuous as well as discrete behaviors and of accounting 
for dependent as well as independent operations. 
In 1966, a new technique was developed to measure 
the probability of task accomplishment as well as performance 
completion times for tasks involved in MMSs. The technique 
is called TEPPS^ '^^ ^^  (Technique for Establishing Personnel 
Performance Standards) and can be used to quantitatively 
determine the effectiveness of system design changes and 
to identify the system critical components that are major 
contributors to errors. System evaluation is accomplished 
using models more difficult than that used in THERP, 
but the quantitative analyses to derive the overall 
reliability estimate still follow the multiplicative 
pattern. Developers of the TEPPS prefer using quantitative 
expert judgments of task performance reliability rather 
than data from the AIR DATA STORE. 
102 Siegel and Wolf developed a computer model to evaluate 
operator reliability in performing a specific task. The 
task in that model was divided into constituent subtasks 
for which specific data were previously compiled from 
the best available sources. The model was then used to 
simulate the task performance, calculate stress, intensity. 
9 
urgency, execution time, and performance success probability 
for each subtask and for the whole task, 
128 Sriyanada and Towill applied the Kalman filter tech­
nique to the problems of predicting human operator performance 
in the execution of a wide variety of tasks described by 
an improved exponential model. Results of industrial 
case studies involving mechanical and electrical assemblies 
showed that realistic predictions can be made even when 
the model parameters are nonstationary. 
Many other methods used for human performance 
quantification in MMSs are generally partitioned into 
two main areas ; analysis of historical data and modeling 
of behavior processes. Their overall goals are to measure 
and predict the effect of the operator on equipment/system 
performance and the effect of the equipment/system on the 
operator behavior. Some of these methods were described 
earlier, to make the representation of this point shorter, 
these methods and some others are listed in Table 2.1 
with the available sources for more details. 
In the nuclear field, several attempts have been 
made to analyze the effects of human reliability on 
12T 
nuclear power plants. Swain " applied his modeling 
technique THERP to specifically determine the human 
factor contribution to the operational reliability of 
nuclear power plants. 
10 
Table 2.1. List of some human performance predictive 
methods 
METHOD SOURCES 
OPERABILITY METHODS 
Analytic 
AIR DATA STORE - American Institute 
for Research 83 
THERP - Technique for Human Error 
Rate Prediction 116, 119, 120, 124 
TEPPS - Technique for Establishing 
Personnel Performance Standards 17, 112 
Pickrel/McDonald method 83 
Berry/Wulff method 15 
Throughput method 72 
Askren/Regulinski method 4, 5, 87 
DEI - Display Evaluation Index 104, 105 
Personnel Performance Metric 19a 
CHPAE - Critical Human Performance 
and Evaluative Program 9 
Simulation 
Digital simulation method 102, 103, 106 
TACDEN 76 
Boolean Predictive Technique 43 
HOS - Human Operator Simulator 132, 133 
ORACLE - Operations Research and 
Critical Link Evaluator 16, 113 
Personnel Subsystem Effectiveness 
method 46 
11 
Table 2.1. (Continued) 
METHOD SOURCES 
MAINTAINABILITY METHODS 
ERUPT - Elementary Reliability Unit 
Parameter Technique 13, 66 
PRI - Personnel Reliability Index 3 
MIL-HDBK 472 Prediction Methods 74 
12 
One of the important studies in nuclear safety was 
the WASH-1400 . Several methods have been used to 
calculate system availability such as fault tree analysis, 
event tree analysis, and failure mode and effect analysis. 
Those methods have been successfully applied to power 
production systems using computer codes for their 
automatic evaluation^ '^^ '^^ °'^ '^^ '^^ '^^ ^^ . In WASH-
86 1400 , fault trees were used to provide a systematic 
method relating failure probabilities to system performance. 
Human errors as basic events appear in most of the man-
machine interfaces on the fault trees. Conservative 
estimates of human response under emergency situations 
were made and THERP was used to examine the human 
contribution to the operational reliability of light 
water nuclear power plants. 
29 Emon and Becar presented a method for system reliabil­
ity analysis known as "GO." The technique was specifically 
utilized to evaluate the reliability of gas-cooled 
reactor scram system including human interfaces. The 
GO code is a non-Monte Carlo method utilizing probability 
.tree analysis. This code was utilized to estimate the 
effects of significant human actions during accident 
sequences and their resulting impacts on HTGR safety and 
to review in detail the current practices for normal 
13 
surveillance and test procedures and their respective 
impact on HTGR safety (Becar et al.^ '^^ )^. 
In 1978, an updated version of the SAINT (System Analysis 
o f  I n t e g r a t e d  N e t w o r k s  o f  T a s k s w a s  
published by researchers in the U.S. Air Force Aerospace 
Medical Research Laboratory at Wright-Patterson AFB. 
SAINT is a network modeling and simulation technique 
developed to assist in the design and analysis of complex 
man-machine systems. SAINT consists of a symbol set 
for modeling system and a complete program for analyzing 
such a model. It provides the conceptual framework which 
allows the development of system models in which man, 
machines, and the environment are represented. SAINT 
permits the assessment of the effect of component 
characteristics of the system on the overall system 
performance. In fact, SAINT has wider capabilities 
and more nuclear relevance than other models such as 
7"3 
THERP. This fact was discussed by Metwally et al. 
and will be a part of this study. 
Although data on human errors in nuclear power 
plants are limited and noisy, many efforts were made 
in order to put the present available data in a reliability 
94 
oriented format. Sabri et al. offered a taxonomy of 
occurrences, types and effects, for the Ft, St. Vrain 330-
MW(e) HTGR plant. The report showed that most of the 
14 
difficulties arising in the operation of the plant were 
attributed to human errors. 
53 Husseiny et al. suggested a taxonomy of operation 
tasks and operator errors (their causes and stresses). The 
developed quantification scheme provides a consistent and 
systematic method for error data collection, updating, 
smoothing, storage, and retrieval for use in reliability 
95 
analysis and for regulatory review purposes. Sabri et al. 
proposed an exponential model for evaluation of operator 
reliability. This model was verified by Joos and Sabri^  ^and 
58 Joos et al. to be applied in nuclear power plants operation 
using available data on human errors that have been reported 
during the operation of commercial light water reactors. The 
analysis assumed a constant human error rate model and a com­
puter program was developed to determine the time distribution 
of observed errors and to calculate estimated error spectrum. 
Sabri^  ^developed a systematic methodology to be utilized 
in establishing a human error data base in nuclear 
plants. Special emphases were given to identification of 
critical safety systems/components affected by human errors, 
failure modes, and error causes and consequences. A two years 
period of operation data in commercial light water reactors 
was retrieved from actual plant operation records, including 
the Licensee Event Reports (LERs). Unique factors to be 
15 
considered in the quantification of human error vis-a-vis 
hardware failure were pointed out. 
58 Joos et al. offered a review of experience in operation 
of U.S. commercial nuclear power plants over a 25 month 
period. The reports accumulated in that period on events 
of human error and component failure were examined to 
evaluate the gross operator error rates. The impact of 
such errors on plant operation and safety was examined 
through the use of proper taxonomies of errors, tasks, 
and failures. Four categories of human errors were 
considered, namely operator, maintenance, installation, 
and administration. The computed error rates were found 
to be significant to a varying degree in both BI-TR and 
This emphasized the importance of considering human factors 
in safety and reliability analysis of nuclear systems. 
The results also indicated that human errors, and especially 
operator errors, do indeed follow the exponential 
reliability model. 
126 Swain and Guttmann developed a "Handbook of Human Re­
liability Analysis with the Emphasis on Nuclear Plant Applica­
tion. " The purpose of this handbook is to aid qualified per­
sons in evaluating the effects of human error on the availa­
bility of engineered safety features and systems in nuclear 
power plants. The handbook expands the human error analysis 
presented in WASH-1400, and includes principles of human 
16 
behavior and ergonomics, analytical procedures, mathe­
matical models, and hijman error data derived from related 
performance measures and experience. The derived data 
represent human error probabilities that should be adequate 
to determine merits of different configurations of equipment, 
procedures, and operating practices within a plant, and 
for gross comparisons among plants. Limitations of the 
present handbook and cautions to be observed in its use are 
explicitly stated. 
During the time from December 2 through December 7, 
1979, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
(IEEE), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USKRC), and 
the Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) conducted a 
O C 
standards workshop on "Human Factors and Nuclear Safety" . 
The principal objective of the workshop was to evaluate 
the human in the environment of the present generation 
power stations. To meet this goal, four tasks to be 
addressed during the meeting were identified by the 
Steering Committee : 
1. To identify and evaluate methods of analyzing 
human actions or errors as modified by those 
conditions present within nuclear station 
design. 
2. To assess the state-of-the-art of human factors 
as it relates to nuclear safety, and make 
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recommendations for future research efforts 
needed to help in the quantitative process and 
to enhance the performance of the operator. 
3. To develop the framework for future standards 
efforts in the area of human reliability. 
4. To establish effective communication among those 
experts whose combined expertise is needed to 
effectively address human factors relative to 
nuclear safety. 
The present study is now carried on addressing task 1 
where the outcome is expected to establish useful guidelines 
for the other three tasks. 
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3. TECHNIQUES FOR MODELING AND ANALYZING HUMAN TASKS 
IN NUCLEAR POVJER PLANTS: THE "THERP" METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter the Technique for Human Error Rate 
Prediction (THERP) will be explained in detail. Applica­
bility of the technique to model and analyze human tasks 
and the relevant performance shaping factors in nuclear 
power plants will be discussed. The concept of event 
trees which are used to describe task details as means 
for quantification of human reliability, the American 
Institute of Research (AIR) data store as one of the 
sources used to predict human error rates, and performance 
shaping factors whose assessment is greatly needed to 
examine their impact on system operation in response to 
the task performance, will be explained in sections 3.2, 
3.3, and 3.4, respectively. Section 3.5 will be devoted 
to demonstrating the THERP steps. An illustrative example 
will be given in section 3.6. 
3.2. Event Trees (Probability Trees) 
3.2.1. Theory 
The purpose of the probability tree is to provide a 
convenient summarization of all possible sequences of 
d i f f e r e n t  s t a g e  o u t c o m e s  ( e v e n t  s p a c e ) I n  
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system reliability analysis the stages are the different 
component status. The reliability block diagram is used 
as a guideline to describe the logic sequence of events 
while tracing the event tree. Overall system reliability 
can then easily be determined. 
In task analysis, the stages may be a component 
status or a human response. The outcome of each stage 
is represented by two event forks. The upper fork is for 
success (good outcome) while the lower fork is for 
failure (bad outcome) . Each sequence of branches or 
paths from the base of the tree (extreme left position) 
leads to an end position. Each end position corresponds 
to an elementary event in the event space of the subject 
being analyzed. At each intersection, the success 
probability is written on the upper fork and failure 
probability on the lower fork. 
The probabilities in the first stage are independent 
(not conditional) while for all other stages going from 
left to right are conditional. End probabilities can be 
obtained by multiplying all probability values on all 
forks connecting this end point to the common starting 
point (base). Two conditions must be satisfied: 
1. At any point of branching, the sum of probabilities 
on the two branching forks is unity. 
2. All end probabilities must sum to unity. 
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3.2.2. Illustrative example 
Process: Testing Electrical Switch 
Stage 1 Switch Condition 
o Good, P(G) = â = 0.95 
o Bad, P(B) = a = 0.05 
Stage 2 Test Result 
Accept when good = P(A/G) = F = 0.95 
Reject when good = P(R/G) = b = 0.05 
Accept when bad = P(A/B) = c = 0.05 
Reject when bad = P(R/B) = c = 0.95 
The event tree is shown in Figure 3.1. The event space 
including all possible outcomes is shown below. 
OUTCOME 1: P {Switch is accepted when good}= iF = .9025 
P I Switch is rejected when good}= ib = .0475 
P { Switch is accepted when bad J = ac = .0025 
OUTCOME 4; P {Switch is rejected when bad }= ac = .0475 
1.0000 
Algebraically, 
IF + âb + ac 4- ac 
= a(F+b) + a(c+c) 
= a + a 
1 
Usually the outcomes are clustered on common lines 
(bars) expressing failure and success of the whole task. 
The sum of all probabilities at the end of the failure 
OUTCOME 2 
OUTCOME 3 
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Stage 1 
Switch 
Condition 
Stage 2 
Test 
Resuit 
Good 
P(G) = a = .95 
Bad 
P(B) = a = .05 
P(A/G) = b = .95 
P(R/G) = b = .05 
P(A/B) = c = -05 
P(R/B) = c = .95 
Figure 3.1. Event tree of testing electrical switch 
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bar gives the probability of failure. Similarly, the 
sum of the probabilities at the end of the success bar 
gives the total reliability. 
Referring to our example the outcomes 1 and 2 
represent success because the tester accepted a good 
switch in 1 and rejected a bad switch in 4. On the other 
hand, the outcomes 2 and 3 represent failure because 
the tester rejected a good switch in 2 and accepted a bad 
switch in 3. Three important points must be stressed here: 
1. Branching at each stage may be more than two­
fold (good-bad), the multiple branch may carry 
a discrete probability distribution adding to 
unity or one can represent the outcome by a 
continuous probability distribution. 
2. A sequence of events may not lead to a certain 
success or failure. In this case, one can use a 
weighting factor as a multiplier just before reaching 
the success/failure bar. This weighting factor is 
judgmental and represents the probability that 
specific sequence of events will lead to the task 
success/failure. 
3. In some tasks or system analysis, it is preferable 
to use different levels of success (degradation 
modes); in this case we will have more than two 
bars. 
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3.3. AIR Data Store 
In the area of human performance quantification, 
many studies have been made since 1960. Many quantification 
techniques have been developed, but a complete evaluation 
has not been perfected. One of the early studies is the 
performance data store which was designed by Altman and 
his colleagues^ 'at the American Institute of Research 
in 1962. The work was directed towards the development 
of an operability index for different components (controls 
and displays) involved in human behaviors' aspects. 
Human behavior as defined by Altman is a specific 
step or action in a given task. Three objectives were 
set for the operability index. First it would be a task 
oriented, secondly it would be defined by reliability 
(probability of success) and time of behavior performance; 
finally the data on the operability index would be 
obtained, insofar as possible, from available experimental 
and field data. 
Because a task may be too complex to be considered as a 
basic unit of the evaluation of the operability index, a 
smaller division of human behavior was selected to be such a 
basic unit. The human behavior aspects were considered to fit 
the commonly accepted Stimulus-Organism-Response (SOR) 
paradigm. Table 3.1 provides a list of some components 
that are involved in these three aspects. 
24 
Table 3.1. Some components involved in human behavior 
aspects 
STIMULUS 
(DISPLAYS) 
ORGANISM 
R 
RESPONSE 
(CONTROLS) 
Counter 
Labeling 
Light 
Scale, Circular 
Scale, Linear 
Scale, Semicircular 
Scope 
Recognition 
Manipulation 
Identification 
Crank 
Joy stick 
Knob 
Lever 
Push Button 
Rotary Selector 
Speaking 
Toggle Switch 
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Altman and his colleagues reviewed several research 
reports looking for useful data to assess the effects 
of design dimensions of different components on human 
performance. Problems of discrepancies in data and areas 
of missing data were faced and treated by several means. 
All estimates of operability indices (reliabilities and 
times) were reviewed for consistency and reasonableness 
and then put in a central data store. In that store, three 
values were given to each component (control or display). 
These values are: 
1. Base time for hiraian manipulation (minimum time 
required for an operation when all dimensions within 
the component are optimum). 
2. Success probability estimate for each component. 
This value will depend on the parameter and dimension 
used and is the complement of the human error 
probability. 
3. Time increments to be added to the base time when 
the dimensions are not optimum. 
Table 3.2 shows these values for a joy stick as an 
example of a response component (control) and labeling 
as stimuli component (display). Reliability values for 
human performance for some controls and displays are 
given in Appendix A. 
Table 3.2, Success probability and time of human manipulation of labeling 
(display), joy sticks and speaking (controls) (Altman^ ) 
Time 
Success increment. 
Component Parameter Dimension probability sec. 
Labeling (input Span 
component) 
Base time = 0.20 sec. a-Digits 
b-Words 
Legibility 
Size of printing 
(height), in. 
2 .9998 0.00 
3 .9994 0.11 
4-5 .9992 0.29 
6-7 .9991 0.71 
1 or 2 .9999 0.00 
3-5 .9995 .20 
6-11 .9985 1.65 
Clear and .9999 0.00 
concise 
Potentially .9997 0.25 
ambiguous 
>1/5 .9997 0.00 
1/8 .9994 0.20 
Joy stick (output Length, in. 6-9 .9963 1.50 
component) 12-18 .9967 0.00 
21-27 .9963 1.50 
Base time = 1.93 sec. Extent of movement, 5-20 .9981 0.00 
degree 
30-40 .9975 0.20 
40-60 .9960 0.50 
Control resistance, 
lb. 
Stick support 
Time delay, sec. 
Speaking (output 
component) 
Base time = 0.10 sec. 
Number of words or 
numbers (including 
repetitions) 
Number of repetitions 
Nature of message 
5-10 .9999 0 .00  
10-30 .9992 0.50 
Present .9990 0.00 
Absent .9950 1.00 
.3 .9967 0.00 
.6-1.5 .9963 0.50 
3. .9957 3.00 
1 .9999 0.00 
2-5 .9999 0.10 
5-10 .9998 0.45 
>10 .9996 1.00 
None .9998 0.00 
1 .9999 0.00 
>2 .9999 0.00 
Familiar + .9999 0.00 
common 
language 
0.10 Familiar + .9998 
uncommon 
language 
0.25 Unfamiliar .9997 
+ common 
language 
Unfamiliar .9995 0.40 
+ uncommon 
language 
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3.3.1. Use of the AIR DATA STORE 
To use the data store with the aim of getting time 
and reliability estimates for a certain mission, the 
mission must be subdivided according to the tree shown in 
Figure 3.2. This procedure is the same as that followed 
in task analysis. The calculation starts from the bottom 
of the tree by obtaining the time and reliability for each 
component dimension using the data store, then moving 
upwards by adding times and multiplying reliabilities 
to get the operability index of a higher subdivision and 
so on until we get the operability index of the entire 
mission. The computation can be done by hand or using 
computer programs such as those developed by Munger and 
Mbhn.79'B0 
Investigation of reliability and validity of the 
operability index obtained using the AIR DATA STORE is 
outside the scope of this work and was discussed by Meister^ .^ 
Some concerns related to the AIR DATA STORE will be 
discussed in detail in Section 3.5. 
3.4. Performance Shaping Factors 
3.4.1. Role of performance shaping factors in the assess­
ment of human reliability in nuclear power plants 
Performance shaping factors (PSFs)^ ^^ '^ ^^ '^ ^^  is a term 
T_26 
originally coined by Swain and Guttman. PSFs are those 
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MISSION 
PHASES 
EACH PHASE 
TASKS 
EACH TASK 
STEPS (BEHAVIORS) 
EACH STEP 
3 ASPECTS CS, 0, R) 
EACH ASPECT 
PARAMETERS 
EACH PARAMETER 
HAS ITS DIMENSION 
Figure 3.2. Task analysis for using the AIR Data Store 
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factors that affect the human reliability in situations 
such as power plant operation, maintenance, and testing. 
They control the amount of variability in the human 
performance to a specific task in such a manner as to make it 
highly reliable, highly unreliable, or at some level in 
between. In other words, if the human error probability 
(HEP) is assumed to lie between a lower and upper limit, 
favorable PSFs will move the HEP towards the lower limit 
while unfavorable PSFs will move it towards the upper 
limit. 
The effect of PSFs on HEP can be analyzed by the 
effect of different operating conditions on hardware 
failure probabilities. 
Generally, PSFs can be classified into three sets: 
1. Extra - individual PSFs. These include the 
situational characteristics, task and equipment 
characteristics, and job instructions. 
2. Intra - individual PSFs. These include the 
individual (organismic) factors. 
3. A set of PSFs that forms a bridge between the two 
previous sets and includes both psychological and 
physiological stresses. 
Table 3.3 presents a representative listing of the 
PSFs in each set. For more detail, to show how these 
31 
Table 3.3. Representative listing of factors that determine 
human performance reliability (adat>ted from 
reference 126) 
Extra - Individual 
Situational Characteristics^ '20-22,26,44,100a,126,130 
Architectural features 
Quality of environment 
Temperature, humidity 
Air quality 
Noise and vibration 
Degree of general cleanliness 
Work hours/work breaks 
Availability/adequacy of special equipment, tools and 
supplies 
Organizational structure (e.g., authority, responsibility, 
communication channels) 
Actions by supervisors, co-workers, union representatives, 
and regulatory personnel 
Rewards, recognition, benefits 
Job and Task Instructions 
Procedures required (written or not written) 
Written or oral communications 
Cautions and warnings 
Work methods 
Plant policies (shop practices) 
Task and Equipment Characteristics^ ® 
59,68,75,84,89,101 
Perceptual (display) requirements 
Motor (control) requirements 
Control-display relationship 
Anticipatory requirements 
Interpretation 
Decision making 
Complexity (information load) 
Narrowness of task 
Frequency and repetitiveness 
Task criticality 
Long and short-term memory 
Calculat ional requirements 
Feedback (knowledge of results) 
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Table 3.3. (Continued) 
Continuity (discrete vs continuous) 
Team structure 
Man-machine interface 
Factors 
Design of prime equipment, test equipment, manufacturing 
equipment, job aids, tools, fixtures 
Stressors 
2 Psychological Stressors 
Suddeness of stresses 
Duration of stress 
Task speed 
Task load 
High jeopardy risk 
Threats (of failure, loss of job) 
Monotonous, degrading, or meaningless work 
Long, uneventful vigilance periods 
Conflicts of motives about job performance 
Reinforcement absent or negative 
Sensory deprivation 
Distractions (noise, glare, movement, flicker, color) 
Inconsistent cueing 
Physiological Stressors 
Duration of stress 
Fatigue 
Pain or discomfort 
Hunger or thirst 
Temperature extreme 
Radiation 
G-force extremes 
Atmospheric pressure extremes 
Oxygen insufficiency 
Vibration 
Movement constriction 
Lack of physical exercise 
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Table 3.3. (Continued) 
Intra-Individual 
Organismic Factors35'47,48,88,136 
Previous training/experience 
State of current practice or skill 
Personality and intelligence variables 
Motivation and attitudes 
Knowledge of required performance standards 
Physical conditions 
Attitudes based on influence of family and/or other 
outside persons or agencies 
Group identifications 
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factors shape the human performance, one can refer to 
the available references indicated in the same table. 
PSFs will affect the human failure rate, and so the 
human performance reliability, as a result of their direct 
impact on the following channels : 
1. Human performance dimensions (direct, such as accuracy, 
reaction time, and response duration, or indirect, such 
as personal aspects). 
2. Human performance evaluation standards (direct, such as 
accuracy tolerance, or indirect, such as personal 
characteristics or family environment). 
3. Human performance adequacy (success or failure). 
These channels are illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
Some performance shaping factors can be expressed 
quantitatively, such as temperature, humidity, noise 
level, work hours, etc., while others are expressed 
qualitatively. 
27 Recently, Embrey produced a list setting out approxi­
mately fifty factors categorized under the same areas shown 
in Table 3.3. 
PSPs interact in a very complex manner. This makes it 
difficult to develop analytical expressions describing the 
relative influences of the PSFs on the performance of the 
given task. Instead, the analyst usually gives a judgmental 
weighting factor to the calculated human error probability 
Extra - Stressors Intra - Human Human Human Human 
Individual Individual Performance Performance Performance Performance 
PSFs PSFs Dimensions Evaluation Adequacy Reliability 
Standards 
Task and 
equipment 
character­
istics 
Job 
instructions 
Individ­
ual 
factors 
Physiolog­
ical 
stresses 
Psycholog­
ical 
stresses 
Situational 
character­
istics 
Direct 
and 
Indirect 
Direct 
and 
Indirect 
Success 
Failure 
Failure 
rate 
CO Ln 
Figure 3.3. Impacts of PSFs (adapted from reference 127) 
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(HEP) according to the existing relevant PSFs. This was one 
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of the important concerns that Embrey pointed out about 
the traditional concept of the PSFs considering them as 
determinants, not as modifiers to the HEP. 
Applying the PSFs to human reliability assessment 
can be accomplished through the following steps : 
1. A subset of factors from the PSFs list is selected 
on the basis of their perceived importance in 
determining the human reliability for the type 
of task under consideration. 
2. Each factor in the subset is weighted according 
to its effect on the reliability (relevancy 
weighting, see methods in (56)). 
25 A simple procedure was recommended by Edwards 
where the relevant PSFs are ranked according to their 
importance. An arbitrary value, say 10, is assigned to 
the lowest ranked factor. Values for the rest of the 
factors are assigned according to their importance 
over the lowest ranked one which was already given a 
value of 10. Finally, all weights are normalized so 
that their sum is unity. 
3. Each factor is rated according to its quality 
(worth) in the task being analyzed. The worth 
value can be given to each factor on a numerical 
scale. The midpoint of this continuum represents 
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a worth value of a factor that neither enhances 
nor degrades the human reliability. The extreme 
left point will be given to a factor that severely 
causes reliability degradation while the extreme 
right point will be given to a factor that greatly 
enhances the reliability. The difference between 
the relevance weighting and the quality rating is 
that the first represents the potentiality that a 
particular factor has for influencing human error 
for particular types of tasks and is essentially 
based on a priori evidence and knowledge regarding 
the general class of tasks being considered, while 
the second considers the actual situation in the 
specific task under consideration. 
4. The Error Reduction Index (ERI) is calculated 
for each factor by simply multiplying its relevance 
weighting and the quality rating. This index 
represents the relative importance of the factor 
in determining the overall likelihood of success. 
5. Derivation of the Success Likelihood Index (SLI): 
ERIs for all PSFs considered in the analysis are 
added up to yield a single index of the likelihood 
of task being successfully completed. The index 
will indicate the utility of the chosen combination 
of PSFs in enhancing reliability for the task 
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to be investigated. SLI is very valuable in 
providing a measure to compare different system 
configurations in terms of their effect on human 
reliability. In order to obtain a reliable, 
consistent SLI estimate for a certain task, the 
first three steps in this procedure should be 
consensual activities. 
3.4.2. Some relevant PSFs to human tasks in nuclear power 
plants highlighted from reviewing Licensee Event Reports 
(LERs) 
Although the importance of each factor of the 
PSFs listed in Table 3.3 cannot be undermined, it is 
extremely difficult to identify relevant PSFs when analyzing 
human tasks in nuclear power plants based on current 
data format. Most of the PSFs included in the intra-
individual and stressor sets are very difficult to determine 
and cannot be detected through reviewing LERs. 
Reviewing LERs revealed that some of the relevant 
PSFs have to be considered in analyzing human tasks in 
nuclear power plants are: 
-Written procedures for changing/restoring 
controls (not used, not followed in order; 
procedure deficiency). 
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-Check-off list for the procedural step (not 
required; not used). 
-Oral/written instructions. 
-Component list prepared from the written 
procedure (wrong component listed, one or 
more component being omitted). 
-Logs used for recording actions (not 
completed). 
-Follow up for verification, 
-If any, location of position indicators for 
controls. 
-Component/display characteristics 
-Dimension 
-Proximity 
-Location 
-Labels 
-Administrative controls associated with changing/ 
restoring controls (locking, tagging). 
-Communication quality within one group, between 
two or more groups, or between shifts. 
-Environmental quality especially radioactivity 
level. 
-Time sressses (day, or night shifts). 
An effort is made in the present work (Chapter Six) 
to put the available information, in the current form of the 
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LERs, in a developed event description sheet. Reviewing 
data through this new format and over a considerable 
time period can help in making the Success Likelihood 
Index (SLI) of different tasks more reliable and more 
valid. Improving the reliability and validity of the 
SLI will come as a direct result of giving the LERs 
the chance to play an effective role besides the experts' 
judgments in evaluating the SLI. This can be done 
through the following procedures: 
1. Reviewing all available information can help in 
identifying actual human errors in the performance 
of human tasks in nuclear plants. 
2. PSFs can be better selected by thorough review 
of the cause description (CD) paragraph (Chapter 
Six) . 
3. Ranking the relevant PSFs can be based on the 
relative frequencies of these factors. This 
means that the relative frequency of each factor 
can be taken as a direct measure of its relevance 
weighting. The rating of each factor is 
assigned depending on level of significance of the 
consequence of the unfavorability of this factor. 
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3.5, THERP Methodology 
92 In 1962, Rook described a method for evaluating 
the human error contribution to system degradation. 
This method, now called THERP (Technique for Human Error 
Rate Prediction) is based upon probability theory and 
other methods used by reliability engineers. The method 
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was used by Rook as a quantitative approach to reduce 
human errors (improve human performance) in industrial 
production. 
In 1963, Swain^ S^,!!? introduced the THERP 
as one of the powerful methods for performing human 
factor reliability analysis. This was done by a full 
treatment of both the mathematics and the application of 
THERP to field operations. The model has been used 
primarily to provide quantitative predictions of system 
degradation resulting from human errors in association with 
equipment reliability, operational procedures, and other 
system characteristics which influence human behavior. 
121 In 1969, Swain applied the modeling technique 
THERP to determine specifically the human factor contri­
bution to the operational reliability of nuclear power 
plants. 
or 
In WASH-1400 , fault trees were used to provide a 
systematic method of relating system failure probabilities 
to basic components and event probabilities. Human 
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errors as basic events appear in most of the man-machine 
interfaces on the fault trees. Conservative estimates 
of human response under emergency situations were made and 
the THERP technique was used to examine the human contri­
bution to the operational reliability of light water 
reactors. It is the purpose of this work to discuss this 
modeling technique, its reliability, validity, and 
capabilities, also, to investigate the use of data from 
reviewing LERs in this model. 
THERP is a modeling technique for prediction of 
human-error rates in man-machine system and evaluation 
of the degradation to the system or any part of it 
likely to be caused by human errors in association 
with equipment reliability, operational procedures, and 
other system characteristics which influence human 
behavior. Application of THERP is done in five essential 
steps. At the last step we calculate the system unre­
liability due to the human contribution. Depending on 
this value, if it is an acceptable level or not, one can 
decide to terminate the calculation or recommend some 
changes and iterate until the system unreliability 
(Qrj.) is reduced to an acceptable value. A paradigm for 
the technique is outlined in Figure 3.4. The following 
is a detailed explanation of the five steps; sources of 
information needed to carry out each step are mentioned. 
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Figure 3.4. "THERP" paradijm 
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3.5.1. Step 1: Definition of system failure to be evaluated 
Here, the interest is to investigate the part of 
system unreliability that is due to human contribution. 
This approach actually eliminates the machine part 
(component failures) but not the man-machine interface. 
The sources of information are : 1) Schematic diagram, 
mechanical/electrical drawings of the system under con­
sideration. 2) Technical specifications describing 
maintenance/operational procedures. 
3.5.2. Step 2: Identification of all human operations and 
relevant PSFs affecting the system function 
This step includes a detailed identification of all 
human tasks to be performed on the system. The system and 
task analysis will cover the required human actions 
(written procedures to be followed in the event 
of equipment defects or breakdown, or to compensate for 
other abnormal conditions) as well as the optional human 
actions (which are not a part of the written procedures 
but might be substituted for the required human actions). 
To assist in the process of task analysis, relevant 
PSFs need to be assessed to examine their impact on system 
operation in response to the task performance. Importance 
and methods of weighing and rating of different PSFs were 
discussed in detail in section 3.4. 
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The task analysis effort is simplified by the 
construction of a complete event tree (the concept was 
explained in section 3.2) that describes task details 
as means for quantification of human relationship 
(Swain, et al.^ ^^ ). Event trees are very useful in 
applying human error probabilities (HEPs), their effects on 
system degradation, and predictions of all relevant PSFs. 
The branches of the tree represent a diagrammatic task 
analysis which illustrates pictorially the sequence and 
flow of task behaviors and other task or situational 
relationships. Problems of dependence and independence 
of events can be included in the event tree. 
Although the PSFs are generally defined for any 
type of task including internal and external factors 
126 (Swain and Guttmann ), there are specific situational 
58 PSFs which are system-specific (Joos, Sabri and Husseiny , 
Sabri and Husseiny^ ,^ Husseiny and Sabri^ '^^ )^. Experience 
in reviewing the Licensee Event Reports (LERs) for 
commercial power plants indicates that the human error 
probability associated with a given event depends on 
pertaining PSFs and on preceding events. 
The PSFs are usually limited to those factors affecting 
human performance in situations such as operations, 
maintenance and testing. Variability of human performance 
does considerably influence the reliability of the human 
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123 127 
element (Swain ' ) . Sources of information needed in 
this step are the technical specifications of the plant 
that describe operational and maintenance procedures. 
3.5.3. Step 3 : Prediction of human error rates 
This quantitative step requires the assignment of 
probability values on all branches of the event tree 
already constructed in Step 2. Here, the appropriateness 
of data used is very important. The following are some 
of the possible data sources: 
1. Experimental data 
This is the data from simulation studies in the 
behavioral laboratories. 
Swain^ ^^  criticized experimental data in that 
they cannot be generalized to operational situations. 
HEPs from experimental data can be viewed to be 
higher than that in the usual operational situations 
because experiments are originally set up to generate 
high error rates in order to minimize the number of 
subjects necessary to test the statistical significance 
of measurable differences between experimental 
conditions or treatments. On the other hand, HEPs 
from experimental data can be viewed to be lower or 
higher than that in the usual operational situations 
because the latter are multitask, e.g., the task 
which the investigator is interested in, is but one of 
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•many tasks which are competing for the attention 
of the operator. 
2. AIR DATA STORE 
The AIR DATA STORE and how to use it was 
explained in detail in section 3.3. Time span 
and success probability figures from human 
manipulation of many components in the AIR DATA 
STORE are based on measures from many experimental 
studies. These figures were based on the assump­
tion that the equipment is at least moderately 
well-engineered from the human-factors stand 
point and is manipulated by an adequately 
motivated and adequately trained operator. 
It should be recalled here that the AIR DATA STORE 
considered the human action (behavior) as the simplest 
step in the task analysis and this was subdivided into 
three aspects, stimulus (S), organism (0), and response 
(R) .  
From the AIR DATA STORE, one can get the operability 
index of all components involved in these three aspects. 
Adding times and multiplying probabilities one can get 
the time span and success probability for the human action 
(step) involved. 
Applicability of AIR DATA STORE All figures for 
actions (steps) in the AIR DATA STORE are probabilities 
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for doing the step incorrectly (complement of human success 
probability) which lie under category II. Nothing is 
mentioned about probabilities of omitting a certain step, 
category I, or probabilities of inadvertent commission, 
category III (Chapter Six). 
In the application of the AIR DATA STORE, gross 
behavioral assumptions must be involved. Among these 
assumptions are: 
(a) Assumptions for follow-up (monitoring) 
In situations where two operators are involved 
in one action and one monitors the other, one cannot 
consider that the failure probability in performing 
that action is the product of the two HEPs. 
Consideration of dependence must be taken into 
account. This includes whether or not the monitor 
consciously or unconsciously assumes that the 
step he is monitoring has been done correctly. 
(b) Assumptions for self-correction of errors 
In many situations, the accuracy of human 
performance is dependent upon errors he has just 
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committed. The assumption stated by Swain et al. 
in this respect is as follows : 
If a man has *X' probability of error for 
an important time-critical task on which errors 
occur infrequently, then his probability of 
making an error on trial 2 (given error on trial 
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1 and not discovered) is '2X' and his probability 
of making an error on trial 3 (given errors on 
trials 1, 2 and not discovered) is '3X' and so 
on, until the limiting condition of 1.0 error 
probability is reached. 
(c) Assumptions for behavior under off-optimum stress 
Reference 60 contains some selected abstracts 
from literature on stress. See also reference 
45 for stress effects and reference 90 for some 
high stress situations. 
It is very difficult to quantify the amount of 
variation in human performance (how much the HEP will 
be varied) under the effect of operational stresses with 
difficult levels. 
Classical studies assumed the relationship between 
the perceived stress level and its effectiveness on the 
human performance to be of a curvilinear type such as 
shown in Figure 3.5. This hypothetical relationship can be 
applied for most types of stresses, especially in the very low 
and moderately high stress levels. For these regions, the 
human performance at any stress level can be related to 
that at the optimum level using a modifying factor. 
In the low stress level region, performance effec­
tiveness is below optimum. This can be attributed to 
decline in the person's level of arousal, or alertness, 
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caused by the lack of stimuli . For simplicity in design, 
there are many human tasks in nuclear power plants that 
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Figure 3.5. Hypothetical relationship betvreen human 
performance and stress (adapted fron 
reference 126, page 17-2) 
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do not have any auditory or display signal indicating 
their duties. These tasks, such as periodic monitor­
ing, recording, and reporting, lie under this stress 
region. 
1 26 Swain and Guttmann suggested a factor of 2.0 to be 
multiplied by the HEP at optimum stress level if the task has 
to be performed under conditions of very low stress 
level. 
For the moderately high level of stress, the 
level of arousal is considerably high so that the 
net end effect is disruptive. Human tasks involved 
in operations that need attention, such as reactor start-up, 
reactor shut-down, mode change, fueling, refueling, or unusual 
events with moderate significance, can be assumed to 
lie in that region. Swain and Guttmann ** suggested 
to multiply the HEP and the uncertainty bounds for step-
by-step, rule-based tasks performed under optimal stress 
level by 2.0. For tasks requiring dynamic interplay 
between the operator and displays, he used a multiplier 
of 3. The estimates of multipliers cannot be taken 
blindly because they are subject to variation due 
to the diversity of human reaction under such circum­
stances . 
For the extremely high stress regions, the degree 
by which the human performance is degraded differs 
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from one stress type to another. In this case, judgmental 
weights are assigned at different levels. Scarcity 
of data and the inadequacy of available ones to be 
applied in nuclear field make the process of judgmental 
weighting very critical and questionable. In WASH-
1400®^ , estimates for nuclear power plant personnel 
error probabilities in extremely high stress situations, 
such as large LOCA, were based on two old studies, the 
90 Ronan study (about critical incidents collected on 
U.S. Air Force air crews who survived in flight emergencies) 
and the Berkun^  ^study (in which raw recruits and experienced 
soldiers were placed in several laboratory simulated 
situations). The results are shown in Figure 3.6. 
In this figure, the estimated HEP for an average operator 
was plotted against the time after large LOCA initia­
tion. 
In the nuclear field, the type and level of stress 
are very important and should be considered, especially 
those stresses that pertain to this field among which 
are: 
-High radiation level in some zones where main­
tenance activities can occur. Usually, the level 
and working time are precalculated so that the 
•maintainer will not receive a dose that exceeds 
the MPD, If time required is larger, another 
53 
I s t r e s s f u l  c o n d i t i o n s  p e r s i s t  
.25 
o.K. 
120 60 1.5 10 25 30 
Time after large LOCA (min) 
Figure 3.6. Estimated Human Performance after large LOCA 
(adapted from reference 126, pages 12-23) 
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maintainer can go in to complete the former's 
work. This also put the maintainer under 
severe time stress. 
-Complicated operation and occurrences in the 
reactor core that is not easily understandable 
and interpreted by operational personnel. 
-Threatened catastrophic consequences that 
may happen if any wrong action is taken. 
-Distraction by other duties. 
3. Operational data 
There is no doubt that operational data are the 
most desirable source of information needed to model 
and analyze human tasks. These data involve 
an actual interaction between all performance 
shaping factors. Unfortunately, this fact was 
completely overlooked in the present form of 
the Licensee Event Report (LER). Reviewing 
these LERs revealed that they are noisy and 
not reliability oriented. It is one of the aims 
of this work to highlight this fact. However, 
attempts were made in Chapter Six to extract 
all possible information included in these 
reports and put them in developed reliability 
oriented forms. 
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3.5.4. Step 4: Determination of the effect of human 
errors on the system 
The probability tree constructed in step 2 describes 
task details with all the relevant PSFs. At any branching 
point in the probability tree there will be two probability 
values. On the lower branch there is a failure probability 
and on the upper branch there is a success probability. 
Let be the calculated value of the failure 
probability on the i^  ^failure branch. Now, the purpose 
of this step is to assign a value which represents the 
failure probability of the system under investigation 
when an error of class i has positively occurred. The 
value will then represent the joint probability 
that the system will fail when an error of class i 
occurs with probability P^ . 
For human operations or series of operations performed 
more than once and a single incorrect performance results 
in a failure condition with probability F^ , we have 
Qi = 1 - (1 -
Here, represents the probability that n^  operations 
will result in one or more failures of class i. 
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If we have N final failure paths that will be directed 
to the failure bar, the total probability of failure will be 
given by 
N 
Qrp = 1 - IT (1 - Qv-) • 
 ^ K=1 
Determination of the value is a completely 
judgmental step. Judgments have to be from highly 
qualified reliability engineers who can determine the 
effect of a certain sequence of events (human error/success, 
favorable/unfavorable PSF) on equipment failure rates 
or system effectiveness. 
115 Swain draws the probability trees from top to 
bottom. At each branching point, the left branch represents 
success situation while the right branch represents failure 
situation. For the reason of keeping track of event 
sequence, it is more logical and convenient to draw the 
event tree from right to left. The upper and lower 
branches will represent success and failure situations, 
respectively. 
Capital English letters will be used to denote the 
events, small English letters will represent failure 
rates while success rates will be represented by small 
letters but upper lined. For example, if "A" refers 
to certain human action, "a" will represent its human 
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error probability in performing this action and "a" 
will be the human success probability which is the 
complement of "a." 
Greek letters will be used to express the favorability 
of a situation that is not human controlled, upper lined 
Greek letters will represent the unfavorability of that 
situation. 
Q.J. can be calculated either directly by adding up 
all the end values of the failure paths or indirectly 
by adding up all the end values of the success paths and 
then finding the complement of the sum (assuming independency 
of all paths). If the values of failure/success probabilities 
on the branches are given to be within a certain range 
determined by lower and upper limits, we can determine 
two values of 0^ . An optimistic value determined by-
taking lower limits of failure probabilities and upper 
limits of success probabilities on different paths during 
estimating the 0^  values. Similarly, the pessimistic 0^  
values can be determined by taking upper limits of failure 
probabilities and lower limits of success probabilities. 
3.5.5. Step 5: Recommendation of changes to system and 
calculation of the new system failure rate 
The final step is to investigate the value of 0^  which 
is an estimation of system unreliability due to human 
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contribution. If the estimated value is not within an 
acceptable range, several iterations are made to reduce 
the unreliability to an acceptable value. Otherwise the 
calculations would be terminated. The iteration process 
provides means to synthesize task performances of desirable 
quality which would permit the analyst to provide recom­
mendations for remedial changes to improve task performance 
with due account of particular PSFs. Generally, the 
recommended changes can take the form of modifications to 
equipment, training, personnel selection, or operation 
procedures. The difference between two successive iterated 
values for can be balanced against the various costs 
of changing the system. 
The logical procedure to be followed in minimizing 
the 0^  values is to start investigating the highest 
component among the Q^ 's. Working first on this main 
contributing element will accelerate the iteration 
process to be terminated rapidly. 
3.5.6. Reliability and validity of THERP as a human 
error rates predictive tool 
Consistency of the THERP technique was examined 
126 by Swain and Guttmann who stated that: 
Although the technique is quantitative in 
nature, its application requires many 
qualitative judgments by persons who are 
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well-trained and experienced in the 
psychology of human behavior. However, 
the close agreement in predictions obtained 
by two users of THERP indicates that the 
judgments that are required may not unduly 
reduce the consistency of the technique 
itself. 
Little work has been done concerning the validity 
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of predictions made with THERP, Swain points out 
that there is some evidence that, at least for many 
applications, the validity of the technique and its 
predictions is adequate. 
The importance of a reliable data bank for human 
error rates taken from actual operation experience (as 
we recommended in several locations in the present study) 
arises again to validate this technique or any other 
technique that can be used in modeling and analyzing 
human tasks. 
3.6. Illustrative Example 
Suppose a system has two valves, VI and V2, so that 
mispositioning of either VI or V2 will cause the system 
to fail. The purpose of the analysis is to determine 
human contribution to the failure of the system using 
the event tree concept. We will consider here that 
human error is involved while restoring VI and V2 after 
maintenance and testing. Failure to restore valves after 
maintenance and testing is very common. Frequency and 
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probable causes will be discussed in chapter seven. The 
process of restoration can roughly include the following 
major steps : 
1. Operator - 1 restores VI 
2. Operator - 2 checks the restoration of VI 
3. Operator - 1 restores V2 
4. Operator - 2 checks the restoration of V2 
Failure/success to follow logical procedure and 
failure/success to use the check-off provision properly are 
neglected for simplicity. 
Beside the human errors committed by operators 1 and 2 
in restoring and checking the two valves, we will consider 
the sticking of the valve as a component failure and the 
relative positions, sizes, labels of the valves as one of 
the important and most relevant PSFs. Table 3.4 illustrates 
the events involved in this task together with values of 
success and failure probabilities while Figure 3.7 shows 
the event tree constructed. 
The following assumptions were made during the 
analysis : 
1. One valve only out of two is likely to stick, 
so we consider V2 to stick with probability .001. 
2. Operator - 1 success in restoring VI will give 
him the credit for restoring V2 properly (SI path) 
61 
3. Operator - 2 success in correcting wrong restora­
tion of VI will assure the success of restoration 
of V2 (S6 path). 
4. Restoration and checking of sticking valves have 
failure probabilities higher than those of non-
sticking valves. 
Table 3.4. Events involved in the task of valve restoration 
Event Failure Success 
Symbol Description Failure mode Failure probability Success probability 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Symbol Value bound bound Symbol Value bound bound 
A Restore VI 
A' Check VI 
R Relative posi­
tions, sizes, 
and labels of 
VI and V2 
A v2 condition 
B Restore V2 
(V2 stick) 
C Restore V2 
(V2 not stick) 
B' Check V2 
(V2 stick) 
Failure to 
restore VI 
Failure to 
check VI 
VI and V2 are 
small, not 
separated 
enough, and 
have bad labels 
Stick 
Failure to 
restore V2 
(V2 stick) 
Failure to 
restore V2 (V2 
not stick) 
Failure to 
check V2 
(V2 stick) 
.001 .0005 .005 a .999 .995 .9995 
.1 .05 .5 â' .9 .5 .95 
. 5 —— — r .5 —— — 
6 .001 .0001 .01 6 .999 .99 .9999 
b .010 .004 .04 b .99 .96 .996 
.003 .001 .01 ,997 .99 .999 
.08 .80 b' .8 .2 .92 
Check V2 
(V2 not stick) 
Failure to 
check V2 
(V2 not stick) 
^Values taken from reference 126. 
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Figure 3.7. Event tree for valve restoration 
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Results obtained for system failure and success probabil 
ities together with lower and upper bounds are listed below. 
SUCCESS 
Path Value 
SI .4995000000 .4975000000 .4997500000 
S2 .4975034985 .4875997500 .4992003250 
S3 .0013473014 .0024626250 .0004747150 
S4 .0004945050 .0047760000 .0000497751 
S5 .0000039960 .0000398000 .0000001839 
S6 .0009000000 .0025000000 .0004750000 
Total success 
probability .9997493009 .9948781750 .9999499990 
Path Value 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
F1 .0001497001 .0000249850 .0024626250 
F2 .0000009990 .0000000160 .0001597000 
F3 .0001000000 .0000250000 .0025000000 
Total failure 
probability .0002506991 .0000500010 
Lower Bound 
.0051218450 
Upper Bound 
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4. EVALUATION OF SAINT MODELING 
TECHNIQUE FOR HUMAN TASKS IN 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
4.1. Introduction 
System Analysis of Integrated Networks of Tasks 
(SAINT) (developed by researchers in the U.S. Air 
Force Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory) has proved 
to be very useful for the simulation and analysis 
of human performance in tasks involving nuclear power 
plant operation, maintenance and -testing. In this 
chapter, a complete description and evaluation of the 
technique will be given. The SAINT and THERP tech­
niques will be compared with respect to their relevance 
to conducting task analysis, estimation of human error 
probabilities and accounting for performance shaping 
factors in nuclear power plants. Evaluation results 
showed that SAINT is more flexible and has promising 
features for human engineering studies of complex 
systems when compared to the static THERP technique 
currently used in nuclear safety analysis. 
4.2. General Description 
SAINT is a network modeling and simulation technique 
designed to aid the system designer and human factors 
engineer in analyzing complex man-machine systems. 
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SAINT is not a model but rather a framework within 
which appropriate quantitative models can be designed 
in a communicative fashion representing man-machine 
environment interactions.The technique permits 
investigation of the inçact of modifications to the 
man-machine environment interface on overall system 
performance. 
System description, using SAINT includes tasks, 
resources, precedence relations among tasks, flow 
of information through the system and effects of the 
environmental stressors and PSFs on task performance. 
Provisions are available for specification, evaluation 
and monitoring of system state variables as they 
change with time and for representing the dynamic inter­
action of tasks, resources and state variables in the 
X08 
overall system. Figure 4.1 depicts the SAINT approach 
to task analysis. The network model is accomplished 
using conceptual graphic symbols for diagramming event 
sequence involving more than one (maximum crew of 
eleven) operator. The results of task analysis are 
then used as inputs to the SAINT computer program. 
Computer analysis of task activity networks will include 
all the human performance dynamics proposed in Siegel 
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and Wolf's model . This is done using different 
available subroutines in the SAINT code. SAINT output 
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Figure 4.1. SAINT analysis .approach 
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consists of task and mission performance estimates. 
Sensitivity analysis can be done by varying some of 
the input variables to investigate hxanan factors 
affecting the outcomes of task and mission under con­
sideration. 
4.3. SAINT Symbolism and 
Modeling Concepts 
A task is the basic element of SAINT and is 
represented by a node as shown in Figure 4.2.a. Tasks 
are related to one another by precedence relations 
represented by branches. The combination of tasks 
(nodes) and precedence relations (branches) is an 
abstract representation of the whole system. 
The input side of the task symbol is divided 
into two parts; the upper part identifies the number 
of task predecessors required to be completed prior to 
release of the task for the first time (Rl), while the 
lower part identifies the number of task predecessors 
required on subsequent release (R2). Source (first) 
and sink (last) nodes are represented by symbols shown 
in Figure 4.2.b. 
The output side identifies the task number and its 
shape specifies the type of task branching emanating from 
the task as shown in Figure 4.2.c. SAINT provides five 
70 
Code Information Required 
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Figure 4.2.a. Task node 
Source Task (First) Sink Task 
Figure 4.2.b. Source and sink task symbols 
D > 
Deterministic Modified Conditional Conditional 
Probabilistic Probabilistic Take First Take All 
Figure 4.2.c. Different output side shapes 
Figure 4.2. Symbolic representation of the task in SAINT 
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types of branching; deterministic, probabilistic, modified 
probabilistic, conditional take first, and conditional 
take all. The number of parameters and the parameter 
definition for each branching are given in Table 4.1. 
SAINT conditional branching capabilities allow users to branch 
from one task in the network to another, based on the values 
of the system, resource, or information attributes if 
certain specified conditions are satisfied. Table 4.2 
gives all the conditional branching allowed by SAINT. The 
middle portion of the task symbol allocated for task 
description in four (or more if needed) rows. Each row 
consists of two sections, the left-hand section is used for 
the task description code that identifies the type of 
information that appears in the right-hand section. Seven­
teen codes are available in SAINT, to describe the task, to 
choose from them what is relevant. These codes are 
illustrated in Table 4.3, while the abbreviations used in 
writing the required information are listed in Table 4.4. 
Attribute values and task duration may be constant 
or samples from probability distributions, or values obtained 
from a user-written subprogram (user functions). There are 
eleven probability distributions available in SAINT. These 
are described in distribution sets and identified by a 
unique distribution set number. These distributions 
are; 
Table 4.1. Different branching types at the output side of SAINT symbol 
Branching 
type 
Description of 
branching operation 
IH 
o 
K 
n 
§ 
<U Parameter Definition 
0 2. 1 2 
1. Deterministic All branches emanating from the 
task will be selected (Proba­
bility of 1.0 Is assigned to 
all emanated branches) 
0 — — — — 
2. Probabil­
istic 
One and only one of the emanated 
branches will be selected. The 
selection Is made on a random 
basis using the probabilities 
associated with the branches. 
(The sum of all probabilities 
on the emanated branches must 
be equal to 1.0.) 
1 Probability — 
3. Modified 
Probabil­
istic 
Same as above, but when re­
cycling the probability will 
be changed. (At any time the 
2 Probability Change in probability 
(±) 
task Is completed, the sum of 
all probabilities on the 
emanated branches must be 
equal to 1.0.) 
4. Conditional One and only one of the emanated 2 
Take First branches will be selected. The 
branches are rank ordered and 
the associated conditions are 
tested. The first branch whose 
condition is satisfied is 
selected. 
Conditional All branches whose conditions 
Take All are satisfied will be selected. 
As with conditional take-first 
branching, the branches are 
rank ordered and the associated 
conditions are tested. All 
branches from the tasks are 
tested for possible selection. 
Examples on 
types 4, 5 
Example 1 
Example 2 
Condition Value 
Condition Value 
Completion/ 
incompletlon of 
specified task 
Performance time 
equal, less, 
greater than 
specified time 
Specified task 
number 
Specified time 
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Table 4.2. Conditional branching allowed by SAINT 
Code Description 
(TLV, x) Time of task completion < x 
(TGV, x) Time of task completion > x 
(TLA, T, A) Time of task completion ^  value of 
attribute A type T 
(TGA, T, A) Time of task completion > value of 
attribute A type T 
(TVC, N) Task N has been completed 
(TVN, N) Task N has not been completed 
(TAC, T. A) Task identified by attribute A type T has 
been completed 
(TAN, T, A) Task identified by attribute A type T has 
not been completed 
(ALV, T, A, x) The value of attribute A type T ^  x 
(AGV, T, A, x) The value of attribute A type T > x 
(ALA, T, A, B) The value of attribute A type T <_ the 
value of attribute B type T 
(AGA, T, A, B) The value of attribute A type T > the 
value of attribute B type T 
Table 4.3. Task description codes available in SAINT 
Description 
code Information required Example Details 
ATAS 
DIFF 
DMOD 
INCM 
Information and/or resource and/or 
system attribute assignment to be 
performed at task completion (COM) 
or release (REL) or start (STA). 
Value assigned may be scaling 
constant (SC) or from distribution 
set (DS). 
Different predecessors option 
required to release the task 
Distribution set modification to 
be made 
Information choice mechanism mode 
taken to retain the information 
packet. The decision may be 
taken when the first/last 
predecessor satisfies its require­
ment or when the biggest/smallest 
value of certain attribute reaches. 
COM:IA,2=DS,3 
REL;RA,1-2=SC,9 
YES 
NO 
DS,4+DS,2 
SMA,4 
LAS 
The information attribute (IA)2 is 
to be assigned a value drawn from 
the distribution set 3 at the time 
the task is completed. A constant 
value of 0,9 is assigned to the 
attribute 2 of resource 1 at the 
time the task is released. 
Distribution set 4 is to be 
replaced by distribution set 2 
Information packet with the 
smallest value of attribute 4 is 
to be saved. Information packet 
arriving with the last predecessor 
completion is to be saved. 
LABL 
MARK 
Label associated with the task 
Marking information to the task 
at specific stage (REL/COM/STA) 
CLOSE M0V-14A 
REL Marking is to take place at the 
time of release of the task. 
MODF Moderator function to be applied 
to task performance 
PREC Completion precedence for task 
processing if more than one task 
were completed simultaneously. 
PRTY Priority value if more than one 
task were assigned to one 
resource 
RCLR Resource clearing to be performed 
REGL Regulation to be performed on 
the state variable upon the 
completion of the task 
RESR The resource associated with the 
task (equipment, operator, etc.). 
1,5 If the statement is preceeded by 
TIME DS1,3 the meaning is that the 
performance time taken from dis­
tribution set 3 is modified by 
the moderator function 1 (say to 
include resource speed) and 
moderator function 5 (say to 
include environmental effect). 
15 If the PREC for another task is 
13 and the two tasks were 
completed simultaneously, this 
task will be processed first. 
(CLR1,SIG6), 
(CLR5) 
If this task and another task 
of priority 2 are assigned to 
one resource, this task could be 
performed first. 
Resource 1 is to be cleared and 
task 6 is to be signalled, 
resource 5 Is to be cleared and 
no task signalled. 
o\ 
SS(5)->- 3.* The value of SS(5) is regulated 
SS(2)+1 to take a new value of 3.*SS(2) 
+1 upon the completion of the 
task 
AND;1 Task will be performed by 
resource 1 
AND:1,2 Task will be performed by 
resources 1 and 2 
OR:3,4 Task will be performed by 
resource 3 or 4 
Table 4.3. (Continued) 
Description Information required 
STAT Types and points at which the 
required statistics (mean, 
standard deviation, minimum, 
maximum, and histogram) need 
to be observed. Types may 
be time of first occurrence 
(FIR), time of all occur­
rences (ALL), time between 
occurrences (BET), or the 
number of occurrences (NUN). 
Collection points may be at 
the release (REL), start 
(STA), completion (COM), or 
clearing (CLR) of the task 
SWIT Switching to be performed 
TCLR Task clearing to be performed 
TIME Performance time characteristics 
Example 
BET STA 
Details 
Statistics are to be collected 
on the time between starts of 
the task. 
IS,3=152 The value of switch 3 is to be 
set to 152 
27,39 Task 27 to be cleared and task 39 
to be signalled upon completion 
of task 27. 
DS,3 Performance time is taken from 
distribution set 3. 
SC,4 Performance time is 4. 
RA,4-5 Performance time is located in 
attribute 5 of resource 4. 
UTCH User-defined task 
Istlcs 
character- (1,2.4),(5,.6) The task requires user-defined 
task characteristics 1,5; and 
they have values of 2.4, .6, 
respectively. 
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Table 4.4. Abbreviations for task descriptions information 
in SAINT 
Abbreviation Meaning 
ALL Time of all occurrences 
BET Time between occurrences 
BIG Biggest attribute value 
COM Task completion 
DS Distribution set 
FIR First attribute value or 
Time of first occurrence 
lA Information attribute 
LAS Last attribute value 
NUM Number of occurrences 
RA Resource attribute 
REL Task release 
SA System attribute 
SC Scaling constant 
SMA Smallest attribute value 
SS State variable 
STA Task start 
UF User function 
80 
1. Constant (CO) 
2. Normal (NO) 
3. Uniform (UN) 
4. Erlang (ER) 
5. Lognormal (LO) 
6. Poisson (PO) 
7. Beta (BE) 
8. Gamma (GA) 
9. Triangular (TR) 
10. Beta fitted to three estimates as in PERT (BP) 
11. Weibull (WE) 
SAINT allows the user to make any task modifications 
during the modeling process. This modification involves 
a substitution of the characteristics and output side of 
one task for those of another task upon the completion of 
a third task. Either interchange modification or multiple 
replacement modification may be used in one SAINT model. 
Figure 4.3 shows the symbolism used for task modification 
with its two types, interchange and multiple replacement. 
Figure 4.3.a is the general symbolism used for task 
modification. In the situation described by this figure, 
completion of task 3 causes the distribution of the 
discription and output of task 2 for those of task 1. 
Figure 4.3.b gives an example of the interchange 
modification. Upon completion of task 3, inputs to tasks 
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1,2 would result in an output from task 2. Later upon 
completion of task 4, inputs to task 1,2 would result in 
an output from task 1. 
Figure 4.3.c illustrates a situation which requires 
multiple replacement modification. Upon completion of 
task 4, inputs to tasks 1 or 2 result in an output 
from task 2 and an input to task 3 yields an output 
from task 3. Later, upon completion of task 5, an input 
to task 1, 2, or 3 results in an output from task 3. 
4.4. Incorporating Subroutines in SAINT 
The following are some important subroutines incorporated 
in the SAINT technique. 
1. Subroutine MODRF: 
Task performance characteristics (including time) 
in complex man-machine systems are not simply 
expressed by some specific distribution sets. 
Moderator functions give the user the liberty 
to moderate the preassigned distribution for the 
performance characteristic according to any situational 
effective change. MODF can be made inactive and will 
be activated at any desired task. This moderation 
is accomplished by using the subroutine MODRF. 
2. Subroutine STATE : 
State variables, time dependent variables usually 
designated by SS(I), must be coded in subroutine 
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STATE in FORTRAN or a compatible language using 
special SAINT common variables. The algebraic or 
difference equation must be of the form SS(I)=f(t); 
in this case SAINT will automatically advance 
simulated time, accounting for task completions and 
state variable updating. If SS(I) is expressed in 
a differential equation DD(I)=d/dt SS(I)=f(t), 
SAINT will automatically integrate the left-hand side 
to determine the corresponding values of SS(I). 
There is nore to say about state variables in 
dynamic tasks and user written subprograms to 
calculate dynamic properties, retrieve the time 
that a transaction has been awaiting scheduling, 
and regulate the state variable value. 
For manipulating attributes and priority values, 
SAINT provides some user support programs that can be 
called to assist in SAINT modeling. These subroutines 
include : 
3. Subroutine GETIA(NAT,VALUE) retrieves the values of 
information attributes. 
4. Subroutine PUTIA(NAT,VALUE) resets the values of 
information attributes. 
5. Subroutine GETRA(NRE,NAT,VALUE) retrieves the 
values of resource attributes. 
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6. Subroutine PUTEA(NRE,NAT,VALUE) resets the values 
of resource attributes. 
7. Subroutine GETSA(NAT,VALUE) retrieves the values of 
system attributes 
8. Subroutine PUTSA(NAT,VALUE) resets the values of 
system attributes. 
9. Subroutine GETPR(ITASK,VALUE) retrieves the values 
of task priorities. 
10. Subroutine PUTPR(ITASK,VALUE) resets the values of 
task priorities. 
11. Subroutine QRANK(IRANK) resets the ranking procedure 
used in ranking tasks awaiting scheduling. 
12. Function TIMEQ(IDUM) retrieves the time that a task 
has been awaiting scheduling. 
13. Function TMARK(IDUM) retrieves the mark time 
associated with a task awaiting scheduling. 
14. Function BETA(NDIS) generates samples from Beta or 
Beta-PERT distributions. 
15. Function ERLNG(NDIS) generates samples from Erlang 
distributions. 
16. Function GAMM(NDIS) generates samples from Gamma 
distributions. 
17. Function RLOGN(NDIS) generates samples from log normal 
distributions. 
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18. Function RNORM(NDIS) generates samples from normal 
distributions. 
19. Function TRNGL(NDIS) generates samples from triangular 
distributions. 
20. Function UNFKM(NDIS) generates samples from uniform 
distributions. 
21. Function WEIBL(NDIS) generates samples from Weibull 
distributions. 
22. Function DRAND(IY) generates a pseudo-random number 
between 0 and 1. 
23. Subroutine NPOSN(K,NPSSN) generates samples from 
Poisson distributions. 
The SAINT user may define characteristics of task order 
than those required by SAINT by using them in conjunction 
with moderator functions or other user-written subprograms. 
The resulting user-defined task characteristics make the 
user able to model the effect of different system conditions 
(e.g., performance shaping factors on the task performance). 
Retrieval and resetting these user-defined task character­
istics can be accomplished through the following 
subroutines : 
24. GETTC(NTASK,NCHAR,VALUE) Retrieves VALUE as the value 
of user-defined task 
characteristics NCHAR of 
task NTASK. 
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25. PUTTC(NTASK,NCHAR,VALUE) Sets user-defined task 
characteristic NCHAR of task 
NTASK to VALUE. 
Finally, SAINT includes a number of subprograms that 
allow the user to manipulate input and output information 
using the following subroutines. 
26. Subroutine UCLCT(XX,ICODE) is used for collection and 
reporting of user-generated statistics for variables 
based on observation. 
27. Subroutine UTMST(XX,ICODE) is used for collection 
and reporting of user-generated statistics for 
time-persistent variables. 
28. Subroutine UTMSA(XX,ICODE) is used for collection 
of user-generated statistics for time-persistent 
variables. 
29. Subroutine UHIST(XX,ICODE) is used for collection 
and reporting for user-generated histograms. 
30. Subroutine UPLOT(X,T,IPLOT) is used for collection 
and reporting of user-generated plots. 
31. Subroutine CLEAR is used for reinitialization of 
all user-generated statistics and plots. 
32. Subroutine CLROB(IND) is used for reinitialization 
of user-generated statistics for variables based on 
observation. 
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33. Subroutine CLRTP(IîîD) is used for reinitialization 
of user-generated statistics for time-persistent 
variables. 
34. The SAINT variable USTPV(ICODE, 6) must be reset by 
the user when user-generated statistics for time-
persistent variables are reinitialized. 
35. Subroutine CLRHI(IND) is used for reinitialization 
of user-generated histograms. 
36. Subroutine CLRPT(IND) is used for reinitialization 
of user-generated plots. 
37. Subroutine ENDIT is used to generate reports of 
statistical quantities for an iteration and to 
reinitialize user-generated statistics for the next 
iteration. 
38. Subroutine UOTPT is used to generate reports of 
statistical quantities for a set of iterations. 
4,5. Comparison Between SAINT and THERP 
Modeling Techniques 
4.5.1. Introduction 
A comparison is made between THERP and SAINT 
techniques as tools for human factor analysis in nuclear 
power plant operation.Our assessment of THERP and 
SAINT features and capabilities shows that the latter 
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has wider capabilities and more nuclear relevance. This 
is illustrated in the following sections and the case 
study in Chapter Five. 
In the following sections, the major differences between 
the two techniques will be illustrated. Other important 
differences include the ease of use of SAINT by 
personnel who have no extensive expertise in human factors. 
The dynamic nature of the SAINT allows for continuous 
monitoring of task performance via graphic display and 
spot inspection during task performance. 
4.5.2. Comparison relative to task description 
THERP Task description in THERP is less 
structured and cannot accommodate a variety of attributes. 
SAINT A simple task may involve many attributes 
(system attribute, information attribute, resource 
attribute) for defining the task. This makes the task 
description more compact and clear. 
NUCLEAR RELEVANCE Complexity of systems and 
performance shaping factors together with the variety 
of resources in nuclear activities make SAINT 
modeling more preferable. 
4.5.3. Comparison relative to attributes 
THERP Attributes in THERP are quantitatively 
defined by constant values. Branching occurs whether 
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the specific value of an attribute is satisfied or 
not. 
SAINT Attribute values in SAINT and also task 
duration may be constants, a sample from one of 
eleven available probability distributions (Section 4.3), 
or value obtained from user-written programs. 
NUCLEAR RELEVANCE Attribute values involved in 
nuclear tasks may be unknown. A statistical distribution 
may be better needed for reasonable selections. 
4.5.4. Comparison relative to event sequences 
THERP The event sequences in THERP are fixed and 
a limited number (two) of probabilistic branching is 
allowed. This number is governed by the event tree 
concept that allows two probabilities complementing each 
other one for success and the other for failure. 
SAINT Five types of branching are provided in 
SAINT: deterministic; probabilistic; modified probabilistic; 
conditional take first; and conditional take all. Moreover, 
through the probabilistic branching, more than two emanating 
branches can be allowed with all probabilities summed to uni 
NUCLEAR RELEVANCE Event sequences and hence 
system reliability are dependent upon success/failure 
probabilities and interactions among personnel and 
hardware. SAINT, with its wide scope of branching. 
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can be very useful in investigating degradation status 
of nuclear systems/subsystems rather than the "failure/ 
success" restriction imposed by most reliability analytical 
methods. 
4.5.5. Comparison relative to branching nature 
THERP TKEKP concentrates mainly on actions being 
performed during the task if they are done correctly or 
incorrectly. Subsequent actions will depend on these two 
definite paths. 
SAIHT Beside expanding the performance probability 
to more than two through SAINT's probabilistic branching, 
there is the conditional branching that governs the 
emanating path by the performance time and/or the attribute 
values to be lower, higher, or at certain predetermined 
level (Table 4.2). 
ITU CLEAR RELEVANCE Performance time and other 
attribute values are very important and critical in 
most of the tasks involved in operation, maintenance, 
and testing of nuclear systems. Subsequent human actions 
and system/subsystem responses are greatly dependent on 
the time and other attribute values involved in tasks. 
4.5.6. Comparison relative to task nature 
THERP Task analysis in THERP is static in nature. 
This can provide a good assessment of present reliability 
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and possible areas for improvement or for comparison of 
alternatives. 
SAINT Task analysis in SAINT is dynamic in 
nature. State variables, expressed explicitly or 
implicitly as function of time or even expressed by 
differential equations, can appear with their time 
dependent values among different tasks. On the other 
hand, SAINT allows the user to carry on any task modifica­
tions during the modeling process. Either interchange 
modification or multiple replacement modification is 
allowed. 
Through the modified probabilistic branching, SAINT 
allows the recycling of certain task with the performance 
probability being modified. 
Finally, the attribute values are allowed to be 
modified according to any situational effective change. 
This is done using one of many subroutines available in 
SAINT (Section 4,4). 
NUCLEAR RELEVANCE Complete task analysis can 
be achieved if we introduce the state variables to be 
monitored by operation personnel such as temperature, 
pressure, conductivity, etc. Although this will complicate 
the modeling process, but the wide capabilities of SAINT 
can provide a strong support to this area of research. 
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Operation, maintenance, and testing procedures of 
nuclear power plants involve interchange and multiple 
replacement of many tasks depending on different situational 
parameters, SAINT can maneuver and simulate these tasks. 
4.5.7. Comparison relative to crew activities 
THE5P Introducing more than one resource in analyzing 
human tasks using THERP, makes the representation difficult 
and complicated. 
SAINT SAINT can be used easily to study crew 
activities. Different human resources with different 
attributes involved in one task can be modeled without any 
complexity. Moreover, interchanging and replacement 
between different resources are allowed. This gives the 
SAINT the merit of providing a great flexibility in the 
level of aggregation employed. 
NUCLEAR RELEVANCE Crew activities are very common 
in the operation, maintenance, and testing of nuclear 
systems/subsystems. Operation activities involve many 
personnel such as the shift supervisor, senior control 
operator, control operator, equipment operator, and equipment 
attendant. 
Maintenance activities involve instrument foreman, 
instrument technicians, electrical foremen, electricians, 
mechanical foremen, mechanics, welders, helpers, storekeeper, 
and stockmen. 
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Good coinmunications is greatly important among the 
personnel of each group and among different groups. 
Examples are the maintenance activities which require good 
communication between the operation and maintenance groups; 
also, radioactive release activities which require good 
communication between the operation and chemistry groups. 
Good communication is required between personnel 
if one task starts during one shift and has to be completed 
the next shift. 
Reviewing LERs revealed that so many events involved 
crew activities, also poor communication was the failure 
mode of many significant human related events. Analyzing 
these events using the SAINT will give the human reliability 
research area a great depth and significance. 
4.5.8. Comparison relative to the possible outcomes 
THERP Like many reliability techniques, reliability 
estimate as an outcome is not permitted to be shown as 
function of time except as discrete basis. Event tree is 
required to redo again at any desired period level. 
SAINT Reliability (system or human) and other 
outcomes can be represented in a continuous or graphic 
way. 
NUCLEAR RELEVANCE Time affects the physical and 
emotional stresses of human, also it affects the 
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vigilance and reactive capability. Continuous display 
of human reliability as a function of time using the SAINT 
will allow the human reliability analyst to investigate 
many problems associated with high stress level situations 
and the variation of human performance with time. 
4.5.9. Comparison relative to interevent dependencies 
THERP THERP is very limited to static, inflexible, 
discrete representation of inter-event dependencies. 
SAINT SAINT is dynamic, flexible, time dependent 
representation dependencies is possible. 
NUCLEAR RELEVANCE Most of the human related 
events in nuclear power plants occur by cause and effect 
relationships where inter-event relationships are very 
important. 
4.5.10. Comparison relative to mathematical sophistication 
THERP THERP is a simple, limited multiplicative 
model suitable for extremely simple and basic tasks. 
SAINT Through many subroutines available 
in SAINT, complete computer analysis of task/activity 
including all human performance dynamics can be accomplished. 
Different available subroutines and their areas of use are 
explained in detail in section 4.4. 
NUCLEAR RELEVANCE Task performance characteristics 
(including time) in complex MMSs such as found in 
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nuclear field need to be deeply investigated using 
SAINT. 
4.5.11. Comparison relative to capability 
THE!RP THERP is limited to the use of a single 
model. 
SAINT The SAINT technique can accommodate for 
the use of any applicable model. 
Nuclear Relevance The nature of tasks in nuclear 
power plants is of complex nature which would require a 
flexible framework of representation that accepts various 
models for task analysis. 
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5. CASE STUDY 
5.1. Introduction 
To emphasize our evaluation to the SAIHT, we shall 
consider an abnormal event that actually occurred in one 
of the operating nuclear power plants, Calvert Cliffs-1. 
The event is related to the emergency power supply of 
the nuclear power station and demonstrates the role of 
human error contribution in the station blackout. Calvert 
Cliffs has two units that share three diesel generators 
which start up in case of emergency at any of the two units. 
5.2. Background (General) 
5.2.1. Safety injection systems in nuclear power plants 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC, had 
divided the spectrum of all possible accidents in nuclear 
power plants into nine broad classes in increasing order 
of severity. All accidents pertaining to each class are 
listed in an annex to Appendix D of lOCFR 50. 
Loss of coolant accidents lies under Class 8 and can be 
divided into three categories: (1) Minor losses that are 
compensated by various design features with no serious 
effect on operation, (2) larger breaks that would result 
in reactor trip and for which provisions are available for 
cooling the core, and (3) a design-basis accident. 
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DBA, double-ended major coolant pipe fracture ("guillotine") 
break) that could release fission products to the contain­
ment. 
The abbreviation LOCA is usually used to describe 
the third category of loss of coolant accidents, LOCA 
would result whenever the reactor coolant system experiences 
a break or opening large enough so that the coolant inventory 
in the system could not be maintained by the normally 
operating make up system. 
Many systems in nuclear power plants are designed to 
have engineering safety features, ESF, in order to mitigate 
the consequences of LOCA. 
The ESF functions can be described as follows : 
1. Reactor Trip (RT): To stop the fission process and 
terminate core power generation. 
2. Emergency Core Cooling (ECC); To cool the core, 
thereby keeping the release of radioactivity from the 
fuel into the containment at low levels. 
3. Post Accident Radioactivity Removal (PARR): To remove 
radioactivity released from the core to the containment 
atmosphere. 
4. Post Accident Heat Removal (PAHR): To remove decay 
heat from within the containment, thereby preventing 
overpressurization of the containment. 
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5. Containment Integrity (CI); To prevent radioactivity 
within the containment from being dispersed into the 
enviromrent. 
The role of the engineered safeguards in protecting 
barriers during LOCA is shown in Figure 5.1. 
The Emergency Core Cooling System, ECCS, is the system 
which possesses the second ESF feature described above. 
Following a major LOCA the ultimate function of the ECCS 
is to reflood the core so that the decay heat can be 
removed by stable nucleate boiling. The ECCS supplies 
cool water continuously to the reactor vessel to replace 
that which boils away in the core. The steam that is thus 
formed escapes first to the upper plenum of the vessel 
and then through the primary system breach and into the 
containment atmosphere. According to the different 
designs for both BWR and PWR, subsystems of the emergency 
core cooling are different in both types of reactors. 
In BWRs, there are two different means for emergency 
core cooling. The first method has the high pressure 
core spray system at the high-pressure end of the range, 
followed by the low-pressure core spray system at the 
low-pressure end of the pressure range. Both subsystems 
discharge through ring headers inside the reactor 
pressure vessel directly onto the core. The second method 
is a combination of steam blow-off to the pressure 
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Figure 5.1. Role of engineered safeguards in protecting 
barriers during LOCA (adapted from 
reference 100b) 
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suppression pool at the high pressure end of the range 
followed by residual heat removal, RHR, system operation 
in the low pressure core injection mode as soon as the 
pressure permits. Low pressure injection discharges 
directly into the reactor vessel. In all cases, the water 
supply is taken from the pressure suppression pool while 
pare of the ïUiR system controls the pool temperature. 
In PWRs, the emergency core cooling operates as part 
of the safety injection system. As long as the charging 
pumps of the chemical and volume control system, CVCS, 
have adequate capacity, they are used as the high pressure 
injection pumps. 
Figures 5.2. and 5.3 show the control of consequences 
of LOCA by ECC in BWR, PWR. 
Two basic principles have been followed in the design 
and application of how che safety injection actuated 
signal, SIAS, will actuate the ESF systems in the present 
day nuclear power plants. General Electric's approach to 
protective logic systems in BWRs has devoted two separate 
systems for each protective function: 
- Reactor protection logic system (RPLS) for the 
reactor protection system (RPS). 
- Low pressure core injection instrumentation and 
control system for the low pressure core injection 
system (LPCIS). 
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The Westinghouse PWR design has, however, incorporated 
all major protective system logic functions into one 
major system known as the Safety Injection Control System. 
This latter approach will be emphasized here since this 
section of the study relates to occurrence at a Westinghouse 
plant. 
Figure 5.4 shows different locations on the Safety 
Injection System where the SIAS acts. 
5.2.2. Auxiliary Electric Power Systems, AEPS, in nuclear 
power plants 
The main constituents of the AEPS for one of a two 
units power plant are: 
1. Off-site a-c power source 
This is the preferred source and consists of two 
redundant sources. Each source is designed to supply the 
emergency power needs of both units. Practically each 
source supplies half the requirements of each unit and 
acts as an alternate source for the other half of each 
unit. 
2. On-site a-c power source 
This is the standby source and consists of three 
(or more) diesel generator sets, one for each unit while 
the third serves either unit in case of inoperability of 
its own. 
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The selection design and qualifications of diesel 
generator units used as on site electric power systems at U.S. 
nuclear power plants is explained in reference 55b. 
Figure 5.5 illustrates the block diagram of the AEPS 
for one of two units nuclear power plants. 
The principal functions of the AEPS are the following: 
- To provide power to the Reactor Power System (RPS) for 
safe shutdown. 
- To provide power to the Engineering Safety Feature Systems 
(ESFS) to mitigate the effects of transients and accidents. 
Coincident loss of the two mutually redundant off-site 
sources will cause an insufficient power to the ESFSs. 
This term was used in WASH-1400^  ^to express any state 
of the AEPS that inhibits adequate ESFS operability 
during the course of an accident. Complete evaluation 
for this top event using fault tree technique was accomplished 
in WASH-1400®^  for both PWR, BWR AEPSs. 
Simultaneous unavailability of both the off-site 
a-c power and the on-site a-c power (station blackout) 
is one of the serious events that can jeopardize both the 
public and safety. 
The assessment of the reliability of diesel generators 
is a very important factor in mitigating the probability of 
9 70 
station blackout. * 
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5.2.3. Background about the facility 
The event occurred on Feb. 8, 1980 at Calvert Cliffs-1 
nuclear power plant which is one of two units licensed by 
the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, Baltimore, 
Maryland. Listed below are some important points of 
information about the facility. 
Reacter type PWR 
Power level 2700 MWT 
Date of commercial operation May 8, 1975 
A/E Bechtel 
NSSS Combustion Engineering 
The stand-by a-c power source for the two units consists of 
three diesel generators: Dll, D21 and D12. Dll is dedicated 
to unit 1 and D21 is dedicated to unit 2, while D12 
represents the swing diesel generator that is shared 
between the two units. 
In Calvert Cliffs, a safety injection activated 
signal (SIAS) starts the three diesel generators and a 
manual shutdown of the diesel generators overrides the 
SIAS start. 
The event that will be described in the following 
section is concerned with an inadvertent initiation of 
SIAS at unit 1 and all emergency diesel generators (3) 
failure in both units. 
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5.3. The Event 
5.3.1. Event description 
To avoid missing any information about the event, 
the following is an excerpt from the licensee to NRC 
about this event. 
At 1511, while performing a routine surveillance 
test (STP-M-210A, reactor protection system 
functional test shutdown) which effects inputs 
to the engineered safety feature actuation 
system, the technician inadvertently initiated 
SIAS (Safety Injection Actuated Signal) on 
unit 1. Unit 1 was in Mode 5 with the Reactor 
Coolant System drained to the middle of the hot 
legs. The high pressure, containment spray and 
charging pumps were all in pull to lock, 12 
Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pump was 
running for shutdown, cooling and 11 LPSI pump 
was in normal after stop. 
After the SIAS was initiated the operator 
noticed that the boric acid direct make-up 
valve CVC 514 MOV and gravity feed valves 
CVC 508 MOV and CVC 509 MOV had opened and 
11 LPSI pump had started as did 11, 12 and 21 
diesel generators. The operator verified a 
pressurizer block permissive alarm present, 
then blocked and reset SIAS channels A and B. 
He then instructed the other operator to shut 
the boric acid gravity feed valves and stop 
the diesel generators. A short time after 
the diesels were stopped a common alarm for 
each diesel and 'Diesel Engine-Exciter 
Shutdown' alarm were received. It was then 
realized that all diesels were out-of-service 
(T.S.3.8.1.1.d, unit 2 and T.S.3.8.1.2, unit 
1). The Shift Supervisor (SS) proceeded to 
the diesel generator rooms to reset the 
diesels and the relieving Senior Control Room 
Operator (SCRO) proceeded to the ESFAS 
cabinets to verify that all the actuation 
modules had been reseL. Waexi Lhe relieving 
SCRO arrived at the ESFAS cabinets the 
technician informed him that he had reset 
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the S IAS. The diesel genrators were then reset 
and started to verify their operability, and 
were returned to service by 1527. Unit 2 was 
in Mode 1 and operating at 100% during the 
event. This is not a repetitive occurrence. 
Cause Description: 
The cause of the inadvertent S IAS was the 
technician missing a step in the Surveillance 
Test which would have maintained the S IAS in 
a blocked condition while resetting the sensor 
channels following the functional test. The 
apparent cause for the diesel generators to 
become inoperable, when they were shutdown after 
resetting the SIAS occurred when the operator 
attempted to reset the SIAS signal from the 
control room. This step was not completely 
effective (all actuation modules did not 
reset), or the technician interfered with 
the operator when he reset the SIAS at the 
ESFAS cabinets resulting in a partial reset. 
Consequently, when the operator stopped the 
diesels they still had a SIAS start signal 
which initiated a start failure alarm rendering 
the diesels inoperable until the operators 
reset S IAS and the diesel generators. Tiie 
corrective actions were to reinstruct the 
technician in the importance of following 
step-by-step instructions of procedures, and 
standing order 80-1 had been issued which 
requires the operators to clearly determine 
by verifying locally at the ESFAS cabinets 
that the actuation modules are in a non-
tripped condition prior to stopping the 
diesels after a false SIAS. It is not pos­
sible to troubleshoot the SIAS reset circuit 
for a possible circuit malfunction because 
a NRC required modification is currently 
being implemented. The circuit will be 
tested for proper operation following the 
modification. 
The importance of the event comes from its consequences 
that all the standby a-c sources (three diesel generators) 
were unavailable for several minutes due to human error. 
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Modeling and analyzing the event can help in the 
quantitative determination of human contribution in the 
assessment of the issue of station blackout at pressurized 
water reactors. Simultaneous loss of off-site a-c 
power, loss of on-site a-c power, and failure of the 
auxiliary feed water system, (especially at unit-2 which 
was operating at full power) will seriously affect the 
steam generator decay heat removal and so the plant 
safety is greatly jeopardized. This sequence of events 
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was modeled by Mclagan and Azarm using the event tree 
methodology as shown in Figure 5.6. 
99 The event was analyzed in detail by Sabri and Husseiny 
and was classified as a significant event from both system 
and human factors view points. 
5.3.2. Chronological development of the event 
The chronological development of the event is 
illustrated in Figure 5.7 and can be well-understood 
by reviewing actions and consequences through the pre-
event, event, and post-event situations. Abbreviations 
used are: 
AO Auxiliary Operator 
BAMUV Boric Acid Make-Up Valve 
CCP Containment Charging Pump 
CSP Containment Spray Pump 
Loss of AC Minimum number of AFW AC Restored Steam 
Offsi te Power Diesel Generators AC-AFW Turbine Before Steam Generator 
(LOSP) Available Available Available Generator Dryout Status 
OK 
OK 
? 
P(LOSP) 
OK 
OG 
OK 
OK 
A^FPT Damage 
Figure 5,6. Event tree for station blackout and auxiliary feedwater sequence (adapted from reference 69) 
Activity (Unit 1) Status 
Cold shutdown (Unit 1) 
ACS drained to middle of hot leg (Unit 1) 
100% power (Unit 2) 
SIAS not maintained In a blocked condition 
(missed rGqiiired procedure step) Technician 
Yes 
terminate mitigating 
event ! 
Terminate 
Second 
Event 
Action Consequence Action Consequence 
Alarm 
Shut 
STOP 
STOP 
Shut 
Reset 
DG's 
Verify 
Reset Sensor 
Channels 
Inadvertent 
Initiation of SIAS 
DG's (3) Out-of-
Servlce 
11 LPSI Pump 
Start 
Gravity Feed Valves 
(2) Open 
Boric Acid Make-Up 
Valve Open 
11. 12, 21 DG (3) 
Start 
Routine 
Surveillance Test 
(Affect ESFAS) 
Operator Blocked 
and Reset SIAS 
Channels A&B 
Operators Verify a 
Pressurlzer Block 
Permissive Alarm 
Present 
Time 
Figure 5.7. Flow diagram of the event (adapted from reference 99) 
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DG Diesel Generator 
ESFAS Engineered Safety Feature 
LPS I 
RCS 
GFV 
RO 
SCRO 
Actuated Signal 
Gravity Feed Valve 
Low Pressure Safety Injection 
Reactor Coolant System 
Reactor Operator 
Senior Control Room Operator 
SS 
SIAS Safety Injection Actuated Signal 
Shift Supervisor 
Pre-event Situation 
-Unit 2 in mode 1 with 100% power level 
-Unit 1 in mode 5 with: 
-RCS was drained to the middle of hot legs. 
-CSP, CCP were in poll to lock. 
-#12 LPSI pump was running for shutdown cooling 
-#11 LPSI puiiip was normal after stop. 
-Routine surveillance reactor protection functional 
test was carried on. 
The event 
-Following the functional test the technician, while 
resetting the sensor channels, missed one procedural 
step which would have maintained the SIAS in a 
blocked condition. 
-SIAS was inadvertently actuated at 15:11 with the 
following consequences, 
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-BAMUV-CVC 514 MOV opened 
-GFVs-CVC 508 MOV, CVC 509 MOV opened 
-#11 LPSI pump 
-DGs - 11, 12, 21 
started 
started 
3. Post-event Situation 
-The RO verified the presence of pressurizer block 
permissive alarm. 
-The RO blocked and reset the SIAS channels A, B 
from the ESFAS cabinets in the control room or he 
interfered with the technician working there. 
However, this step was not completely effective 
(all actuation modules did not reset), 
-The RO instructed the AO to do the following. 
-Stop DGs-ll, 12, 21 
-The AO did what he had instructed correctly. 
-Few minutes later after DGs stop (15 : ? ) a common 
alarm for each DG and diesel-exciter shutdown 
alarm was received indicating that all the standby 
a-c power for both units are unavailable in 
violation of T.S.3.8.1.1,d unit 2 and T.S.3.8.1.2 
unit 1. 
-SS proceeded to DG rooms to reset the diesels. 
-Shut BAMUV-CVC 514 NOV. 
-Shut GFVs-CVC 508 MOV, CVC 509 MOV 
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-SCRO proceeded to the ESFAS cabinets to verify that 
all the actuation modules had been reset. There, 
he was told by technician that he had reset the SIAS, 
-Diesels were reset and started to verify their 
operability and were returned to service by 15:27. 
5.4. Simulation Using SAINT 
The event involves the following resources and tasks : 
Resources 
R^  : Technician 
Rg : Reactor operator 
Rg; Senior reactor operator 
R^ : Shift supervisor 
Rg: Auxiliary operator - 1 
Rg: Auxiliary operator - 2 
Ry: Auxiliary operator - 3 
Rg: Safety Injection Logic System 
Rg: Pressurizer permissive alarm switch 
R^ q; BAMUV 
R^ 2.' First GFV 
R^ 2: Second GFV 
R^ 2'- I'I'SI pump f 11 
R14: DG ^  11 
R^ g: DG 9^  12 
DG f 21 
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R^ y: Common alarm switch for each diesel generator 
R^ g: "Diesel Engine-Exciter Shutdown" alarm switch 
R^ g: Instrumentation and control system 
R2Q: Communication 
Tasks 
T^ : The technician (R^ ) blocks the SIAS after 
test (source task) 
T2: The technician (Rj) resets the senior channels 
A and 6 
Tg: The technician completes the test satisfactorily 
(sink task) 
T^ : The Safety Injection Logic System (Rg) actuates 
Tg: The pressurizer permissive alarm switch (Rg) 
actuates 
Tg: The BAMUV (R^ g) opens 
Ty: The two GFVs (R^ ,^ R22) open 
Tg: The LPSI pump f 11 (R^ g) starts 
Tg: The three diesel generators f 11, 12, 21 
(^ 14. ^ 15» 1^5) start 
T^ Q: The instrumentation and control system (R^ g) 
actuates 
T^ :^ The reactor operator (R^ ) verifies the pressure 
permissive alarm (Rg) 
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T-^ 2- reactor operator (R2) communicates with 
the technician (R^ ) to reset all the SIAS 
modules 
The reactor operator (Rg) instructs the auxiliary 
operator-1 (R^ ) to close the BAMUV (R^ g) and 
the GFVs (R^ ,^ Rj^ 2) 
T^ :^ The reactor operator (R2) instructs the auxiliary 
operator-2 (Rg) to stop the LPSI pump f 11 (R^ g) 
T^ g: The reactor operator (R^ ) instructs the auxiliary 
operator-3 (Ry) to stop the diesel generators 
f 11, 12, 21 (R^ .^ R^ 3. R^ g) 
T^ g: The auxiliary operator-1 (R^ ) closes the BAMUV 
(R^ g) and the GFVs (R^ ,^ R22) 
T^ y: The auxiliary operator-2 (Rg) stops the LPSI 
pump f 11 (R^ )^ 
T^ g: The auxiliary operator-3 (Ry) stops the diesel 
generators f 11, 12, 21 (R^ ,^ R^ ,^ R^ g) 
T^ g: All errors are being corrected (sink task) 
Tgg: The common alarm switch for each diesel generator 
(R^ y) and the "Diesel Engine-Exciter Shutdown" 
alarm switch (R^ g) actuate 
T22: The senior control room operator (R3) instructs 
the technician (R^ ) to reset all the safety 
injection actuation modules 
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T22' The shift supervisor (R^ ) instructs the 
auxiliary operator-3 (Ry) to reset the three 
diesel generators 
T23: The technician (R^ ) resets the safety injection 
actuation modules 
T24: The auxiliary operator-3 (Ry) resets the three 
diesel generators 
T25: The reactor opeator (Rg) verifies the dieseles' 
unavailability alarm 
The multitude of tasks presented above and the degree 
of interaction among the various resources cannot be 
represented by THERP in a single step. Nevertheless, 
the dynamic nature of SAINT and its inherent capabilities 
allow the analyst to thoroughly simulate the event under 
cons ideration. 
In simulating the event, the analyst could capitalize 
on the merits of SAINT (Sections 4.5.2 through 4.5.11) and 
exploit the available versatile features of the technique. 
Examples of the. merits useful in the present case are the 
diverse attributes of the multiple resources branching and 
crew activities. 
Figure 5,6 shows a schematic representation of the 
SAINT model illustrating the event. 
Due to unavailability of data needed to describe 
the tasks and the resources, each task is described by 
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its label and the resource involved. However, all 
tasks can be perfectly described using Table 4.3 given 
the availability of data. The following are some 
possible outcomes which are expected from the event 
simulation using SAINT: 
1. Detailed event model relating all tasks 
2. Relationship among tasks and resources 
3. Continuous record of performance time 
4. Detailed record of human reliability 
5. Accurate depiction of errors 
6. Time dependent estimates of human error rates 
ammtcATE 
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Figure 5,8 SAINT model illuscracing event sequences 
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6. DATA BANK FOR HUMAN RELIABILITY 
ANALYSIS IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
6.1. Survey and Evaluation of the 
Present Available Data Sources 
Field data on operator errors can be extracted from 
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several available Occurrences Information Sources (OIS) 
which report, with varying degrees of emphasis on amount of 
detail, operation experiences of light water reactor (LT«JR) 
plants. These OIS include : 
1. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) - Licensee Event 
Reports (LERs) supplemented by details found in 
letters from the licensees to the NRC. 
2. Reports from the Nuclear Safety Information Center 
(NSIC) which publishes periodical selected summaries 
in the journal of Nuclear Safety. 
3. NRC Rainbow Books : such as 
a. NUREG-0020, Operating Units Status Reports 
(OUSR) (Grey Book) 
b. NURE6-0366, Nuclear Power Plant Operating 
Experience (Green Book) 
4. Transient Analysis Classification and Evaluation 
(TRACE) scheme developed by Technology International, 
Inc. (Tll) for compilation of information extracted 
from the LERs and for identification of the level of 
significance of each event. 
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5. Nuclear Power Reliability Data Systems (NPRDS) 
which are compiled by the nuclear utility companies 
based on operation experience, 
6. Special studies by the Electric Power Research 
Institute (EPRI), such as 
a. NP-842; Refueling Outage Trends in Light Water 
Reactors 
b. NP-801; ATWS: A Reappraisal, Part III; Frequency 
of Transients 
7. TII-Ames Evaluated Data Bank on Maintenance and 
Testing (M & T) Related events in Light Water 
Reactors ALO-77/1. 
8. TII-Ames Evaluated Data Bank on Diesel Generator 
(DG) Related Events. 
Table 6.1 gives a summary of the content of the 
available sources and their limitations. The first two 
sources are the more general ones, while the rest are 
derived studies on some specific areas. The major 
limitation in these sources is the type and level of 
details in reporting human-related events. 
6.2. Developed Classification Format for 
Human Related Events 
The safety research group at ISU had extracted 495 
events over the period from Jan., 1972 to Jan., 1978 in 
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which one or more operators were involved. The source 
of information was NSIC reports from 65 commercial 
nuclear power plants. The group did not depend on key 
words in its decision about whether those events were 
operation errors or not. The events extracted from 
the NSIC data banks were coded in the GENCLASS code 
(one line descriptions) with a very brief summary at the 
end of each event. 
This work utilized the extracted events and refined 
them using other additional detailed data sources such 
as : 
1. Licensee Event Reports (LERs) . 
2. Microfiches for the events reported in the LERs 
plus all letters and comments from the plant 
personnel to NRC. 
The refined data were described by two types of 
developed classification formats, the long description 
format (Table 6.2) and the short description format 
(Table 6.3). 
The long description format includes : 
1. Event reference number (6 spaces) 
Same as recorded in the LERs. Page number and the 
old serial number of the event (before refinement) are 
written under the reference number. 
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2. Plant name code (3 spaces) 
3. Plant docket (3 spaces) 
Table 6.4 shows all information about the commercial 
light water reactors. This information includes the 
plant name, plant code number, plant type (PWR or BWR), 
docket number, vendor, A & E, rated power (Ml«7e), and 
date of criticality. 
4. Event date (6 spaces) 
5. Report date (6 spaces) 
6a. System involved (2 spaces) 
6b. System affected (2 spaces) 
The code used for systems identification is given in 
Table 6.5. 
7a. Component involved (2 spaces) 
7b. Component affected (2 spaces) 
The code used for both electrical and mechanical 
components is put in a very clear form to facilitate 
decoding without need to look at tables in most cases. 
The code is given in Table 6.6. 
8. Failure mode (3 spaces) 
Failure modes for operation errors are classified 
in six broad categories as follows : 
- Action being omitted 
- Action being committed incorrectly 
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- Inadvertence 
- Communication 
- Personality/Training 
- Procedure inadequacy/deficiency 
Table 6.7 gives the code used for failure mode. 
Brief explanation for the six categories with some 
illustrative examples are given in the same table. 
Table 6.8 shows a list of the most repetitive 
actions, in the operation events, that can lie under 
the first three categories. 
9. Personnel (2 spaces) 
Table 6.9 gives the code used in identifying the 
personnel involved in the event and their jobs and 
responsibilities. 
Since the data bank presented in this work is 
concerned with the operation event, the interest will 
be in the first section of the table, i.e., the 
Operations Staff. 
10. Duration (3 spaces) 
This is the time between the moment of error 
occurrence and the moment of discovery. This interval 
of time is not available in most of the reports. 
Recovery time, which we are not interested in, is 
more available. 
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The code used here is M for minute, H for hour, D 
for day, and Z if the duration is unknown. 
11. Cue of disco-very (3 spaces) 
This item describes how the error was recognized. 
Table 6.10 lists most of the cues observed during the 
review of data. The table describes the nature of the 
cue, its code, and some examples that can lie under each 
cue. 
12. Method of discovery (1 space) 
The code used here is the same that is used in the 
present format of the LER and it is shown in Table 6.11. 
13. Rated power in MWe (3 spaces) 
It is very important to know the power level at 
the initiation of the error rather than that at the moment 
of discovery. Since the information about the first is 
not always available, the power level at the moment of 
discovery will be recorded. 
14. Plant status (1 space) 
Table 6.12 gives the code used for specifying the 
plant status. Here, as mentioned in the previous item, 
the available status at the moment of discovery will be 
recorded. 
15. Significance 
There is no distinct definition of the significance 
criteria. The event can be considered significant 
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if there is any violation that threatens the health/safety 
of the public and/or the integrity of the plan to any 
extent. To fill this item, level of significance must be 
rated. For the time being, this item will be left blank. 
Description of the event : 
Under the coded line describing the event, a detailed 
description of the event is given. The description includes 
all available information that serve the scope of this 
study. The description is written in four separate 
paragraphs, designated as follows. 
-Event Description (ED) 
Describes the situation before, during, and 
after the event (consequences) 
-Cause Description (CD) 
Describes the role of operation personnel in 
the initiation of the event. How did he commit 
the error? All relevant performance shaping 
factors are described when available. 
-Redundancy (R) 
What is the status of redundant channel(s)? 
-Corrective Action (CA) 
This can be an immediate corrective action taken 
to correct the error or permanent action taken 
to prevent recurrence. 
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Immediate corrective action includes carrying out 
the action that has been omitted or correcting the action 
that has been committed incorrectly. If the event results 
in damage of some components, the immediate corrective action 
will be repair or replacement of the affected component. 
Permanent corrective action may include: 
-Recommendations for design modifications to components 
for which service conditions were found to be different 
from those for which the components were originally 
designed. 
-Increased frequency of surveillance tests 
-Preparation and implementation of more stringent 
procedures for operation, maintenance, and testing. 
-Supplemental training for operation personnel. 
All available information about the extracted operation 
events was reported in the long description format sheets 
under the items explained before. The information matrix 
of the analyzed Licensee Event Reports involving nuclear 
plants operators is presented in Appendix B. 
The short description format will contain a brief 
summary of one line descriptions of all the collated data 
characterizing operator related events given in Appendix B. 
This summary is given in Appendix C. The short description 
format is very useful in human reliability analysis purposes, 
especially if it is utilized with appropriate data analysis 
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and retrieval codes, to evaluate human performance in 
nuclear power plants. This would provide a more compre­
hensive computer compatible procedure for coding and 
search of the information contained in the LERs. 
6.3. Discussion and Recommendations 
6.3.1. Deficiencies of the present sources 
The following section is extracted from NTJREG-
98 2143. The developed classification formats, when 
completely and properly filled, can constitute a useful 
operation data bank for human factor analysis in nuclear 
power plants. As mentioned before in section 6.1 the 
present available data sources are defective. The 
following is a summary of common deficiencies in these 
sources. 
1. Variability in content and style of reported events 
has often made it difficult to extract useful data. 
It would be helpful if there is a standard format 
in the reporting of events. 
2. Lack of one complete data source required the review 
of all sources. 
3. Great difficulty is found in cross-referencing 
reported events from one document to another. 
4. Discrete times of occurrences are not reported although 
report dates are given. Event dates are important 
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for evaluation of frequency of certain occurrences 
in a given facility. The inclusion of discrete 
time information and specific identification of 
critical components involved in the event would 
enable the identification of multiple and repetitive 
events. It would also enhance information on human 
stress levels since multiple occurrences may lead to 
higher stress levels in the human involved. This 
would also yield information as to which shift, if 
any, most human errors occur and would enable 
additional statistical studies. 
Laxity in specific identification of the component(s) 
involved in the event is a common feature of all 
reports. Availability of such information could allow 
the analyst to more easily identify the event as being 
safety related, or not, and to also pinpoint common 
cause failures. 
Some of the reports give overly terse descriptions of 
events and are often made as vague as possible. 
Often, reports do not discriminate between trivial 
incidents of no consequence and events which have 
either induced failure or had potential significance 
to the safety and reliability of the system. 
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8. No record is made of events that may have been 
counted as human error but proper recovery action 
was taken in time. 
9. Several reported events provide only a description 
of an observation made but not necessarily an error or 
failure. 
10. The selection of key words to identify the nature of 
reported events is done casually and without great 
consistency. This makes it difficult to pull a 
certain type of error (say operator, annunciator, 
calibration errors) using key words. 
11. Very little data (less than 50 events) are listed 
from 1960-1968. This is compared to a listing of 
14,000 events between 1959 to 1977. 
12. NRC-LER reports were found to be the best available 
source of information now. These monthly reports 
include the event date and report date, event/cause 
description, and state the system/component involved. 
The reports delineate between human and equipment errors, 
however, human error identification is not always 
broken down into operator, administrative, maintenance, 
etc. 
13. Some of the information provided in the NRC Gray 
Book (which lists data only on events which have 
lead to plant shutdown) would be beneficial if 
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provided for all LER reports. Examples are data 
on the duration and any corrective action taken or 
recommended to prevent recurrence. 
14. Reportable events are geared more to hardware 
problems with no attention given to human factors. 
This is also apparent in the Tech. Specs. 
6.3.2. Recommendations for improving data sources to 
facilitate the evaluation of man-machine interfaces and 
human performance in nuclear power plants 
The following section is extracted from NUREG-
98 2143. The present data system is extremely deficient 
relative to the man-machine interface and human factors 
safety considerations. There is a need to consider how 
to include the man-machine interface consideration. This 
may include: 
-Aspects of the man-machine interface to be considered. 
-Level of detail. 
-Hissing information needed for trend analysis. 
-•Modifications needed in future reporting requirements. 
-"Watch list" items that are uniquely related to 
human factors engineering and man-machine interface. 
-Man-machine interface considerations input to the 
cause-consequence matrix. 
-Development of the significance criteria relative 
to the man-machine interface aspects. 
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-Development of packages for trend and factor analysis 
for identifying and flagging significant trends/events 
related to system performance (mechanical, electrical, 
and man-machine interface/generic and plant(s) 
specific). The packages may be designed in a way that 
makes it possible to identify root causes. 
In including the man-machine interface aspects, one may 
consider these aspects in any way that can help identify: 
-Corrective course of action needed (e.g., training, 
staffing and manning requirements, etc.). 
-The performance shaping factors (PSF) involved. 
The following is a very preliminary list of items 
that may be considered: 
-Override of an Engineered Safety Feature (0-ESF). 
-Loss of indication (LOI) (caused by mechanical, 
electrical, or human action and/or operator 
response following a LOI). 
-Operator or M&T crew actions causing degradation 
of an ESF (e.g., loss of redundancy). 
-Operators' response following an event involving a 
loss of safety function (complete or degraded). 
A sample of elements that may be included in the new 
coding and reporting form are: 
-Environmental stresses involved in conducting a 
certain task. In most cases, this needs to be 
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inferred from current LERs, but future reporting 
may include them. Examples of these are: 
—Visibility. 
—Humidity and temperature levels. 
—Specialized tools or protective clothing 
needed for performing M&T tasks, 
—Time required to perform a certain task and 
impacts of performance shaping factors (PSF) 
on time requirements. 
—Manning requirements and characteristics. 
—Shift identification. 
A more conçrehensive list may be developed taking into 
account the limitations imposed by the current content of 
the LERs and practical considerations in future requirements. 
Means of including the time element in the event 
reporting and coding needs to be assessed. The time element 
(duration) may be meaningful in assessing safety implica­
tions in only certain cases (e.g., an ESF was not available 
and could not be secured within its prescribed time span 
for a response, or a loss of indication that continued 
for a certain time making it difficult for the operator to 
diagnose or take proper action, etc.). Including the time 
element for all sequences representing the natural 
expected course of a transient may not be cost-effective 
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and can be quite a burden on the reporter, the coder, and 
the analyst. 
There is a need to identify and provide means of 
differentiating between the normal sequence of a transient 
and where deviations from the expected sequence took 
place. Causes for such deviations need to be flagged. 
Examples may include mechanical and electrical causes 
where redundancy was lost or a man-machine interface 
cause where the operator did override an engineered 
safety feature or the operator was presented with loss 
of indication that may have been caused by a M&T crew 
previous action, etc. Including these identifiers (of 
deviation from expected normal course of transients), 
will make the coding and the analysis and evaluation 
more meaningful later. There can be many situations 
where as many as 15 steps may be coded that only represent 
the expected sequence of a transient. 
Limiting the encoding to what is contained in the 
LERs and not including the results of analysis (or 
opinions) may limit the utility of the system. This is 
true for past LERs, where reliance on the "cause" 
given in the LER without analysis may be misleading. 
Future LERs may allow the reporters and the qualified 
analysts to include their interpretation. Many of the 
past LERs are vague and may not be amenable to sequence 
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coding. However, they represent over 80% of the operation 
data that is available now or in the near future. They 
contain a wealth of information and certainly can provide 
an excellent tool for trend analysis and for "learning 
lessons" if some analysis and interpretations by qualified 
teams are allowed. 
In many cases (and this is especially true for the 
man-machine interface and human factors engineering considera­
tions), it is necessary to carry retrospective analysis of 
past operation data to reconcile the differences between 
the perceptions prevailing and the realities supported 
by the past operation data. VThen one considers the cost 
and time associated with this retrospective analysis of the 
data and the cost and risk (in terms of safety) associated 
with hardware retrofits and design modifications, one will 
find it extremely cost-effective (in terms of safety and 
resources) to carry the retrospective analysis of the past 
and present operation data. Though retrospective analysis 
of past operation data will involve high investments of 
resources (funds and manpower), it carries with it a 
"high return" on the investment. This is due to the fact 
that it provides one with a high degree of certainty of 
the outcome and basis for the acceptability of proposed 
modifications. It can also be used as a tool for identifying 
areas of priorities for development of new guidelines 
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and standards and needed modifications. Thus, an optimum 
utilization of the limited resources can be made. 
Means of including corrective actions taken, and their 
degree of effectiveness need to be assessed. In many cases 
the corrective actions taken give a clearer picture of 
what took place. Measuring "effectiveness" of the 
corrective actions taken can identify the areas where 
"procedural" fixes may not be the best approach and where 
design modifications may be needed. It can also provide 
a reservoir of effective and (less effective) corrective 
options for similar problems such that one would not 
start from ground zero for similar problems. 
Means of identifying "generic" problems and trends 
need to be developed. Appropriate combinations of causes, 
consequences, and system responses/performance need to be 
developed to identify "significant/potentially significant' 
trends, and to help provide a preliminary answer to the 
"right" "what ifs." This may be a feature in the "watch 
list." 
6.3.3. Addition of a supplementary data sheet for human 
performance to the current Licensee Event Report (LER) 
The present form of the Licensee Event Report, sho;\m 
Figure 6.1, includes 45 items to be filled by the plant's 
personnel. These items (when filled accurately) give good 
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Figure 6.1. Present form of the Licensee Event Report 
(LER) (from reference 81) 
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information about event description and probable conse­
quences, causes, and corrective actions, \7hen modeling and 
analyzing the failure processes of engineering systems 
in nuclear power plants, the present LER format represents 
an adequate source of information. However, in human 
reliability study, the analyst must have a data bank that 
describes the relevant performance shaping factors to be 
used to determine whether human performance will be highly 
reliable or highly unreliable, or at some level in between. 
Although many of performance shaping factors 
are usually interrelated in a complex manner, it 
is felt that the LERs should contain more additional 
information to facilitate the evaluation of the man-machine 
interface. It is recommended that a supplementary report 
be attached to the present form of LER to be filled when 
the failure mechanism involves man-machine interactions. 
These supplementary sheets may include some of the items 
that describe the situation when the event happened and 
at the time of discovery. 
A sample of the format content for the supplementary 
sheet is presented in Figure 6.2. Some items may be filled 
by the shift supervisor, others may be filled by the 
personnel involved. 
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Situational Characteristics 
- Quality of the Environment 
—Temperature 
—Relative Humidity 
—Noise & Vibration Level 
- Work Hours and Scheduling of 
—Shift 
—Time Stresses 
—Working Time (hours) 
—Last Break (hours) 
- Availability/Adequacy of 
Special Equipment/Tools and 
Supplies (Mark 2) 
- Manning Parameters 
- Tyoe of Personnel (see Table 
3.3) 
Job and Task Instructions 
- Procedure Required 
- Written or Oral Communication 
If yes, 
—Groups and Shifts 
--Type of information 
- -Mode 
-Cautions and Warnings 
<63°F, 63-73°F, >73*F 
low, normal, high 
<60dbi >60db 
Work Breaks 
day, swing, naith,„. 
yes, no * 
available, unavailable, 
adequate, inadequate 
trained 
noncollege, college 
written, 
yes, no 
nonwritten 
within one group, to other 
group, to other shift 
quantitative, qualitative, 
geometric (spatial) 
written, verbal, signal 
yes, no 
Task and Equipment Characterstics 
-Component / Hardware at the Man-Machine interface 
—Displays (see Table 3.4) 
—Controls (see Table 3.5) 
- Anticipatory Requirements 
- Interpretation Required 
- Decision-Making 
- Frequency of Activity Per­
formed 
- Feedback Channel 
- Continuity 
Stressors 
- Psychological Stressors (see 
Table 3.8) 
- Physiological Stressors (see 
Table 3.7) 
- Personnel Reaction to Stress 
see Table 3.8) 
one signal, more than one 
yes, no 
yes, no 
very low, low once/week, 
high once/day, very high 
yes, no 
continuous, discrete 
Figure 6.2. Format for human factors event record 
Table 6.1. Comparison of available data 
NUREG-214398) 
Source Content 
Plant dockets Usually contains complete 
description of event, 
cause, effect(s), and 
location of occurrence. 
Volumes of material from 
plants' conception to 
present operating status. 
Atomic Energy 
Commission AEC-
Operating 
Experience 
Reports 
(Assumed by 
Nuclear Regula­
tory Commis­
sion in 1974. 
NUREG-Operating 
Experience 
Reports) 
Listing of operational 
events leading to plant 
outage, contains discrete 
times of outage, 20 words 
or less description, 
cause, major systems and 
component(s) involved. 
Also contains half-page 
summary of yearly high­
lights by plant, includ­
ing availability and 
capacity factors. 
for nuclear power plant operation (extracted from 
Features related to 
Description human performance 
Inexhaustible amount of 
work is necessary for 
data acquisition because 
of the documentation 
length and wordllness. 
Contains comprehensive 
information, but the time 
necessary for extraction 
is prohibitive. Includes 
data on encountered 
radiation exposures during 
maintenance and testing 
activities. 
Event cause is given by 
only a one word descrip­
tion. System identifica­
tion is general. Component 
involved is listed. 
Effect of event (other 
than leading to outage) is 
neglected. Type of outage 
and duration is included. 
Human factors can be 
inferred but are not 
always stated. 
Minimum amount of informa­
tion related to events 
other than those with 
outage consequences. 
Yearly highlights may 
include maintenance and 
testing data and operator 
errors. 
NRC-Operatlng 
Units Status 
Report (NRC-
Grey Book) 
Nuclear Safety 
(Published by 
Nuclear Safety 
Information 
Center - NSIC) 
Monthly publication which 
gives operational date-by 
facility, for month of 
report, and by year-to-
date. Gives abbreviated 
list of reports received 
from the Licensee and 
shutdown/reduction informa­
tion Including: duration, 
reason, causc and method 
of shutdown, system and 
components involved, and 
any corrective action 
that was taken. 
Quarterly journal con­
taining: 
1. A summary of 
operating U.S. power 
reactors. 
2. Selected safety 
related events for 
journal period, and 
3. Events resulting 
in reactor shutdoxm and 
their causes. 
Basically includes good 
operations data but is 
overly terse in descrip­
tive account of events. 
Only lists events which 
resulted in outage. Ex­
tremely brief description. 
Dose levels reported if 
greater than technical 
specifications but 
description absent. 
1. Taken from NRC-
Opergtlng Units Status 
Report. 
2. Gives one sentence 
descriptions of the 
occurrence, the cause, 
and the component/system 
involved. Also includes 
one page description of 
selected events. 
3. Short, two line summary 
of event, cause, component 
and system involved. In­
cludes the event date. 
Summary tables often 
useful, however, short 
articles periodically 
available on specific 
events. Radiation 
exposure only considered 
in a limited number of 
essay articles. 
Table 6.1. (Continued) 
Features related to 
Source Content Description human performance 
NSIC-Nuclear 
Reactor Oper­
ating Exper­
ience Reports 
NRC-Llcensee 
Event Reports 
(LERs) 
Compilation oE abnoi.-mal 
occurrences from 1959 to 
present. Very little 
data from 1960-68 (less 
than 50 events). Includes 
50-100 word summaries with 
associated keywords for 
computer retrieval. 
Monthly reports or com­
pilation of events from 
1969 to present. Includes 
a standardized format 
sorted by: facility name; 
system, component and date. 
Gives brief description of 
event and cause, and 
delineates between human 
and equipment error. 
Little consistency in 
reporting of events, 
especially pre-1972. 
Events often vague as to 
the human Involvement, 
System identification is 
often too general. Event 
effect(s) often missing. 
Easily attainable in 
either document or tape 
form. 
Pre-1972 data, although 
formulated, is overly 
terse in description. 
Human error is not always 
delineated as being 
operator, maintenance, 
etc. Overall, best source 
of abnormal occurrences. 
Contains most of the 
reportable events after 
1971. Descriptions are 
often vague and LWR 
event categorization 
experience is necessary 
for useful data extrac­
tion. Radiation ex­
posure dose given if 
greater than technical 
specifications. 
Best source of readily 
available data for safety 
related events. System 
categorization is too 
broad. Dose levels 
usually available only if 
greater than technical 
specifications, 
Licensee Basically same as LlîRs, 
letters except an additional event 
to NRC description Is often 
available with schematic 
representation. 
NCADS Nuclear 
Plant Re­
liability 
Data System 
Quarterly reports which 
include (1) Data similar 
to LERs; (2) Component 
failure reports; and (3) 
System reliability sum­
maries including opera­
tion statistics failure 
counts, times for repair, 
and the number of sur­
veillance tests performed 
during the reporting 
period. 
Available only on micro- Similar to LERs, however, 
fiche, and therefore, they provide more 
extremely time consuming details which can not be 
for data extraction. Event interpreted with close 
descriptive schematic when familiarity with the 
Included is useful for specific plant P&ID. 
determination of occurrence 
location. There does not 
appear to be any require­
ments on letter content 
other than LER content. 
Computer coded system 
dependent upon utility 
cooperation for data input 
Initiated in 1974. Com­
ponent description and 
failure mode is good, 
however,system delineation 
is too general. The 
system is suitable for 
computer calculated 
reliability and failure 
statistics, however to 
date, the source is 
incomplete. 
Appears to be a good 
data source especially 
for statistical analysis, 
however, several facil­
ities have not supplied 
input data. 
Table 6.1. (Continued) 
Source Content 
EPRI 
NP-801 Compilation of data com­
pleted In 1978 which In­
cludes plant name, date of 
transient occurrence, out­
age time, type of 
transient, and the source 
of the scram signal. 
NP-755 Includes plant avail­
ability, outage trends 
by component and system, 
and descriptive impacts 
of major outages. 
NP-842 Summary of refueling 
outage trends, including 
impacts, characteristics, 
and critical path 
analysis. 
Description 
Features related to 
human performance 
Data are collected directly 
from the utilities and 
therefore dependent upon 
their response. Cate­
gorization limited to 
outages and is very 
general in cause delinea­
tion. Good source for 
basic utility Information 
but not appropriate as an 
LWR incident bank. 
Basically useful only for 
an error count of those 
events which led to an 
outage. 
Maintenance 
Orders (MOS) 
Provide information about 
fitatus of equipment. 
WASH-1311 
A Compilation 
of Occupational 
Radiation 
Exposure from 
Light Water 
Cooled Nuclear 
Power Plants 
1969-1973 
Reactor licenses provided 
information pertaining to 
1. The number of reactor 
plant personnel re­
ceiving exposures 
greater than 100 
mrem/year. 
2. The total-Man-Rem for 
these personnel. 
3. A breakdown of the 
total exposure by work 
function (operations, 
maintenance; refueling 
etc.). 
4. Average exposures for 
1-3. 
Available in each plant 
but not In a released 
form. 
Data base accumulated 
from licensee reports and 
calculations made by the 
AEG. Information given 
for those LWRs in 
commercial operation after 
1969 beginning with the 
first full year of opera­
tion and including subse­
quent years through 1973. 
Does not Include exposure 
data for specific tasks. 
A good supplement to LERs 
since it lists information 
related to events occur­
ring In the specific plant 
but not reported in LERs 
since many ot the events 
do not fall under the 
category of reportable 
events. 
Identifies total exposure 
during maintenance activi­
ties only. Gives compari­
son between yearly opera­
tions and maintenance 
exposures by per cent. 
Does not give average 
maintenance exposure. 
Table 6.1. (Continued) 
Source Content 
NUREG-0109 
Occupational 
Radiation 
Exposure at 
Light Water 
Cooled Power 
Reactors 
1969-1975 
Contains a compilation of 
the occupational radiation 
exposures at LWRs from 
1969-1975, for plants with 
at least one full year of 
operation. Content 
similar to WASH-1311 ex­
cept information on over­
exposures at commercial 
power reactors for 1971-
1975 is included. 
Description 
Features related to 
human performance 
Updated data base from 
WASH-1311 and licensee 
reports submitted to 
NRC. Does not Include 
exposure data for 
specific tasks. 
Same as WASH-1311 except 
overexposure information 
included for 1971-1975 
given by: 
-Number of overexposure» 
-Whole body Man-Rem 
involved 
-Whole body maximum ex­
posure (rems) 
-Number of reports of 
exposure to excessive 
concentration of radio­
active material 
-Maximum exposure to a 
specific body part. 
Compilation and 
Analysis of 
Data and Oc­
cupational 
Radiation 
Exposure 
Experienced 
at Operating 
Nuclear Power 
Plants (Atomic 
Industrial 
Forum, 1974) 
Review of occupation 
radiation exposure at 14 
LWRs. Includes variables 
affecting exposure: 
-Plant age 
-Reactor type 
-Plant size 
-Nature of work and 
timing 
-Plant design 
Includes exposures from 
specific sources; 
-Radwaste systems 
-Procedures related to 
fuel handling and 
refueling 
-Instrument work 
-Inservlce Inspections 
-Control rod maintenance 
-Equipment failure 
-Steam generators 
-System pumps 
-Main coolant loops 
-Valves 
-Turbines and auxiliary 
equipment 
-Demlneralizers 
Data bases accumulated 
from reportable occur­
rences plus communica­
tion with plant personnel. 
Includes specific task 
exposures, total annual 
plant exposures, and 
percentages of exposure 
received during outages. 
Incomplete data base, but 
may provide useful com­
parisons with other data 
bases, such as LERs. 
Does not contain informa­
tion relative to Mainte­
nance and Testing problems, 
which are not related to 
occupational exposures. 
Identifies the major 
sources contributing to 
occupational radiation 
exposure at 8 BWRs and 6 
PWRs from 1969-1973. 
Compiles occupation 
radiation exposure 
associated with these 
sources during operation 
and maintenance at these 
plants. Source does not ^ 
address Maintenance and ^ 
Testing events. 
Table 6.1. (Continued) 
Features related to 
Source Content Description human performance 
LER Review and 
Analysis, TRACE 
Summaries, 
Human Related 
Events. TII, 
Ames, lA. 
444 LER records and 93 
events related to diesel 
generator failure and 
station blackout are 
classified by TRACE and 
are compiled in this 
source. 
TRACE information 
matrix have multiple 
entries/combinations to 
include all information 
obtained from the LERs. 
Human related events are 
ranked by significance to 
facilitate qualitative 
analysis and assessment 
of event significance. 
Trace combines the 
features of earlier 
Nuclear Safety Research 
Group Classification 
Codes Including GENCLASS, 
OPERCLASS, and MTC and/or 
current NSAC programs; 
namely ALERT and SEE-IN. 
Main objectives of TRACE 
are to review, select, 
categorize, evaluate and 
rank by significance 
those events or plant 
conditions which have 
been caused by human 
errors and which did or 
could have led to some 
significant consequences. 
Table 6.2. Developeil lonj^  description format for human related events 
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Table 6.4. Plant code and information 
Docket 
Code Name No. Type 
ARl Arkansas-1 313 P 
BVl Beaver Valley-1 334 P 
BPl Big Rock Point-1 155 B 
BFl Brovms Ferry-1 259 B 
BF2 Browns Ferry-2 260 B 
BF2 Browns Ferry-3 296 B 
BRI Brunsv.'ick-l 325 B 
BR2 Brunsv;ick-2 324 B 
CCI Calvert Cliffs-1 317 P 
CC2 Calvert Cliffs-2 318 P 
DCl Cook-1 315 P 
DC2 Cook-2 316 P 
COI Cooper Station-1 298 B 
CR3 Crystal River-3 302 P 
DBl Davis-Besse-1 346 P 
DRl Dresden-1 010 B 
DR2 Dresden-2 237 B 
DR3 Dresden-3 249 , B 
DM Duane Arnold 331 B 
JFl Farely-1 348 P 
FPl Fitzpatrick-1 333 B 
FCl Fort Calhoun-1 285 P 
HNl Hadam Neck-1 213 P 
RGi Ginna-l 244 P 
ENl Hatch-1 321 B 
HBl Humboldt Bay 133 B 
EN2 Hatch-2 366 B 
IPl Indian Point-1 003 P 
IP2 Indian Point-2 247 P 
MlfE Date of 
Vendor A & E Rating Criticality 
B & W Bechtel 0850 080674 
VTH S & W 0852 051076 
GE Bechtel 0072 092762 
CE TVA 1065 081773 
GE TVA 1065 072074 
GE TVA 1065 080876 
GE United Eng. 0821 100876 
GE United Eng. 0821 032075 
CE Bechtel 0845 100774 
CE Bechtel . 0845 113076 
m AEP 1054 011875 
WH AEP 1060 031778 
GE Burns & Roe 0778 022174 
B & W Gilbt. Assoc. 0825 011477 
B & W Bechtel 0906 091077 
GE Bechtel 0200 101559 
GE S & W 0794 010770 
GE S & W 0794 013171 
GE Bechtel 0538 032374 
WH Bechtel/SSI 0829 080977 
GE S & W 0821 111774 
CE G & H 0457 080673 
WH S & W 0575 072467 
m Gilbert 0490 110869 
GE SSI 0786 091274 
GE Bechtel 0663 421663 
GE SSI 0795 070178 
B & W Utility 0265 080262 
WH UK & C 0873 052273 
IP3 Indian Point-3 286 P 
KEl Kewaunee-1 305 P 
MYl Maine Yankee-1 309 P 
Mil Millstone-1 245 B 
MI2 Millstone-2 336 P 
MOI Monticello-1 263 B 
NMl Nine Mile Point-1 220 B 
NAl North Anna-1 338 P 
OEl Oconee-1 269 P 
0E2 Oconee-2 270 P 
0E3 Oconee-3 287 P 
OCl Oyster Creek-1 219 B 
PAl Palisaùes-1 255 P 
PB2 Peach Bottorn-2 277 B 
PB3 Peach Bottom-3 278 B 
PIl Pilgrim-1 293 B 
PTl Point Beach-1 266 P 
PT2 Point Beach-2 301 P 
PRl Prairie Island-1 282 P 
PR2 Prairie Island-2 306 P 
OCl Quad Cities-1 254 B 
QC2 Quad Cities-2 265 B 
RSI Rancho Seco-1 312 P 
R02 Robinson-2 261 P 
SAl Salem-1 272 P 
SOI San Onofre-1 206 P 
SLl St. Lucie-1 335 P 
SUl Surry-1 280 P 
SU2 Surry-2 281 P 
Til Three Mile: Island-1 289 P 
TI2 Three Mile Island-2 320 P 
TRl Troj an 344 P 
TU3 Turkey Point-3 250 P 
TU4 Turkey Polnt-4 251 P 
VYl Vermont Yankee 271 B 
YRl Yankee Rowe 029 P 
WH UE & C 0873 040676 
m Pioneer 0535 030774 
CE S & W 0790 102372 
GE Ebasco 0660 102670 
CE Bechtel 0830 101775 
GE Bechtel 0545 121070 
GE Utility 0610 090569 
WH S & W 0934 040578 
B & W DPC/Bechtel 0887 041973 
B & W DPC/Bechtel 0887 111173 
B & W DPC/Bechtel 0887 090574 
GE Burns & Roe 0650 050369 
CE Bechtel 0805 052471 
GE Bechtel 1065 091673 
GE Bechtel 1065 080774 
GE Bechtel 0655 061672 
m Bechtel 0497 110270 
WH Bechtel 0497 053072 
m Pioneer 0530 120173 
Pioneer 0530 121774 
GE Sargent/Lun 0789 101871 
GE Sargent/Lun 0789 042672 
B & W Bechtel 0917 091674 
WH Ebasco 0700 092070 
WH Pse & G 1090 121176 
WH Bechtel 0430 061467 
CE . Ebasco 0802 042276 
WH S & W 0822 070172 
WH S & W 0822 030773 
B & W Gilbt. Assoc. 0819 060574 
B & W Burns & Roe 0905 032878 
WH Bechtel 1130 121575 
WH Bechtel 0693 102072 
WH Bechtel 0693 061173 
GE Ebasco 0514 032472 
WH S & W 0175 081960 
Table 6.4. (Continued) 
Code Name 
Docket 
No. Type Vendor 
MWE Date of 
A & E Rating Criticality 
Zll 
ZI2 
Zion-1 
Zion-2 
295 
304 
P 
P 
WH 
WH 
Sargent/Lun 1040 061973 
Sargent/Lun 1040 122473 
Table 6.5. Code used for reactor systems matrix 
Standard Generic Code System Description 
Reactor 
RA Reactor Vessel Internals 
RB Reactivity Control Systems 
RC Reactor Core 
Reactor Coolant System and Connected Systems 
CA Reactor Vessels and Appurtenances 
CB Coolant Recirculation Systems and Controls 
CC Main Steam Systems and Controls 
CD Main Stream Isolation Systems and Controls 
CE Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System and Controls 
CF Residual Heat Removal Systems and Controls 
CO Reactor Coolant Cleanup Systems and Controls 
CH Feedwater Systems and Controls 
CI Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection System 
CJ Other Coolant Subsystems and Their Controls 
Engineered Safety Features 
SA Reactor Containment Systems 
SB Containment Heat Removal Systems and Controls 
SC Containment Air Purification and Cleanup Systems and 
Controls 
SD Containment Isolation Systems and Controls 
SE Containment Combustible Gas Control Systems and Controls 
SF Emergency Core Cooling Systems and Controls 
SG Control Room Habitability Systems and Controls 
SH Other Engineered Safety Feature Systems and Their Controls 
Instrumentation and Controls 
lA Reactor Trip Systems 
IB Engineered Safety Feature Instrument Systems 
IC Systems Required for Safe Shutdown 
ID Safety Related Display Instrumentation 
IE Other Instrument Systems Required for Safety 
IF Other Instrument Systems Not Required for Safety 
Electric Power Systems 
EA Offsite Power Systems and Controls 
EB AC Onsite Power Systems and Controls 
EC DC Onsite Power Systems and Controls 
ED Onsite Power Systems and Controls (Composite AC and DC) 
EE Emergency Generator Systems and Controls 
EF Emergency Lighting Systems and Controls  ^
EG Other Electric Power Systems and Controls  ^
Fuel Storage and Handling Systems 
FA New Fuel Storage Facilities 
FB Spent Fuel Storage Facilities 
FC Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup Systems and Controls 
FD Fuel Handling Systems 
Table 6.5. (Continued) 
Standard Generic Code System Description 
Auxiliary Water Systems 
WA Station Service Water Systems and Controls 
WB Cooling Systems for Reactor Auxiliaries and Controls 
WC Demineralized Water Make-up Systems and Controls 
TO Potable and Sanitary Water Systems and Controls 
WE Ultimate Heat Sink Facilities 
W Condensate Storage Facilities 
WG Other Auxiliary Water Systems and Their Controls 
Auxiliary Process Systems 
PA Compressed Air Systems and Controls 
PB Process Sampling Systems 
PC Chemical, Volume Control and Liquid Poison Systems and 
Controls 
PD Failed Fuel Detection Systems 
PE Other Auxiliary Process Systems and Their Controls 
Other Auxiliary Systems 
AA Air Conditioning, Heating, Cooling and Ventilation Systems 
and Controls 
AB Fire Protection Systems and Controls 
AC Communication Systems 
AD Other Auxiliary Systems and Their Controls 
Steam and Power Conversion Systems 
HA Turbine-Generators and Controls 
HB Main Steam Supply System and Controls (Other than CC) 
HC Main Condenser Systems and Controls 
HD Turbine Gland Sealing Systems and Controls 
HE Turbine Bypass Systems and Controls 
HF Circulating Water Systems and Controls 
HG Condensate Clean-Up Systems and Controls 
HH Condensate and Feedwater Systems and Controls (Other than 
CH) 
HI Steam Generator Blowdown Systems and Controls 
HJ Other Features of Steam and Power Conversion Systems (Not 
included elsewhere) 
Radioactive Waste Management Systems 
M 
MA Liquid Radioactive Waste Management Systems vo 
MB Gaseous Radioactive Waste Management Systems 
MC Process and Effluent Radiological Monitoring Systems 
MD Solid Radioactive Waste Management Systems 
Radiation Protection Systems 
BA Area Monitoring Systems 
BB Airborne Radioactivity Monitoring Systems 
XX Other Systems 
ZZ System Code Not Applicable 
Table b.6. Code used for "component" identification (component matrix) 
Code Component 
Mechanical Components 
BL Blower/Fan 
CT Cabinet 
CM Cam 
CL Clamp 
CC Cooler/Chiller 
CN Condenser 
CR Control Rod 
CD Control Rod Drive Unit 
CP Cover Plate 
DP Damper 
DZ Demineralizer 
DG Diesel Generator 
DH Door/Hatch 
DW Drywell 
DI Duct 
FS Filter or Strainer 
FT Fitting 
FG Flange 
FE Fuel element/Assembly 
GB Gas Bottle 
GK Gasket 
HE Heat Exchanger 
Code Component 
Electrical Components 
AL Alarm 
AM Amplifier 
AZ Analyzer 
AN Annunciator 
BY Battery/DC Power Supply 
BC Battery Charger 
BI Bistable 
BS Bus 
CA Cable 
CB Circuit Breaker 
CH Clutch 
CD Coil 
DT Detector 
DI Dial 
DR Diode or Rectifier 
FD Film Badge/Dosimeter 
FU Fuse 
GE Generator 
HT Heat Tracing Element 
KG Heating Element 
LN Line IP 
LK Linkage IM 
10 
NZ Nozzle IR 
OR Orifice JP 
PP Pipe LT 
PJ Pipe Gap/Joint LA 
PO Pool 
PV Pressure Vessel MN 
PZ Pressurizer MO 
PM Pump MS 
RU Refrigeration Unit ND 
RW Rod Worth Minimizer 
PR 
SH Shock Absorber/Hydraulic PB 
SB Snubber 
SA Sluice Gate RM 
SG Steam Generator RC 
SN Strainer RG 
SE Subtree RY 
SU Sump RS 
RT 
TR Tank, Accumulator 
TJ Tank, Boron Injection SO 
TB Tank, Boric Acid Storage SC 
TA Tank, Chemical Addition SF 
TD Tank, Condensate Storage SD 
TC Tank, Core Flood SV 
TU Tank, Fuel SL 
TG Tank, Refueling Water Storage SM 
Incore Probe 
Input Module 
Instrumentation (Others) 
Inverter (Solid State) 
Jumper 
Light 
Lightening Arrestor 
Monitor, Other than Radiation 
Motor 
Motor Starter 
Neutron Detector 
Potentiometer 
Pushbutton 
Radiation Monitor 
Recorder 
Regulator 
Relay 
Relay or Switch Contact 
Resistor, Temperature Device 
Signal Comparator 
Switch, Control 
Switch, Flow 
Switch, Ground 
Switch, Level 
Switch, Limit 
Switch, Manual 
Table 6.6. (Continued) 
Code Component Code Component 
TS Tank, Surge SP Switch, Pressure 
TX Tank, Other SR Switch, Reset 
TQ Tendon ST Switch, Temperature 
TV Tubing SQ Switch, Torque 
TI Turbine SX Switch, Unknown 
VC Valve, Check TZ Terminal Board 
VE Valve, Explosive Operated TO Thermal Overload 
VH Valve, Hydraulic Operated TH Thermostat 
VM Valve, Manual TM Timer 
VO Valve, Motor Operated TN Trans former, Current 
VP Valve, Operator TP Transformer, Potential 
VU Valve, Pneumatic Operated TW Transformer, Power (or Control) 
VR Valve, Relief TF Transformer, Flow 
VS Valve, Safety TL Transformer, Level 
VF Valve, Safety-Relief TE Transformer, Pressure 
VD Valve, Solenoid Operated TT Trans former, Temperature 
VK Valve, Stop Check 
VX Valve, Unknown WR Wire 
W Valve, Vacuum Relief 
VT Vent 00 Event 
WO Well, Other 
WW Wetwell/Torus 
Table 6.7, Code used for "failure mode" 
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 
Action being omitted 
The action can be a step In the 
procedure or written/oral 
Instruction 
Action being committed 
Incorrectly 
Inadvertence 
In this category, the 
personnel commits an action 
which should not have been 
taken. 
As an illustration: 
(As a part of the procedure 
for testing the operabllity 
of system "XXX" the 
personnel has to close 
valve "V13B") 
In this example, the action 
to be taken is "CLOSE." 
The following situations 
are possible: 
1 - The Operations 
personnel omits this step. 
In this case, the failure 
mode "Did Not Close" or 
"Left Open" will lie under 
Category 1 and will be 
coded as "ICL." "1" 
designates the category 
number while "CL" is the 
abbreviation of the 
action "CLOSE." 
II - The Operations 
personnel may carry out 
the procedure step on 
valve "V13B" but In an 
Incorrect manner. In this 
case, the failure mode 
"Improper Closure" will 
lie under Category 2 and 
will be coded as "2CL." 
This means that the 
action "CLOSE" (CL) has 
been carried Improperly 
(Category 2). 
III - The Operations 
personnel may carry out 
the procedure step but on 
a wrong valve (say V12B). 
In this case the failure 
mode "Inadvertent Closure" 
will lie under Category 3 
and will be coded as 
"3CL." 
Table 5,4 shows the most 
repetitive actions in­
volved In operations 
events together with their 
codes. (2 letters). 
Table 6.7. (Continued) 
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 
Communication 
If there are more than one personnel 
Involved In the event, the failure 
mode will lie under this category. 
Problems with Communication may be 
within one shift or between dif­
ferent shifts. Also, they may be 
between two or more crews (Opera­
tions, Maintenance, Chemistry, etc.) 
The failure mode under this category 
will be coded as "4CC." 
Personality/Training Procedure Inadequacy/ 
Deficiency 
Under this category we will put This will be coded as 
all human errors that are "6PU." 
related to: 
I - Lack of experience/training. 
II - Psychometric parameters 
Failure modes such as: 
-MlsldentifIcatlons (Code 5 MD) 
-Misinterpretation (Code 5 MT) 
-Mlsjudgment (Code 5 MJ) 
-Slow/Fast Response (Code 5 SR, 
5 FR) 
-Procedure unfamlliarlty (Code 
5 PU) 
-Lack of experience (Code 5 LE) 
will lie under this category. 
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Table 6.H. Most repetitive actions in operation events 
Action Code Action Code 
Adjust AD Open OP 
Actuate AC Operate OR 
Add AD Place in Service PS 
Align AL Position PN 
Calculate CI Procedure Inadequacy PI 
Calibrate CB Misjudge MJ 
Check/Verify CH Remove from Service RS 
Close CL Record RC 
Connect CN Release RL 
Control CR Report RP 
Deenergize DG Reset RT 
Energize EG Return to Service RN 
Fill FL Review RV 
Follow Procedure FP Sample SM 
Insert IN Slow Response SR 
Inattention lA Start ST 
Lock LO Secure SC 
Log LG Tag TG 
Maintain MT Tighten TN 
Monitor MR Test TS 
No Response NR Unlock TIL 
Notify NO Verify VF 
Observe OB Withdraw TO 
Table 6.9. Code used for "personnel" 
Code Personnel 
Operations Staff 
SS Shift Supervisor 
SCO Senior Control Operator 
CO Control Operator 
EO Equipment Operator 
EA Equipment Attendant 
Technical Staff 
RE Reactor Engineer 
job and responsibility (from reference 41) 
Responsibility 
Responsible for the station during an assigned work shift. 
Instructs, trains, and assigns work to personnel engaged 
in controlling the operation of reactor-generator units 
and associated equipment. 
Actual operation and control of the reactor turbine-
generator units and associated equipment. 
Assists the control operator on shift. His responsibility 
is operation and inspection of individual equipment and 
operation of the radwaste systems on a rotating basis 
during normal plant shutdown. 
Works as directed by operations personnel to operate equip­
ment and systems in areas of water treatment, oil cleaning, 
and fuel handling. He works with the relief shift super­
visor on fuel handling, radwaste, relief duties and unusual 
problems. 
Responsible for the safe, efficient performance of the 
reactor and performs nuclear physics calculations as 
required to assure proper fuel management and that thermal 
limitations are not exceeded. 
PPE Power Plant Engineer 
CE Chemical Engineer 
RPE Radiation Protection Engineer 
GC Graduate Chemist 
CT Chemical Technician 
HP Health Physicist 
RPT Radiation Protection 
Technician 
Maintenance Staff 
Instrument Foreman 
Instrument Technicians 
Electrical Foremen 
Electricians 
Mechanical Foremen 
Mechanics 
Welders 
Helpers 
Storekeepers 
Stockmen 
Responsible for determining station performance, the 
establishment of efficient operating procedures and, 
in conjunction with the reactor engineers, the most 
efficient utilization of fuel. 
Directs the chemical and radiochemical programs of the 
plant and environments. 
Directs radiation protection programs. 
Has the responsibility for the day-to-day direction of 
the chemical technicians and the assurance that plant 
chemistry is maintained within license limits. 
Prepares and analyzes test specimens, assembles materials 
and equipment, and makes the necessary analysis of data. 
Responsible for daily direction of radiation protection 
technicians and the implementation of the radiation 
program to plant license standards. 
Measuring and reading through routine radiation surveys, 
he Implements the plant radiation protection program as 
required by approved procedure. 
Instrument, electrical, and mechanical foremen are not 
required to direct and be responsible for the calibra­
tion, maintenance, and operation of equipment in their 
respective areas of experience and training, and to oversee 
the efforts of technicians, electricians, and mechanics 
serving under them. 
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Table 6.10. Code used for "cue of discovery 
Cue Description Code 
1. Observation of unannunciated displays OUD 
Nonannmciated displays include : 
-Meters 
-Digital Displays 
-Chart recorders 
-Indicator lights 
-Graphs 
Examples are: 
-Valve position indicators (open-close) 
-Control rod position indicators (in notches) 
-Temperature, pressure, level, volume, concentra­
tion, and activity indicators 
2. Annunciated Displays AD 
Examples : 
-Low/high level alarm 
-High activity alarm 
-Low flow alarm 
3. Observation while walk-In OWI 
Usually this code will be used for walk-in 
outside the control room (e.g., auxiliary 
building, DG building...) 
Examples : 
-Noticing water in the floor of the auxiliary 
building 
-Noticing tank overflowing 
-Hearing sound of air blowing in DG room 
4. Review Operation Logs ROL 
Examples : 
-Operation data 
-Monitor charts 
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Table 6.10. (Continued) 
Cue Description Code 
-Power recorder charts 
-Plant status 
5. Review Survey/Test Logs RSL 
Examples : 
-Test completion and results 
-Test due and intervals 
-Routing log review 
-Jumper log review 
-Sampling schedule (discharge viz. sampling) 
6. Random Inspection RI 
Examples : 
-Relays block after survey 
-Routine operator patrol in control room 
-Valve line-up checks 
7. Severe Damage 
Examples : 
-Water hammer 
8. Safety Injection SI 
9. Reactor Trip RT 
10. Review Release Log RRL 
11. Problem Investigation PI 
12. Calculation Results CR 
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Table 6.11. Code used for "method of discovery" 
Code Discovery Method 
A Operational event - any event not included in the 
codes below. 
B Routine test/inspection - surveillance test -
previous maintenance test - annual inspections -
etc. 
C Special test/inspection - nonroutine tests 
D External source - such as notification from NRC, 
sister licensee, vendor, A/E - etc. 
Z Item not applicable 
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Table 6.12. Code used for "plant status" 
Code Status 
A Under construction 
B Preoperational, S/U or power assention tests 
(in progress) 
C Routine S/U operations 
D Routine S/D operations 
E Steady state operations 
F Load changes during routine power operation 
G S/D (hot or cold) except refueling 
H Refueling 
X Others (including special tests, emergency S/D 
operations, etc.) 
Z Item not applicable 
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7. DATA ANALYSIS AND QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION 
7.1. Introduction 
The developed classification format presented in 
Chapter Six together with the recommended supplementary 
report for human related events provide, when properly 
and completely filled, very valuable information matrices 
for human factor analysis in nuclear power plants. 
Qualitative evaluation of the information matrix was 
explained in the previous chapter. However, one 
cannot say that the constructed data bank is perfect 
because of the deficiencies explained in section 6.4.1. 
This chapter explores some studies that can be carried out 
quantitatively. Findings from these studies supported 
by the information matrix will be illustrated. 
7.2. Trend Analysis 
Both one dimensional and multidimensional trends 
can be easily determined by counting the number of 
operation errors that belong to one or two specific 
items. 
For one dimensional trend all events can be 
classified according to the following: 
- Vendor 
- A/E 
- Plant type (BWR or PWR) 
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- System involved 
- Component involved 
- Failure mode 
- Cue of discovery 
Table 7.1 shows the classification of events 
according to the cue of discovery. Observation of 
Unannunciated Displays (OUD) (meters, digital displays, 
chart recorders, indicator lights, graphs, etc.) represent 
41.12% of the total cues of discovery. This high 
percentage tells that displays are effective error 
discoverers. Better locations and evidence of these 
displays will give this tool more effectiveness and 
will result in minimizing the down time of components 
and/or systems. 
Table 7.2 gives a summary of operation errors in 
terms of human failure modes connected with various 
operator actions. About 50% of the total errors are 
due to omission (category 1). The following are some 
recommendations for mitigating this type of errors. 
1. Assign more than one person to important tasks. 
2. Study the possibility of design changes adding 
interlocks (mechanical and/or electrical) that will 
prevent skipping one procedural step. 
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3. Insist that review of check list of task completion 
be done without delay, and in a manner preventing 
any doubt. 
4. . Insure better distribution of tasks among workers 
to avoid uneven distribution of responsibility. 
5. Insure tight administrative controls on distribution 
of tasks to reduced crews, especially on weekends. 
Recommendations to minimize human errors under the 
other categories are given below. 
Category 2 : Committing an action improperly 
Committing an action properly is a strong feature 
of well-trained and experienced personnel. Training, 
periodic meetings between various groups, and periodic 
review of plant technical specifications are some 
effective recommendations in this respect. 
Category 3 : Inadvertence 
- Place more stress on training program for personnel. 
- Mitigate stresses on personnel such that worker can 
do the assigned job comfortably and in a reasonable 
time (without the pressure of the next task encumbering 
the execution of the present task). 
- Make labels on components distinguishable and clear. 
Material and location of labels should be suitable 
for their use. 
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- Insure fast review of task completion checklist by a 
person other than the one who did the task to increase 
the probability that a wrong action will be corrected. 
- Insure room to provide safe interaction between man and 
controls. 
- Be concerned over design and arrangement of controls and 
displays. 
Category 4: Communication 
- It is the responsibility of the administrative division 
in each plant to review its organizational rules and 
to provide for adequate communication within one shift, 
between shifts, and between crews. 
Category 5: Personality/Training 
- Establish rigid standards for the selection, training, 
and licensing of operations personnel. 
- Encourage programs in human engineering studies to 
help workers perform systems functions to the best of 
their capabilities, thereby increasing the efficiency 
and reliability of the system of which they are a part. 
Category 6 : Procedure Inadequacy/Deficiency 
The procedures of each plant must be reviewed 
thoroughly and comprehensively. 
Other multidimensional trends can be studied such 
as shown in Tables 7.3 and 7.4, from which one can see 
that the most frequent operator error modes involve valves 
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(mispositioning, inadvertent actuation, misalignment... 
etc.). With respect to classification of operation 
errors according to component involved, it was found that 
the highest percentage of the data involves valves. This 
trend is consistent with the experience in other industries 
and is expected when one considers the LER reporting 
requirements and the number of valves involved in a typical 
LWR plant. 
There is an important point that has to be brought 
forward when one classifies error counts. The results 
should not be taken at face value without some concern 
over statistical significance. 
7.3. Operator Error Computations 
7.3.1. Concept and theory 
Assuming a constant hazard rate "X", the human 
reliability function will take an exponential form 
expressed by 
R(t) = (1) 
where 
t = time to component failure due to human error. 
The corresponding probability density function (p.d.f.) 
for the variate "t" is given by 
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f(t) = (2) 
The mean time between failure (MTBF) "0" can be obtained by 
In this case, X will represent the failure rate. 
Practically, the parameter of this reliability model is 
not known and has to be estimated. Two types of failure 
rates can be estimated, the failure rate per hour 
"Xg" and the failure rate per demand "x^ ". 
In human reliability analysis, these failure rates 
will indicate the unavailability of the component due to 
human error. By this definition, the estimator must 
pertain to specific human failure mode "M," component "C," 
and system "S." With this understanding, Xg(M,C,S), 
Xjj(24,C,S) will be given by 
0 = E(t) 
o 
/ tf(t)dt = X / te^ d^t = Y (3) 
(4) 
îjCM.C.S) - (5) 
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where 
n = number of failures with mode M of component 
C in system S. 
Nc s ~ population of component "C" in system "S" 
T = total operational time 
D = total demands on component "C" 
Equations 4 and 5 represent the optimistic estimates 
for the failure rates. Pessimistic estimates can be 
obtained by replacing n by n + 1. 
7.3.2. Confidence interval, level, and limits 
Certainly the human related events investigated in 
this work are fewer than those that actually occurred. 
The difference comes from: 
1. Some insignificant or reversal errors have been, 
omitted, so that not all the events in the plants 
are reported. 
2. Judgmental error by the analysts while investigating 
operational error, due to poverty of reported 
information, so that some events may be mistakenly 
omitted. 
So, one can consider that those events are samples of the 
whole population of events and the estimated value of 
failure rate "x" is a point estimate of the actual value 
"x". In this case, confidence intervals will be of use. 
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The following is a suggested procedure for calculating 
the confidence intervals for the hourly failure rates 
If 1 I» 
Let: 
= Lower confidence limit for X 
Xy = Upner confidence limit for X 
(Xl.^ u) = Confidence interval for X 
1 - a = Confidence level 
1 - a represents the probability that X falls within 
the interval 
The quantity fj can be shown to have a chi-square 
distribution^^where 
X = Actual failure rate 
\ = Estimated failure rate 
f = The degrees of freedom of the chi-square distribution = 
twice the number of failures within the operational 
time T used in calculating x, 
To get X^ .Xy, we have 
P { X 1-T;f -
fx 
- X ^ a  ;f } = 1 - (6) 
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2 2 
P { X J — X — X—g }  —  1 - a  ( / )  
So, we have 
2 a f 
1 " 
^ £ (8) 
2 
y = X—^  (9) 
The degree of freedom f can be set at 2n or 2(n+l). 
It can be shown that^ '^^  ^the conservative two tailed 
intervals at a confidence level 1-a for 0,X are given by 
2n  ^1 - |-;2n 
©L = 0 -2 , = 2H (10) 
X 1 - %^ 2n 
2^ 
2fn+l') * ;^2^ (n+l) 
®U " ® ~2 '  ^ 2(n+l)— (11) 
f;2(n+l) 
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7.3.3. WASH-1400 estimates of human contributions to the 
unavailability of individual systems 
The results of WASH-1400 indicated that system un­
availabilities were importantly influenced by human actions. 
Table 7.5 gives the approximate human contributions to 
unavailabilities. The human contributions range from 95% 
for containment spray injection subsystem to 2% for 
accumulators. The pre-accident human failure modes are 
dominated by errors involving mispositioning of valves 
and failure to detect the errors. Post-accident failure 
modes are dominated by the failure to close/open 
valves. 
An estimate of human contribution to LTTO. risk 
dominating accident sequences is shown in Table 7.6, 
Critical human errors in these sequences are related to 
failure to act (transfer of swing DG, actuation of service 
water system, etc.). Other critical errors are valving 
errors and miscalibration of sensors and instrumentation. 
7.3.4. Gross operator error rate estimates 
The operator error rates (hourly or per demand) may 
be calculated based on the frequency counts provided in 
Table 7.7. The human error rate is defined, similar to 
equations 4 and 5, as : 
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I h  
Xjj(M,S,C) = ytTTT ' (per hour) (12) 
i ^  ^  
X q (M , S , C )  =  Y î T U r  ' (per demand) (13) 
i 1 1 
where 
= number of events related to failure mode "M" with 
component "C" in system "S" in the i^  ^plant. 
= Population of component "C" in system "S" in the i^  ^
plant. 
= Critical hours of the i^  ^plant during which "f^ " 
events occurred. 
= Total number of demands on system "S" in the i^  ^plant. 
7.3.5. Illustrative example 
"Valve mispositioning in Emergency Core Cooling (ECCS) 
and Auxiliary Feed Water System (AFWS)" 
Tables 7.8 and 7.9 provide the frequency count of 
events involving mispositioning of valves in the Emergency 
Core Cooling System (ECCS) and the Auxiliary Feed Water 
System (AFWS). Demand data on the (ECCS) and (AF^ TS) 
valves and valve population data are provided in Tables 
7.10 through 7.13 for all vendors for the period January 1, 
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1972 to January 1, 1978, Table 7.14 provides a summary 
of valve population, critical hours and demand data 
(taken from reference 51). 
Failure rate for valve mispositioning (clustering of 
all failure modes that lead to valves being mispositioned) 
in the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) may be 
calculated using the above tables. The hourly failure 
rate of valves due to operator errors is given by 
where 
M = Mispositioning 
C = valve (check + remote actuated) (Code VM, VO) 
S = ECCS (Code SF) 
= 1.311 X 10^  hrs 
AJJ(M,S,C) 21 1.502 X 10"^  hr~^  
1.311 X 10^  
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Xjj can be used to calculate the unavailability of certain 
component due to human error (q^ ) using the following 
relation 
% = (14) 
where x is the duration of the human error. Experience 
in reviewing human related events shows that this duration 
has a wide variability. It ranges between one minute 
and one month. Based on a one week time interval, 
qjj = 2.691 X 10"^ 
To calculate (per demand), 
zf. = 21 
i ^  
z N . D .  =  8 1 , 6 5 4  
i ^  ^  
A j j( M , S , C )  =  2 . 5 7 1  X  1 0   ^per demand. 
To compute 90% confidence bounds for 
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x2.05[2zf.] ^  
L = lower limit = 
X^ .95[2zfi + 2]. 
U = upper limit = YïT. 
1.1x10 ^ £Xjj_<2.3X10^ 
90% confidence bounds on Og 
1.8 X 10"^ < qy < 3.9 X 10"^ 
For Auxiliary Feed Wacer System, AR-JS, the hourly 
failure rate of valves due to operator errors is : 
Zfi 
xg(M,s,c) J-STT: 
i - -
where 
M 
C 
= Mispositioning 
= Valve (check + remote actuated) (Code VM,VO) 
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S = AFWS (Code CH) 
z£^  = 3 
" 1-852 X 10^  hrs 
= 1.852 X 10 ^  hr ^  
To calculate Xg, 
If^ 
" zNTDT 
zf = 3 
ZN^ D^  = 1.1685 X 10^  
^ O _ A / 
Aj) = ^  1685 X = 2.57 X 10 per demand 
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7.3.6. Comparison with estimates of human error 
probabilities 
In this section, some himan failure rates (per demand) 
calculated based on reported (LER) data will be compared 
with the corresponding expert estimates reported in 
NUREG/CR-1278^ ^^  and WASH-1400^ .^ 
Table 7.13 summarizes the human error probability 
estimates listed in NUREG/CR-1278 coded under the categories 
used in Table 7.7 to collate the "LER" data. The estimates 
in Table 7.15 deal with valve manipulation errors. 
Based on the Licensee Event Reports (LERs), the 
number of reported events dealing with relevant human 
failure modes are listed in Table 7.16. 
Since all these failure modes lead to mispositioning 
of valves due to human error, then the estimated for 
mispositioning of valves is; 
= (6x.001 + 2x.003 + 4x.001 + 2x.005 + 3x.005 4- 2x.005 
+ lx.005 + lx.001)/2l = 2.7 X 10"^ . 
Assuming a recovery factor of ,1 (failure of checker 
to discover the error) 
= 2.7 X 10"^ . 
189 
This value is within the same range of the operator 
failure rate of 2.57 x 10 ^  per demand based on the 
reported LER data for mispositioning of valves. 
From WASH-1400®^ , App. Ill Table 4-1, the median 
unavailability due to mechanical failure (e.g., 
plugging) ranges from 1 x 10"^  to 3 x 10"^  per demand. 
1 X 10"^  per demand  ^3 x 10"^  per demand 
Therefore, the unavailability q due to human errors 
involving mispositioning of valves is not significantly 
greater than that due to mechanical causes. 
7.3.7. Gross operator error rates based on reported 
licensee event reports 
Estimates of gross operator error rate involving 
all categories of human failure modes may be calculated 
provided the appropriate denominator values are defined 
and acquired. The frequency counts given in this section 
are based on identified 495 reported operator errors, 
based on these analyzed operator errors estimates for 
gross operator error failure rate are given in Table 
7.17. 
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7.4. Quantitative Assessment of the PSFs 
The importance of the performance shaping factors as 
determinants of human reliability was exhaustively 
explained in Chapter Three. Frequency and significance 
of certain PSF, as appeared in the operation data, can 
be used in a practical weighting and rating of such 
factor -
The limited and deficient data sources make the 
information about PSFs in the constructed operation data 
bank incomplete. Table 7.18 lists a summary of identified 
reported events involving inadvertent actuation of 
controls due to similarity or proximity of labels. 
The frequency of similarity or proximity of labels as 
performance shaping factor is 17. This number, when 
compared with the frequency of other PSFs involved in 
human tasks, would be very useful in the weighting of 
such a factor. 
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Table 7.1. Classification of events according to the cue 
of discovery 
Cue of discovery No. of events 7o Total 
Annunciated displays 35 7.  07 
Calculation results 7 1.  41 
Observation-nonannxmciated displays 204 41. 12 
Observâtion-walk-in 17 3. 43 
Problem investigation 5 1. ,01 
Random inspection 72 14. .55 
Review operations logs 48 9. .70 
Review release logs 12 2. .42 
Review surveillance logs 73 14. .75 
Reactor trip 13 2 .63 
Severe damage 3 .61 
Safety injection 5 1 .21 
495 100 .00 
Table 7.2a. Summary of operator errors in terms of human failure modes connected with various 
operator actions (categories 1,2,3) 
Category 
12 3 
Did 
Action Code not Improper Inadvertent Total Most Frequent Components 
Actuate AC * —  —  —  —  6 6 
Add AD —  —  4 4 
Align AL 1 22 — —  23 All valves 
Calculate CT 5 — —  5 
Calibrate CB 1 2 — —  3 
Check CH 3 — — —  —  3 
Close CL 37 6 6 49 Mainly valves 
Connect CN —  —  2 — 2 
Deenergize DC 1 9 10 Relays, switches 
Energize EG 3 
— 2 5 
Fill FL 1 —  —  1 
Follow Procedure FP 21 —  —  5 26 
Insert IN 1 1 2 
Lock LO 1 —  —  1 
Log LG 2 2 
Monitor MR 23 1 24 Tanks, sump, well 
Observe OB 6 —  —  —  —  6 
Open OP 21 4 15 40 Valves 
Operate OR 20 — 20 Pumps 
Place in Service PS 2 1 — —  3 
Position PN 19 10 — 29 Switches 
Read RD — — — —  3 3 
Record RC 2 —  —  —  —  2 
Release RL — —  3 7 10 
Remove from 
service RS 1 6 
Report RP 5 1 
Reset RT 4 
Return to service RN 15 — — 
Review RV 3 — — 
Sample SM 4 
Secure SO 2 
Start ST 1 1 
Tag TO 2 
Test TS 31 — —  
Verify FV 31 
Withdraw vro 2 8 
246 96 59 
System 
Valve position 
Control rods 
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Table 7.2b. Summary of operator errors in terms of human 
failure modes connected with various operator 
actions (categories 4,5,6) 
Category Code # 
4 Communication 4CM 23 
Total 23 
5 Personality/Training 
Inattention 
Lack of Experience 
Misinterpretation 
Misidentification 
Misunderstanding 
No response 
Slow response 
Procedure unfamiliarity 
Misj udgement 
Unawareness 
5IA 
5LE 
5MT 
5MF 
5MD 
5NR 
5SL 
5PU 
5MJ 
5UW 
4 
5 
9 
4 
12 
7 
2 
2 
9 
1 
Total 55 
6 Procedural Error 
Procedure inadequacy 
Procedure deficiency 
6PI 
6PD 
4 
12 
Total 16 
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Table 7.2c. Summary of operator errors in terms of human 
failure modes connected with various operator 
actions (Accumulated numbers) 
Category # 
1 246 
2 96 
3 59 
4 23 
5 55 
6 16 
TOTAL 495 
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Table 7.3. Systems/components affected by operator "errors" 
(Operator errors recorded from January 1972 
through December 19, 1977) 
Number of 
events 
Per cent 
BWR PWR of total 
(100 (77 number of 
plant- plant- operator 
System/component involved year year Total errors 
Emergency Core Cooling 
Injection System (ECCIS) 37 
Waste Processing System 
(WPS) 
Instrumentation and 
Monitoring System (IMS) 
Reactor Power Control 
Systems (KPCS) 
34 
34 
23 
Secondary Nonnuclear 
Systems (SNS) 
Reactor Protection Systems 
(BPS) 
Auxiliary Electric Power 
System (AEPS) 
Main Reactor Coolent System 
(RCS) 
Auxiliary Systems for 
Normal Operation (ASNO) 
10 
20 
15 
10 
74 
35 
27 
32 
30 
16 
19 
20 
23 
111 
(48 
valves) 
69 
(38 
valves) 
61 
55 
(29 
control 
rod 
drive) 
40 
36 
34 
30 
27 
21 
13 
12 
11 
8 
7 
7 
6 
5 
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Table 7.3. (Continued) 
Number of 
events 
Per cent 
BWR PWR of total 
(100 (77 number of 
plant- plant- operator 
System/component involved year) year) Total errors 
Other Containment Systems 
(CS) 
Containment Spray and Re­
circulation Systems 
(CSRS) 
Emergency Cooling Recir­
culation Systems (ECRS) 
Total (Systems) 
Components 
Valve 
Monitor/Detector 
Control Rod/Control Rod 
Drive/Control Rod Group 
Pump 
Switch 
Breaker 
Tank 
Alarm 
Diesel Generator 
Bus 
Total (Components) 
12 13 25 5 
1 21 22 4 
11 0 11 
(10 
Torus) 
2 
211 310 521 100 
59 104 163 31 
21 21 42 8 
23 17 40 8 
13 21 34 7 
20 14 34 7 
6 19 25 5 
4 20 24 5 
4 6 10 2 
4 5 9 2 
3 5 8 2 
157 232 389 76 
Table 7.4. Frequent operator failure modes 
Component Failure mode 
Per cent of total 
component 
occurrences 
BWR PWR Total 
Per cent of 
total operator 
errors total 
Valve Left in wrong position 41 41 41 13 
Misalignment 29 15 20 6 
Inadvertent actuation 12 9 10 3 
Improper Operation 8 7 7 2 
Monitor/ 
Detector Did not check/test 38 24 31 2 
Did not Monitor 24 24 24 2 
Left in/out of service 14 10 12 1 
Control Rod/ 
Control Rod 
Drive/Control 
Rod Group Did not check/test 30 6 20 2 
Procedure 26 12 20 2 
Exceeds limits 0 26 15 1 
Improper Sequence 9 6 8 1 
Pump Improper operation 21 
Did not start/stop 23 
Procedure 15 
Did not Check/test 8 
Switch Left in wrong position 15 
Mispositioning 35 
Inadvertent actuation 25 
Breaker Inadvertent actuation 33 
Deenergization 17 
Did not check/test 33 
Tank Exceeds limits 50 
Did not monitor 25 
Alarm No response 75 
Diesel 
Generator Did not check/test 25 
Disengaged 25 
Bus Deenergization 67 
Did not check/test 0 
48 
10 
10 
14 
57 
14 
7 
26 
26 
11 
30 
15 
67 
60 
20 
40 
40 
41 
15 
12 
12 
32 
26 
18 
28 
24 
16 
33 
17 
70 
44 
22 
50 
25 
3 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
<x> 
VD 
Table 7.5. Approximate human contribution to PWR systems unavailability (from reference 98) 
PWR systems 
Approximate 
% human 
contribution 
Nature of predominant human errors 
Pre-accident causes Post-accident causes 
Reactor protection 
Auxiliary feedwater: 
0-8 hours after small LOCA 
Containment spray injection 
negligible 
93% 
8-24 hours after small LOCA negligible 
0-8 hours without offsite power 89% 
95% 
Mispositioning of 
normal valves from 
monthly tests and 
failure to detect 
Mispositioning of 
manual valves from 
monthly tests and 
failure to detect 
Valve mispositioning 
errors from monthly 
tests and failure to 
detect 
Principal contribu­
tion, operator falls 
to transfer the 
switch diesel 
generator when 
needed 
Consequence limiting control: 
Hi; single train 
Hi; both trains 
Hl-Hl; single train 
Hl-Hl, both trains 
Emergency coolant injection: 
Accumulators 
Low-pressure injection 
High-pressure injection 
Safety Injection control 
Containment spray recirculation 
Sensor Mlscallbratlon 
errors 
Mlspositlonlng 
(closure) of MOV in 
accumulator-failure 
to detect pre-existing 
faults 
Valve mlspositlonlng 
during test and main­
tenance 
Valve mlspositlonlng 
In monthly tests-
failure to detect 
pre-existing faults 
Mlscallbratlon errors 
In test and maintenance 
Operator Inad­
vertently stops 
pumps; also falls 
to verify If pump 
Is running from 
auto, start 
Table 7.5. (Continued) 
Approximate Nature of predominant human errors 
% human 
PWR systems contribution Pre-accldent causes Post-accident causes 
Containment heat removal 42% 
Low-pressure recirculation 77% 
High-pressure recirculation 75% 
Containment leakage 23% 
Sodium hydroxide addition 21% 
Misposltioning of air 
vent valves in yearly 
test (or maintenance) 
and nondetectlon of 
previous pre-existing 
faults 
Operator fails to 
open and close 
MOV's for recircu­
lation per realign­
ment procedures in 
short term or long 
term alignment 
Similar to errors 
described above 
Operator fails to 
close valves in 
containment spray 
injection system 
(CSIS) after injec­
tion mode is 
finished 
Valve misposltioning 
errors from tests 
Table 7.6. Human contribution to risk dominating accident sequences In LWRs (from reference 98) 
Calculated human contribution, % 
Nature of errors 
Pre-accldent cause Post-accident causes 
BIffl risk domlnatlHR 
accident sequence 
Overall 
human error 
contribution 
Contribution 
to causing 
initiating 
event 
Contribution 
due to error 
in systems 
TC 
(Failure to shutdown) 
TW 
(Failure to remove 
shutdoim decay heat) 
>95% 
46% 
19% (causing 
shutdown 
demand, i.e., 
a reactor trip) 
41% (causing 
a shutdown 
demand 
16% (mis-
calibration 
of sensors, 
instrumenta­
tion) 
6% (valving 
errors from 
maintenance 
and non-
detection 
64% (failure to manually 
activate boron for reserve 
shutdown) 
52% (failure to actuate 
service water system and 
to restore malpositioned 
valve errors) 
PWR risk dominating 
accident sequence 
TMLB 
(Failure of shutdown 
heat removal for loss 
of AC power transient) 
89% 15% 40% (failure 45% (failure to transfer 
to reopen swing diesel if needed) 
manual valves 
after testing) 
V 
("uncontained" LOCA negligible 
with core-meltdown 
SgC 95% 100% (valve 
(s„au .OCA, core I::'::::"'"' 
meltdom after con- mlscallbratlons) 
talnment failure) 
^These accident sequences dominate BWR release categories, 1, 2, and 3, and also dominate 
probability of core meltdown accidents. 
^Some fraction of the transients initiated by loss of off-site power were human caused 
through switching/relaying errors, etc. This human fraction was not explicitly Isolated in 
WASH-1400 data, but further consideration indicates that the fraction is 1/5. 
^Swlng diesel arrangements now discouraged In licensing practices. 
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324 PC RB VM TB 
188 RB XX VM CR 
471 SA XX VM RM 
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311 SB XX VO XX 
401 SC XX VM XX 
95 SD XX VM XX 
247 SD XX VM XX 
225 SF XX VM 10 
490 SF XX VM PM 
22 WB XX VM PM 
Operate (OR) 214 CB 
274 CB 
297 CB 
413 CB 
474 CB 
232 CC 
287 CE 
316 CH 
357 CH 
194 EC 
150 EE 
410 EE 
483 EE 
372 HC 
142 CG XX VM DZ 
44 MA XX VM TC 
125 MB XX VM TX 
196 PC XX VO TA 
201 PC XX VR PM 
438 RC XX VX TB 
314 50 SE VM XX 
242 SF XX VM XX 
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System 
affected 
Component 
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Component 
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I.D. 
System 
involved 
System 
affected 
Component 
involved 
Component 
affected 
280 MC XX SM RM 
134 RB XX se CR 
100 SD XX VF VM 
429 SD XX se VO 
156 WA XX SX XX 
457 HC XX MN XX 
180 IE XX 00 XX 
Record (RC) 
Read (RD) 
Release (RL) 51 MA 
175 MA 
488 MB 
Remove from 272 lA HE ZZ VO 114 CB 
service (RS) 470 CF 
108 lA 
331 IB 
236 MC 
285 RB 
Report (RP) 221 BA XX RM XX 104 CH 
82 BB XX SM RM 
191 CO XX SP XX 
141 MB XX VR XX 
218 SF XX VX XX 
99 CG CB MN TX 
383 lA XX MT XX 
454 SA XX RC SU 
XX TX XX 4 MA XX TX XX 
XX TX XX 210 MA XX TX XX 
XX TX XX 368 MA XX TX XX 
384 MA )LX TX XX 
406 MA XX TX XX 
482 MA XX TX XX 
131 MB XX TX XX 
XX PM XX 
XX CB XX 
XX se XX 
lA BS XX 
XX RM XX 
XX CR XX 
CC TP PM 128 MA XX TX XX 
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I.D. 
System 
involved 
System 
affected 
Component 
involved 
Component 
affected 
I.D. 
System 
involved 
System 
affected 
Component 
involved 
Component 
affected 
I.D. 
System 
involved 
System 
affected 
Component 
involved 
Component 
affected 
Secure (SC) 
Start (ST) 
Tag (TG) 
Test (TS) 
237 CA CB PM XX 
220 HA EC PM BY 
476 MC XX PM XX 
159 SF XX VM XX 
349 SF XX CB VO 
158 CB XX 00 XX 
266 CD XX SP XX 
342 EA XX 00 XX 
32 EE XX DG XX 
33 EE XX DG XX 
345 EF XX DG XX 
199 T.A XX MN XX 
309 TA XX ID XX 
440 IB XX 10 XX 
267 ID XX MN XX 
268 ID XX MN XX 
452 IE XX 10 XX 
269 MA XX VO XX 
456 MB XX 00 XX 
464 MC XX RM XX 
473 MC XX RM XX 
414 MC XX RM XX 
152 RB XX CR XX 
31 RB XX ZZ XX 
271 RB XX CR XX 
283 RB XX CR XX 
445 RB XX CR XX 
445 RB XX CR XX 
447 RB XX CR XX 
448 RB XX CR XX 
487 CF XX PM XX 
74 CB CF PM VX 
385 MA XX PM TX 
M 
Table 7.7a. (Continued) 
Category 
Test (TS) 
Withdraw (WD) 
Verify (VF) 
449 RB XX CR XX 
465 SG XX 00 XX 
265 SF XX 00 XX 
186 SF XX 00 XX 
310 ZZ XX ZZ XX 
402 ZZ XX 00 XX 
205 RB XX CR XX 
223 RB XX CR XX 
408 ,CE XX , . RG TI 
336 CF XX VM PM 
319 CG CB VM PM 
70 CH XX VX PM 
90 CJ XX VO PM 
91 CJ XX VO PM 
75 ED CB BS PM 
173 ED XX CB XX 
137 EE XX DG XX 
308 EE XX DG XX 
115 IB XX 10 XX 
116 IB XX 10 XX 
146 IB XX MN XX 
208 MA XX VM TX 
2 3 
417 lA XX MN XX 
39 RB XX CR XX 
69 RB XX CR XX 
133 RB XX CR XX 
209 RB XX CR XX 
213 RB XX CR XX 
392 RB XX CR XX 
425 RB XX CR XX 
292 MA XX TX XX 
364 MA XX VM TX 
415 MC XX RM XX 
361 RB XX VX CD 
451 SA XX 00 XX 
80 SA XX VM XX 
37 SB XX CB PM 
42 SB XX CB VO 
328 SB XX PM XX 
6 SF XX VO AC 
25 SF XX VO XX 
40 SF XX CB VO 
41 SF XX CB VO 
57 SF XX VO XX 
362 SF XX SS XX 
435 SF XX PM XX 
48 SF XX VO PM 
Table 7.7b. Collated data for operator errors In the LERs (categories 4,5,6) 
System System Component Component 
Category I.D. involved affected Involved involved 
Communication (CM) 189 CE 
222 CE 
102 CF 
233 CF 
123 EA 
396 EB 
442 EE 
302 lA 
293 lA 
104 IB 
412 MA 
132 MA 
169 MC 
230 MC 
477 MC 
145 PC 
239 PD 
469 RC 
61 SF 
183 SF 
129 SF 
61 SF 
62 SH 
376 WG 
Misinterpretation 30 CJ 
(MT) 139 lA 
257 lA 
XX VM XX 
XX SF XX 
XX PM XX 
XX VM PM 
XX CB BS 
ED CB DG 
XX DG XX 
XX MN XX 
XX MN XX 
XX TT XX 
XX TX XX 
WC VM DZ 
XX 00 XX 
XX RM XX 
XX RM XX 
XX VM TG 
XX MN XX 
XX 00 XX 
XX CB VO 
XX AC XX 
XX VM PM 
XX CB VO 
XX CB PM 
XX VX TX 
XX 00 XX 
XX ZZ XX 
CC 00 XX 
377 ID 
64 RB 
394 ID 
96 RB 
166 RB 
353 RB 
Misunderstanding 350 EE 
(MD) 289 IA 
120 lA 
346 ID 
43 PC 
10 RB 
154 RB 
347 RB 
52 RC 
198 SA 
66 SB 
486 SB 
Misidentification 65 CB 
(MF) 68 CJ 
217 EC 
463 RB 
Misjudgment (MJ) 250 PC 
369 RB 
370 RB 
371 RB 
378 RB 
379 RB 
453 SC 
254 SD 
19 WD 
XX 10 XX 
XX 00 XX 
CA RC XX 
XX CR XX 
XX CR XX 
XX 00 XX 
XX DG XX 
XX SL TI 
XX 00 XX 
XX MN XX 
XX 00 XX 
XX 00 XX 
XX ZZ XX 
XX AC CR 
XX 00 XX 
XX 00 XX 
CB 00 XX 
XX TX XX 
XX AL TX 
XX AL TX 
XX AL CB 
XX CB XX 
XX TB XX 
XX ZZ XX 
XX ZZ XX 
XX ZZ XX 
XX ZZ XX 
XX ZZ XX 
XX 00 XX 
XX VX XX 
XX 00 XX 
Table 7.7b. (Continued) 
Category I.D. 
System 
Involved 
Inattention (TA) 468 CA 
312 CF 
472 MC 
374 WC 
No response (NR) 294 CF 
260 HC 
107 lA 
231 lA 
390 ID 
60 RB 
431 SE 
Slow response (SR) 288 CH 
252 BC 
Lack of experience 397 CE 
(LE) 427 SF 
366 SH 
306 ZZ 
307 ZZ 
Procedure unfamll- 360 PC 
larity (PU) 110 PC 
Unawareness (UW) 93 RB 
Procedure defi­ 251 CB 
ciency ( P D )  479 CI 
278 EË 
System 
affected 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
SA 
XX 
XX 
CC 
XX 
XX 
XX 
CC 
RC 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
RC 
XX 
XX 
Component 
Involved 
00 
ZZ 
RM 
MN 
RC 
AL 
AL 
AL 
AL 
AL 
AL 
se 
ZZ 
00 
VM 
ZZ 
ZZ 
ZZ 
PM 
00 
CD 
00 
00 
BS 
Component 
Involved 
XX 
XX 
XX 
TX 
XX 
' XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
CR 
XX 
LN 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
XX 
TI 
345 IA 
215 MA 
277 MA 
344 MB 
224 RB 
290 RB 
339 RB 
458 RB 
130 SF 
Procedure Inadequacy 103 CH 
(PI) 101 RB 
206 RB 
365 SH 
XX ZZ XX 
XX TX XX 
XX TS XX 
XX VM VO 
XX CR XX 
RC CR FE 
XX VM PM 
RC CR XX 
XX ZZ TX 
XX SX EG 
XX FU CR 
XX CR XX 
XX 10 SS 
ro 
Ni 
N3 
Table 7.8. Frequency count of events Involving mlsposltlonlng of valves In the Emergency Core 
Cooling System (ECCS) 
ECCS (SF) 
Failure mode 
Plant 
P 
type 
B 
Vendor 
B&W WH GE CE 
Remarks 
(ID//, plant code, type, vendor) 
Did not open/left closed 1 1 1 1 (225, VYl, B, GE); (490, RGl, P, WH) 
Improper opening 1 1 (84, SUl, P, WH) 
Inadvertent opening 2 1 2 1 (242, Zll, P, WH); (258, ZI2, P, 
WH); (428, DR2, B, GE) 
Did not close/left open 3 1 2 1 1 (35, MI2, P, CE); (124, 0E3, P, 
B&W); (352, ARl, P, B&W); (426, 
DR2, B, GE) 
Misalignment 2 2 (226, VYl, B, GE); (432, DR2, B, GE) 
Improper operation 1 1 (227, VYl, B, GE) 
Did not report 1 1 (218, QC2, B, GE) 
Did not tag 1 1 (159, PR2, P, WH) 
Did not verify 4 2 1 1 (6, IP2, P, WH); (25, MYl, P, CE) 
Communication 1 1 (129, PAI, P ,  CE) 
Lack of experience 1 1 (427, DR2, B, GE) 
13 8 4 6 8 3 
Total 21 21 
Table 7.9. Frequency counts of events involving mlsposltloning of valves in the Auxiliary Feed 
Water System (AFWS) 
Plant type Vendor Remarks 
Failure mode P B B&W WH GE CE (ID//, plant information) 
Misalignment 1 1 - - - (341, DPI, P, B&W) 
Wrong procedure 
followed 1 - 1 - - (243, ZIl, P, WH) 
Did not verify 1 - 1 - - (70, SAl, P, WH) 
3 1 2 - -
TOTAL 3 3 
Table 7.10. Valve population, demand data, and critical hours for ECCS and AFWS (CE plants, 
period from 1976 to 1978) (from reference 51) 
Demands on 
Critical hours ECCS valve AFWS valve ECCS, AFWS valve 
Plant 76 77 78 Remote actuated check remote actuated check 76 77 78 
CCI 8400 6468 5218 35 45 2 8 4 4 3 
CC2 595 5759 5799 35 45 2 8 1 4 3 
FCl 6228 7042 6432 37 45 6 4 4 4 3 
MI 2 7281 6066 460? 36 44 3 7 4 4 3 
MYl 8396 7331 6062 57 49 3 8 4 4 3 
PAl 5184 8128 3649 36 44 3 7 4 4 3 
SLl 1630 7636 5676 37 40 4 9 2 4 3 
226 
Table 7.11. Valve population, demand data, and critical 
hours for ECCS (GE plants, period from 1976 
to 1978) (from reference 51) 
Critical ECCS Demands on 
hours valves ECCS valves 
Remote 
Plant 76 77 78 Actuated Check 76 77 78 
BFl 2335 5885 6631 63 35 4 4 3 
BF2 2737 7314 4686 63 35 4 4 3 
BF3 2284 6696 5503 63 35 1 4 3 
BRI 738 4452 6447 74 38 1 4 3 
BR2 5259 5358 6047 74 38 4 4 3 
COl 6756 7676 6535 66 40 4 4 3 
DAI 7002 7045 3059 66 40 4 4 3 
DR2 6874 6435 6970 53 24 4 4 3 
DR3 7364 8344 5538 53 24 4 4 3 
ENl 7731 6316 5194 81 44 4 4 3 
EN2 — — — — 1448 81 44 - - 1 
FPl 6527 6213 5906 66 40 4 4 3 
Mil 6853 8125 6327 58 27 4 4 3 
MOl 8228 7092 6615 54 33 4 4 3 
NHl 7887 6343 6940 34 24 4 4 3 
OCl 7027 6236 6105 49 23 4 4 3 
PB2 6147 5056 6006 60 50 4 4 3 
PB3 7056 5693 6001 60 50 4 4 3 
PIl 5463 5850 5927 58 27 4 4 3 
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Table 7.11. (Continued) 
Critical 
hours ECCS 
valves 
Demands on 
ECCS valves 
Plant 76 77 78 
Remote 
Actuated Check 76 77 78 
QCl 5948 6984 6997 65 26 4 4 3 
QC2 7331 7844 5679 65 26 4 4 3 
VTl 6940 7581 5405 56 35 4 4 3 
228 
Table 7.12. Valve population, demand data, and critical hours 
for ECCS and AFWS (WH plants, period from 1976 to 
1978) (from reference 51) 
Demands on 
Critical ECCS AFWS ECCS, AFWS 
hours valves valves valves 
Remote Remote 
Plant 76 77 78 Actuated Check Actuated Check 76 77 78 
BVl 1974 4474 3431 52 36 10 18 2 2 3 
DCl 7384 6845 5289 78 44 15 12 4 4 3 
DC2 — — — — 4132 78 44 15 12 - - 2 
mi 7587 7637 7156 28 27 4 8 4 4 3 
IP2 3247 6716 4360 52 36 12 20 4 4 3 
IP3 2345 6637 5383 52 36 12 20 3 4 3 
JFl — — 545 6283 57 45 19 21 - 1 3 
KEl 7216 7113 6444 37 32 4 11 4 4 3 
NAl — — — — 3242 52 36 10 18 - - 2 
PRl 6949 7582 6692 51 27 6 10 4 4 3 
PR2 6840 7933 7158 51 27 6 10 4 4 3 
PTl 7444 7819 6538 46 27 6 11 4 4 3 
PT2 8065 7649 6667 46 27 7 11 4 4 3 
RGl 5301 7569 5721 44 21 10 12 4 4 3 
R02 7579 7586 5767 52 36 10 18 4 4 3 
SAl 302 2543 4180 81 45 16 13 1 4 3 
SOI 6253 5635 5742 23 18 - - 4 4 3 
SNl 6058 6762 5404 49 32 6 16 4 4 3 
SN2 4689 6094 5824 49 32 6 16 4 4 3 
TRl 3631 7104 1804 30 28 11 15 4 4 3 
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Table 7.12. (Continued) 
Demands on 
Critical ECCS AFWS ECCS, AFWS 
hours valves valves valves 
Remote Remote 
Plant 76 77 78 Actuated Check Actuated Check 76 77 78 
TU3 6760 7186 5893 52 36 10 18 4 4 3 
TU4 6076 5751 5618 52 36 10 18 4 
TRl 7998 6595 6871 20 17 8 4 4 3 
ZIl 5643 6688 5919 69 62 25 7 4 4 3 
ZI2 5559 6775 5701 69 62 25 7 4 4 3 
230 
Table 7.13. Valve population, demand data and critical hours 
for ECCS and AFWS (B & W plants, period from 
1976 to 1978) (from reference 51) 
Demands on 
Critical ECCS AFWS ECCS, AFWS 
hours valves valves valves 
Remote Remote 
Plant 76 77 78 Actuated Check Actuated Check 76 77 78 
ARl 5046 6801 5341 37 27 9 10 4 4 3 
CR3 — —  6056 2337 37 27 9 10 - 3 3 
DBl —  —  1792 3619 37 27 9 10 - 1 3 
OEl 5344 5623 5039 44 20 12 9 4 4 3 
0E2 5668 5460 5113 43 21 12 9 4 4 3 
0E3 6258 6762 6297 42 21 12 9 4 4 3 
RSI 2966 6909 6665 28 44 2 12 4 4 3 
Til 5839 7206 6082 27 27 7 11 4 4 3 
TI2 1087 37 27 9 10 2 
Table 7.14. Valve population, critical hours, and demand data for all plants (period from Jan. 1, 
1972 to Jan. 1, 1978) 
Population Population 
of ECCS of ATOS 
valves Total valves Total 
(check and demands (check and demands 
Critical remote on ECCS remote on AFWS 
hours actuated) ,valves actuated) valves 
Plant T 
^1 
T X 
^2 
X 
"l 
T  x N ^  
°2 Ng X 1 
IPl 40,000 40 1,600,000 24 960 32 1,280,000 18 576 
IP2 22,010 88 1,936,880 18 1,584 32 704,320 18 576 
PI3 8,982 88 790,416 ? 616 32 287,424 7 224 
REl 27,368 69 1,888,392 15 1,035 15 410,520 15 225 
MYl 37,695 104 3,920,280 21 2,184 11 414,645 21 231 
M 14,748 80 1,179,840 9 720 10 147,480 9 90 
OCl 25,023 64 1,601,472 19 1,216 21 525,483 19 399 
0C2 22,413 64 1,434,432 17 1,088 21 470,673 17 357 
SAl 2,845 106 301,570 4 424 29 82,505 4 116 
SLl 9,266 77 713,482 7 539 13 120,458 7 91 
SUl 33,411 81 2,706,291 22 1,782 22 735,042 22 484 
SU2 26,682 81 2,161,242 19 1,539 22 587,004 19 418 
23,909 54 1,291,086 14 756 18 430,362 14 252 
TRl 10,950 58 635,100 8 464 26 284,700 8 208 
IN3 34,388 88 3,026,144 21 1,848 28 962,864 21 588 
0C3 21,377 63 1,346,751 13 819 21 448,917 13 273 
PAl 33,922 80 2,713,760 24 1,920 10 339,220 24 240 
PTl 43,604 73 3,183,092 24 1,752 17 741,268 24 408 
PT2 41,703 73 3,044,319 22 1,606 17 708,951 22 374 
PRl 28,795 78 2,246,010 16 1,248 16 460,720 16 256 
PR2 29,534 78 2,303,652 16 1,248 16 472,544 16 256 
RSI 18,138 72 1,305,936 13 936 14 253,932 13 364 
R02 41,864 88 3,684 032 24 
PO 3 24,609 110 2,706 990 14 
Pli 31,837 85 2,706 145 22 
QCl 39,858 91 3,627 078 24 
QC2 39,484 91 3,593 044 23 
VTl 35,535 91 3,233 685 21 
TU4 26,516 88 2,333 408 18 
Zll 27,557 131 3,609 967 18 
ZI2 24,167 131 3,165 877 16 
EMl 23,037 125 2,879 625 13 
HGl 40,000 40 1,600 000 24 
LCl 40,000 40 1,600 000 24 
Mil 42,610 85 3,621 850 24 
MCI 43,870 87 3,816 690 24 
NMl 40,340 59 2,380 060 24 
OCl 38,736 72 2,788 992 24 
PB2 21,318 110 2,344 980 17 
CC2 6,353 80 508 240 4 
DCl 20,988 122 2,560 536 12 
CR3 6,065 59 357 835 4 
DBl 1,729 59 102 011 1 
BPl 40,000 40 1,600 000 24 
ARl 19,473 59 1,148 907 14 
BVl 6,448 88 567 424 7 
YRl 42,928 37 1,588 336 24 
BF2 16,947 98 1,660 806 14 
CCI 24,012 80 1,920 960 13 
DRl 40,000 40 1,600 000 24 
BFl 21,633 98 2,120 034 17 
BF3 8,980 98 880 040 6 
BR2 14,758 112 1,652 896 11 
col 26,978 106 2,859 668 15 
DR2 40,558 77 3,122 966 24 
DR3 42,492 77 3,271 884 24 
DAl 26,479 106 2,806 774 15 
2,122 28 1,172,192 24 672 
1,540 
1,870 
2,184 
2,093 
1,911 
1,584 28 742,448 18 504 
2,358 32 881,824 18 576 
2,096 32 773,344 16 512 
1,625 
960 
960 
2,040 
2,088 
1,416 
1,728 
1,870 
320 10 63,530 4 40 
1,464 27 566,676 12 324 
236 19 115,235 4 76 
59 19 32,851 1 19 
960 
826 19 369,987 14 266 
616 28 180,544 7 196 
888 12 515,136 24 288 
1,372 
1,040 24 576,288 13 130 
960 
1,666 
588 
1,232 
1,590 
1,848 
1,848 
1,590 
Table 7.14. (Continued) 
Population Population 
of ECCS of AFWS 
valves Total valves Total 
(check and demands (check and demands 
Critical remote on ECCS remote on AFWS 
hours actuated) valves actuated) valves 
Plant T 
^1 
T  x N ^  
'^ l Ni y ^2 T X Ng ^2 Ng X : 
FPl 19,874 106 2,106,644 12 1,272 
JFl 545 102 55,590 2 204 40 21,800 2 80 
FCl 28,896 82 2,369,472 18 1,476 10 288,960 18 180 
RGl 37,182 65 2,416,830 24 1,560 22 818,004 24 528 
HNl 44,756 55 2,461,580 24 1,320 12 537,072 24 288 
ET X = 
1.31 X 10® 
X 
= 81,654 
ET X Ng = 
1.85 X 10^ 
ENg X Dg 
= 11,685 
Table 7.15. Human error probability estimates from NUREG/CR 1278^^^ 
Lower Upper 
Failure mode HEP bound bound 
Category 1 ommisslon 
Did not open (left closed) 
Did not close (left open) 
-Oral Instructions 
Failure to carry out a specific oral instruction to change 
valve(s) 
-ltem(s) not written down by recipient 
-One valve IxlO"^ 5x10 ^  5x10"^ 
-Two valves 3x10*3 1.5x10"^ 1.5x10"^ 
-Three valves 1x10"^ 5xlO"4 5x10"^ 
-Four valves 3xlO~^ 1.5x10"^ 1.5x10"^ 
-Five valves IxlO"! 5x10"^ 5x10"^ 
Item(s) written down be recipient failure to recall each item Ixl0~3 5xlO"4 5x10"^ 
-Written procedures 
-Omitting particular valve In sequence in; 
-Short list (< 10 items) + check off 1x10 ^  1x10 ^  5x10 ^ 
-Short list 
-Long list 
-Long list 
+ no check off 
+ check off 
+ no check off 
-Misuse of the check off provisions 
-Plant procedures not followed, short cuts or personnel 
preferences followed instead 
-Omission of one item from a list of valves or set of tags 
when written procedures are prepared 
Category 2 Incorrect commission 
Improper open/close 
-Reversal errors 
The operator changes a valve that had already been changed and 
-tagged 
-not tagged 
"Erroneous conclusion of valve status 
-Rising-stem valve, the valve sticks at >,3/4 its full stroke 
and there are 
-local position indicator 
-no position Indicator 
3x10 
-3 
3x10 
1x10 
5x10 
1x10 
-4 
5x10 -3 
1x10 
-3 
8x10 -4 1x10 
-2 
-3 
8x10 -4 1x10 
-2 
-2 
1x10 
-3 
5x10 
- 2  
-1 
1x10 
-1 9x10 
-1 
-2 -3 
1x10 5x10 ^ 5x10 
- 2  
3x10"^ 1.5x10"^ 1.5x10"^ 
5x10 
-5 
1x10 
-3 
1x10"^ lxlO'2 5x10 
-1 
2x10 -3 2x10 
- 2  
5x10 -4 1x10 
- 2  
to 
Co in 
Table 7.15. (Continued) 
Failure mode HEP 
Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
-All other valves, if there are 
-Local position indicator 
-No position Indicator 
-Position indicator elsewhere 
-Improper operation 
Failure to complete change of state of MOV (holding time to 
switch is not adequate) 
Category 3 inadvertence 
Inadvertent open/closure 
-Manipulation of wrong valve (manual or remote actuated) where 
the intended valve is among similar appearing valves 
-Manipulation of wrong MOV switch or circuit breaker where 
the intended item is among similar appearing ones 
-Listing error of valves or set of tags when written procedure 
is prepared 
-Tagging wrong MOV where the intended one is among similar ones 
-3 -4 -2 
1x10 5x10 1x10 
IxlO"^ 3x10"^ 1x10"^ 
2xl0~^ IxlO"^ IxlO"^ 
3x10"^ 1x10"^ 1x10"^ 
5x10"^ 2x10"^ 2x10"^ 
3x10"^ 1x10"^ 1x10"^ 
,-3 -3 
3x10 1.5x10 1.5x10 
5x10 ^ 2x10"3 
.-2 
2x10 
- 2  
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Table 7.16. Relevant îïUREG/CR 1278^ ^^  estimates 
Failure mode 
# of HEP from 
Events Table 7.15 Remarks 
Did not open/close 
Did not tag/report 
1 X 10 -3 
3 X 10 -3 
Did not verify 4 1 X 10-3 
Improper 
_3 
op ening/op eration 2 5 X 10 
Inadvertent opening 3 5 X 10-3 
Misalignment 2 5 X 10-3 
Lack of experience 1 5 X 10-3 
Communication 1 1 X 10-3 
Assuming there is 
short list with 
check off (very 
conservative) 
Assuming there are 
local position 
indicators 
238 
Table 7.17. Gross operator error rate based on reported LERs 
CLASSIFICATION ACCORDING TO REACTOR TYPE 
Reactor 
type 
No. of 
plants 
Total 
critical 
hours 
No. of operator 
related events 
(reported LERs) 
Gross operator 
"failure" rate (based 
on reported LERs) 
(hr-1)* 
P 38 916,242 300 3.274 X 10"^ 
B 24 759,933 195 2.566 X 10"4 
TOTAL 62 1,656,175 495 2.953 X 10"^ 
CLASSIFICATION ACCORDING TO VENDOR 
Reactor 
type 
No. of 
plants 
Total 
critical 
hours 
No. of operator 
related events 
(reported LERs) 
Gross operator 
"failure" rate (based 
on reported LERs) 
(hr'l) 
B & W 9 178,127 95 5.333 X 10"^ 
CE 7 154,892 55 3.550 X 10"^ 
GE 23 719,933 191 2.653 X 10"^ 
WH 22 583,223 150 2.571 X 10"^ 
AC 1 30,000 4 1 X 10"^ 
TOTAL 62 1,676,175 495 2.953 X ICT* 
^It should be noted that the most important aspect of these failure 
rates is their order of magnitude. Although the number of significant 
digits is given as four in all cases, two significant digits would suffice 
for practical usage. 
Table 7.18. Summary of identified reported events involving inadvertent actuation of controls 
due to similarity or proximity of labels i 
Action 
Event Gate- Corapo-
ID gory nent Event Consequences Remarks 
11 3AC BI After noticing malfunc­
tion of level instrument 
447-C associated with 
//24 SG, bistables asso­
ciated with 447-B rather 
than 447-G had been 
tvipped. 
99 3RD MN Operator confused the 
level indications of "B" 
Bleed Tank (BT-B) which 
was full, and BT-C, 
which was empty. He 
chose BT-B to let down 
primary system. 
136 3AC PB Operator Chlorinated the 
Service Water System (SWS) 
instead of the "B" cooling 
towers. 
196 30P VX While attempting to lower 
level in ACC-2C, Operator 
opened wrong ACC drain 
valve that lowered the 
ACC-2D level. 
800 gallons of RC from 
BT-B overflowed into the 
Auxiliary Building Sump. 
Similarity of labels or 
proximity may be the 
cause. 
Proximity of displays. 
Discharge of chlorine to 
the lake of .5 mg/1 for 
15 mln. (T.S. violation). 
ACC-2D level was lowered 
27.6 cubic feet below 
T.S. limits 
Controls of chlorina-
tion for both cooling 
towers and SWS are 
located in close 
proximity. 
Similarity of label 
and/or close proximity 
may be contributing 
factors. 
340 3CL VM Operator shut instrument 
air valve [A601 instead 
of SA601, which supplies 
the pneumatic operator of 
normal makeup of low 
control valve MV32. 
443 3AC SP Operators foot hit a 
temporary switch that was 
lying on the floor. The 
switch simulated HI dry 
well pressure. 
49 30P VO During replacement of 
unlt-2 purification 
demineralizer (PD) resin, 
drain valve of unit-1 PD 
was opened Instead of the 
one for unit 2. 
44 30P VM Preparations were made 
to release from "A" Con­
densate Test Tank (CTT), 
CTT-B was released 
instead. 
MV32 failed to open, Similarity of labels. 
RCP-1-2-1 tripped. 
Both CSS and standby 
DCs were Initiated. 
Reactor pressure ex­
ceeded limits of 250psig 
for less than one minute 
with vessel at 155°F. 
Mechanical damage oc­
curred to one anchor 
of one seismic 
restraint. 
Unit-1 letdown storage 
tank level decreased. 
Unit 1 spent resin 
storage tank level 
increased. 
Suitable space for 
temporary test 
switchers and other 
devices must be 
provided. 
Wet label made it 
difficult to dis­
tinguish whether 
the valves are for 
unit 1 or 2. 
N3 
o 
CCT-B was released with­
out sampling. Release 
was within limits. 
IVs for CCT-A,B 
were in close proximity 
and identified by valve 
numbers. 
Table 7.18. (Continued) 
Action 
Event Gate- Compo-
ID gory nent Event 
128 3RP TX RMC technician wrote down 
wrong tank identification 
on the batch card. North 
filtered waste tank, 
T-63A, was released 
Instead of south FWT-
T-36B. 
131 3RP TX The operator was given a 
batch card to release 
Waste Decay Tank T-IOIB. 
He lined up and released 
T-IOIA. 
196 SOP VM Operator assigned to 
agitate the SLCS-sodium 
Pentaborate Storage Tank 
with air in preparation 
for sampling the tank, 
Inadvertently opened the 
water addition valve 
Instead of air sparging 
valve. 
210 3RL TX Operator discharged "B" 
Waste Sample Tank (WST) 
Instead of "A" WST. 
Consequences Remarks 
T-36A was released with­
out sampling. Sampling 
showed no significant 
differences. 
Reporting error. 
Similarity of tank 
identification is 
contributing factor. 
T-IOIA was released with- Similarity of tank 
out permit. Total ac- Identification is 
tlvlty released was contributing factor, 
below limits. 
SLCS-storage tank 
high level. 
Close proximity of 
valves - no caution 
tags used. 
Discharge was 1.45 
times T.S. limits. 
Similarity of tank 
identification is 
contributing factor. 
#11 Reactor Cooling Waste 
Monitoring Tank (RCWMT) 
was aligned for release 
Instead of jfl2 RCWMT. 
The Operator was directed 
to shut the orifice bypass 
valve of = 1256 but shut 
the orifice IV instead. 
"B" Laundry Holdup Tank 
was discharged instead of 
"B" Waste Holding Tank 
("BWMT)("B"LHT). 
Radwaste operator was 
waiting approvals 76-671, 
76-672 to discharge "A" 
Detergent/Tank (DDT) and 
"A" Waste Sample Tank 
(WST). 76-671 was 
received first but "A" 
WST was discharged. 
Waste Monitor Tank-1 
(WMT-1) was released 
Instead of WMT-2. 
Total of 12.2 mci was Mix up in reading valve 
released. The release numbers. 
was well below T.S. 
limits. 
Close proximity may be 
contributing factor. 
-4 
1.2 X 10 uci/ml was 
released in the dis­
charge canal (Below T.S. 
limits). 
Similarity of tank 
identification and 
similarity of valve 
labels for the two 
tanks are contributing 
factors (Color-coded 
identification tags 
were suggested). 
No release limits were 
exceeded. 
Bad designation of 
tanks to be released 
in the forms. 
No release limits were 
exceeded. 
Similarity of tank 
identification may be 
a contributing factor. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the investigations carried out in this 
thesis, the following conclusions can be drawn, 
1. Technique for Human Error Predictions, THERP, was 
demonstrated exploring its capability in quantifying 
the human performance of tasks involving operation, 
maintenance, and testing in nuclear power plants. 
Through the demonstration, the role of the performance 
shaping factors (PSFs) in the assessment of the human 
reliability was stressed and a list of PSFs is developed 
for use with the THERP methodology. Such PSFs are limited 
to those pertaining to nuclear operation tasks. Examples 
of relevant PSFs are: labels of valves, communication, 
procedures, and stresses. By identification of specific 
relevant PSFs, it becomes possible to assign values to 
each PSF using data extracted from LERs. Examination of 
input data sources showed that use of data extracted from 
operation experience is most adequate for THERP input data 
compared to other sources such as AIR DATA STORE. 
2, Considering the System Analysis of Integrated 
Network of Tasks, SAINT, as a tool to model and analyze 
human tasks in nuclear power plants, a comparison was 
made between "THERP" and "SAINT" techniques relative to 
some items that declare their capabilities. The comparison 
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revealed that "SAINT" is more flexible, has a dynamic 
nature that fits the analysis of complex man-machine 
systems, and is more relevant to nuclear systems than the 
static technique "THERP" currently used in nuclear safety 
analysis. 
3. Present available human factors data sources 
were evaluated and newly reliability oriented description 
formats were developed. A supplementary data sheet to the 
Licensee Event Report is suggested to be used to describe 
human related events. 
4. Using available nuclear operation data and the 
developed description formats, an operation data bank was 
constructed. The data bank facilitates the conductance 
of some data analy-;xs with qualitative and quantitative 
evaluations. Results obtained are very useful and 
represent an adequate data source to be used in different 
human reliability models. 
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9. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
The work done on this thesis is only a step that 
needed to be integrated with other research to constitute 
a progress in the area of the human realiability analysis. 
The following are some ideas for future work. 
1. Study of the suggestions addressed in this work and 
further suggestions to provide the human reliability 
orientation when reporting the human related events 
in nuclear power plants. 
2. Construction of a general data bank for all human 
related events in nuclear power plants including 
all information matrices required for human reliability 
analysis. 
3. Quantification of the performance shaping factors 
and their use as determinants to the human error 
probability. (Mathematical causal models and 
computer programs are needed to investigate 
the effects of each factor, the interaction 
of different factors, and the effect of set 
of factors on human performance.) 
4. Study of extending the capabilities of the mathematical 
tools for human reliability analysis, such as fault 
trees and probability (event) trees to describe 
different levels of system successes (degradation) 
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rather than the failure-succèss concept currently 
used by these tools. 
5. Sensitivity analysis to examine the effect of the 
human performance and the relevant performance 
shaping factors on the overall nuclear systems 
reliability. 
Availability of the data bank stated in item 2 and 
progress achieved in items 3 and 4 will help in doing more 
research in the following. 
6. Study of human factors to improve the human performance 
in carrying out operation-maintenance-testing (0-M-T) 
tasks. 
7. Development of a continuous monitoring layout of 
reactor safety system to minimize human errors in 
0-M-T tasks. 
8. Manpower availability and training for 0-M-T 
personnel. 
9. Quality assurance program for 0-M-T tasks. 
10. Assessment of the role of organization and 
administration in 0-M-T tasks. 
11. Evaluation and optimization of maintenance, testing, 
inspection, and repair schedules in nuclear power 
plants. 
12. Minimi z at ion of radiation exposure hazards during 
M-T tasks. 
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Table A.l. Success probabilities for human manipulation of some controls 
and displays (extracted from reference 1) 
Component Parameter Dimension Reliability 
DISPLAYS 
Counters Size (length), in. 1 .9990 
1-2 .9998 
>3 .9995 
Number of drums or 1-3 .9997 
digits 
4-5 .9993 
>7 .9985 
1.3 Labeling Digit span 2 .9998 
3 .9994 
4 or 5 .9992 
6 or 7 .9991 
Words 1 or 2 .9999 
3-5 .9995 
6-11 .9985 
Size of printed >1/5 .9997 
(height), in. 
1/8 .9994 
1.4 Lights Diameter, in. <1/4 .9995 
1/4 - 1/2 .9997 
1/2 - 1 .9999 
Number of lights on 1 or 2 .9998 
3 or 4 .9975 
5-7 .9952 
8-10 .9946 
Presentation Blinking .9998 
Continuous .9996 
1.5 Scales, Linear Size (length), in. 3 .9997 
6 .9998 
9 .9996 
Scale style Moving pointer .9977 
Moving scale .9970 
Color coded .9999 
Scale direction Horizontal .9998 
Vertical .9995 
Distance between 
scale marks, in, ^1/10 .9975 
1/10 - 1/4 .9992 
>1/4 .9998 
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Table A.l. (Continued) 
Component Parameter Dimension Reliability 
Number of units 50-100 .9998 
shown 
200 .9998 
400 .9968 
Scale increase L to R or B to T .9998 
R to L or T to B .9992 
Proportion of scale 1:1 or 1:2 .9999 
marks numbered 
1:5 .9995 
1:10 .9985 
Scales, circular Scale diameter, in. 1 .9996 
1.6-1.75 .9997 
2.75 .9993 
Scale style Moving scale .9966 
Moving pointer .9970 
Color-coded .9999 
Pointer style Horizontal bar, 0 at .9990 
base 
Triangle or vertical .9987 
bar at base 
Distance between ^1/20 - .9975 
marks, in. 
• 1/20-1/4 .9986 
1/4-2 .9996 
Proportion of scale 1:1 .9999 
makrs numbered 
1:5 .9991 
1:10 .9980 
Number of units 50-100 .9996 
Shown on scale 200 .9984 
400 .9962 
600 .9952 
Number of scales 1 or 2 by 1 .9999 
and arrangement 
2 by 2, 2 by 4, 4 by 4, .9997 
4 by 10, 6 by 4, .9990 
8 by 4, 9 by 5 .9975 
Scale increase Right to left .9996 
Left to Right .9999 
Table A.l. (Continued) 
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Component Parameter Dimension Reliability 
Scales, semi- Radius, in. 1/2-3/4 .9996 
circular 3/4-1 .9997 
1-2 .9993 
Scale style Moving pointer .9981 
Moving scale .9978 
Color or zone coded .9999 
Scale arc length, 25 .9937 
deg. 
50-100 .9950 
200 .9964 
Distance between <1/20 .9965 
scale marks, in. 
1/20-1/10 .9933 
1/10-1/2 .9955 
1/2-1 .9969 
1-2 .9962 
Proportion of scale 1:1 or 1:2 .9999 
marks numbered 
1:5 .9995 
1:10 .9985 
Scale increase L to R .9999 
R to L .9996 
Scopes Number of range 1 or 2 .9980 
marks 
3-5 .9997 
6-10 .9999 
10-20 .9990 
>20 .9983 
Bearing-estimation Estimate (no aid) .9975 
method 
Use overlay .9990 
Use cursor .9995 
Scope size, in. 3 .9990 
^4 .9999 
Visual angle, deg. 0-45 .9999 
45-80 .9995 
Target exposure 3 .9990 
time, sec. 
5 .9995 
75 .9999 
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Table A.l. (Continued) 
Component Parameter Dimension Reliability 
CONTROLS 
Cranks 
Joy stick 
Diameter, in. 
C force, lb. 
C/D^ 
Movement direction 
Time lag between 
C turn and 
D movement, sec. 
C/D 
Movement ratio. 
Rev. per in. of 
cursor movement 
Length, in. 
Extent of movement, 
deg. 
C resistance, lb. 
Stick support 
Time lag between 
C movement and 
D movement, sec. 
C/D movement ratio 
C/D movement 
relationship 
3 
4 
8 
12 
<5 
5-10 
Direct 
Reverse 
<1.5 
>2 
1:1 
2:1 
3:1 
6-9 
12-18 
21-27 
5-20 
30-40 
40—60 
5-10 
10-30 
Present 
Absent 
.3 
.ô-l.b 
3 
1:1 or 1:3 
1:4 or 1:6 
1:15 
1:30 
Direct or positive 
Reversed 
.9970 
.9990 
.9975 
.9985 
.9985 
.9972 
.9992 
.9975 
.9980 
.9965 
.9975 
.9990 
.9992 
.9963 
.9967 
.9963 
.9981 
.9975 
.9960 
.9999 
.9992 
.9990 
.9950 
.9967 
.9963 
.9957 
.9936 
.9967 
.9950 
.9967 
.9998 
.9970 
^C = Display, D = Display. 
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Table A.l. (Continued) 
Component Parameter Dimension Reliability 
Knobs Diameter, in. <1/2 .9995 
1/2-3 .9997 
>3 .9994 
Resistance, oz. <4 .9995 
6-16 (heavy) .9998 
C/D movement CW for increase .9999 
relationship 
CCW for increase .9995 
C/D distance ratio, <1 .9999 
in. of indicator 
2-6 .9997 
Movement per 
rotation ^6 .9996 
C/D distance ratio <1/4 .9999 
(meters), propor­
tion of scale 
traversed per 
knob rotation 
1/4-1/2 .9997 
>1/2 .9996 
Knob grip Knurled .9999 
Smooth .9997 
Lock mechanism Present .9999 
Absent ,9996 
Lever (including Length Long .9990 
wrench or pliers) Short .9920 
Plane of movement Vertical .9992 
Horizontal .9999 
Movement amplitude, 5-10 .9964 
deg. 
10-20 .9970 
30-40 .9975 
40-60 .9985 
Resistance, hand 2-5 .9999 
operation, lb. 
10-20 .9992 
Control resistance, 2-5 .9990 
arm operation, lb. 
10-20 .9999 
20-30 .9995 
Table A.l. (Continued) 
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Component Parameter Dimension Reliability 
Direction of Direct .9999 
movement 
Reverse .9985 
C/D movement 1:1 .9957 
ratio (distance) 
1:3 .9976 
1:6 .9983 
1:15 .9975 
1:30 .9985 
Push Buttons Size Miniature .9995 
>1/2 in .9999 
Number of push 
buttons in a 
group 
A. Single column or 1-5 .9997 
row 
6-10 .9995 
11-25 .9990 
B. Double column 1-5 .9997 
or row or rows 
and columns 
6-10 .9995 
11-25 .9990 
C. Matrix 6-10 -9995 
11-25 • .9995 
>25 .9985 
Number of push- 2 .9995 
buttons pushed 
within group 
4 .9991 
8 .9965 
Distance between 1/8-1/4 .9985 
edges, i-n. 
3/8-1/2 .9993 
>1/2 .9998 
Detent Present .9998 
Absent .9993 
Rotary selectors Diameter, in. 1-3 .9997 
>3 .9995 
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Table A.l. (Continued) 
Component Parameter Dimension Reliability 
Number of positions 3-6 .9997 
6-12 .9992 
>12 .9975 
Distance between <15 .9975 
positions, deg. 
15-30 .9998 
>30 .9996 
Indicator style Dot .9995 
Line .9996 
Pointer .9999 
Distance between 1/2 .9988 
edges of adjacent 
switches, in. 
3/4-1 .9995 
>1 .9997 
Toggle switch Size 
Number of positions 
Direction of throw 
Angle of throw, deg. 
Number of switches 
in group 
A. Single column 
or row 
B. Double column, 
double row 
C. Matrix 
Distance between 
switch centers, 
in. 
Miniature, 
Regular and large 
2 
3 
Vertical 
Horizontal 
20 
40 
.90 
I-5 
6-10 
II-25 
I-5 
6-10 
II-25 
6-25 
>25 
<1/2 
3/4 
>1 
.9997 
.9999 
.9999 
.9991 
.9999 
.9996 
.9997 
.9998 
.9999 
.9998 
.9996 
.9990 
.9998 
.9996 
.9990 
.9996 
.9988 
.9993 
.9998 
.9999 
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13. APPENDIX B 
Detailed listing of categorized operator errors 
extracted from Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and letters 
from the licensees to the NRC (Available from the Nuclear 
Engineering Department, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa) 
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14. APPENDIX C 
Analyzed information matrix for characterizing 
operator errors reported in the LERs (Available from the 
Nuclear Engineering Department, Iowa State University, 
Ames, Iowa) 
